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Abstract 
In this thesis, we investigate the impact of firms’ financial conditions on three key corporate 
activities: fixed capital investment, cash holdings, and acquisition behavior. Our study 
provides an important extension to the related literature in the Chinese context by employing 
a 14-year panel of Chinese listed firms during the period 1998-2011.   
In chapter 2, we investigate the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash flow. First, we 
find that firms with free cash flow below (above) their optimal level tend to under- (over-) 
invest, which can be attributed to financial constraints (agency costs). We also find that 
significant heterogeneity in the sensitivities appear among firms with different financial 
conditions, ownership structure. Whether or not firms engage in exporting or Mergers & 
Acquisitions also affects the sensitivities. Additional analyses show that the 2005 exogenous 
split share reform reduced the agency problems faced by state controlled firms, particularly 
those controlled by local governments. 
In chapter 3, we focus the behavior of corporate cash holdings. We find evidence supportive 
of a cost-benefit trade-off model of cash holdings, suggesting that Chinese firms tend to 
actively manage their cash balances towards a target level. Reported evidence also shows that 
consistent with the presence of adjustment costs, there exists considerable heterogeneity in 
adjustment speeds of cash holdings across firms. Furthermore, we show that cash-rich, 
acquiring, and state-owned firms are characterized by a lower value of additional cash. At the 
same time, financially constrained firms have a higher marginal value of cash, suggesting that 
more difficulties in accessing capital markets encourages firms to make better use of 
additional cash. 
In chapter 4, we investigate the extent to which corporate liquidity affects Chinese listed 
firms’ acquisition decisions, method of payment choices, and consequent performance 
following mergers. In line with the free-cash-flow motive of acquisitions, we find that cash-
rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions. Furthermore, the agency costs effect of 
acquisitions is greater for firms who are subject to tunneling. Finally, we provide empirical 
evidence to support the fact that financially constrained firms with higher growth prospects 
tend not to use cash payments in acquisitions. We attribute this finding to the higher 
opportunity cost of cash faced by firms who face more difficulties in accessing capital 
markets. This finding is consistent with the under-performance of cash acquisitions in both 
the short and long-term. 
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1.1. Backgrounds and related literature  
1.1.1. China’s economy  
As the world’s second-largest economy in terms of nominal GDP since 2010, China has 
undergone a remarkable economic transformation from a centrally planned to a market-based 
economy. Over the last 30 years, China experienced a rapid economic and social 
development, suggested by a rapid GDP growth rate (about 10 percent a year on average), 
accelerated capital accumulation (22.5% average annual growth rate in total fixed 
investment)
1,2
, a rapid growth of the urban scale (the urban share of the total population rose 
from 18% in 1978 to 50% in 2010), and a decline in the poverty rate (more than 500 million 
people out of poverty during this period)
 
(Zhang 2007; The World Bank 2014, March 1). 
China’s rise is one of the most successful stories over the last three decades. 
 
1.1.2. China’s financial system  
A large number of researchers find that financial development is positively related to 
economic growth (Demirgüç‐Kunt & Maksimovic 1998; Levine 2005). However, China is 
considered a counterexample to this finding since it has achieved a rapid growth rate despite 
a malfunctioning financial system (Allen et al. 2005; Guariglia et al. 2011). Yet, China’s 
underdeveloped and inefficient financial system hinders to some extent the fast progress of 
                                                          
    
1
 Data source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues, Beijing, 
China Statistical Press. 
    
2
 China has become the world’s largest investor since 2010. The $4.4 trillion of total fixed-asset investment in 
China in 2013 was worth more than the sum of the corresponding figures in the US ($3.1 trillion) and Japan 
($1.2 trillion) (Carpenter et al. 2014). 
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economic growth. We will next briefly describe the characteristics of China’s financial 
system. 
 
1.1.2.1. The formal financial system  
The formal financial sector in China primarily consists of banks, financial intermediaries, and 
financial markets. 
 
1.1.2.1.1. China’s banking sector 
The financial system in China remains mainly bank-based. According to Elliott & Yan 
(2013), the ratio of total bank credit to GDP reached 128% in 2012, which was much larger 
than the corresponding ratio in the US in the same year (48%). However, the large banking 
system, which is characterized by a large amount of NPLs (non-performing loans) and an 
outstanding government debt, dwarfs all other forms of finance and prevails in the current 
financial system of China (Aziz & Duenwald 2002). Based on  research by Boyreau-Debray 
(2003), the insignificant sensitivity of GDP growth to total deposits of the banking system 
indicates that formal finance thorough the banking sector does not contribute to  economic 
growth in China.  
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The majority of Chinese banks, including the “Big Four”3 , are controlled by the 
government. The banks’ ownership structure is crucial since China used to rely on a central 
planning system. There is a significant government stake in many Chinese banks.  
Furthermore, the influence and intervention of the government play a significantly role in 
banks’ decisions. For instance, the central bank explicitly sets primary deposit and lending 
interest rates and target levels for loan volumes. Furthermore, due to political reasons, in 
many circumstances, the government controls lending by pushing a large amount of loans to 
particular firms, sectors, and regions (Elliott & Yan 2013). According to La Porta et al. 
(2002), government ownership of banks is negatively associated with countries’ financial and 
economic development. In China, 99.45% of the assets of the 10 biggest commercial banks 
were owned by the government in 1995, which is much higher than the average of 41.74% 
observed in 91 other countries around the world, including developed or developing countries 
with different origins of the commercial law (common law, French civil law, German civil 
law, Scandinavian law, and socialist law). Guariglia & Poncet (2008) note that measures used 
traditionally for financial development and China-specific indicators for the level of state 
intervention in finance all have a negative impact on economic growth and its sources. 
Therefore, the high government ownership of banks in China may have slowed down 
economic growth. 
The dominance of state-owned banks also causes a massive misallocation of financial 
resources in China, as these banks have a preferential policy of lending to stated-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), which crowds out the access to credit for SMEs (small- and medium-
sized enterprises) and the private sector.  There is evidence that although the ratio of total 
                                                          
    
3
 China’s banking sector is dominated by the “Big Four” stated-owned commercial banks, which are the Bank 
of China (BOC), the People’s Construction Bank of China (PCBC), the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC), and 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). 
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bank credit to GDP (111%) in China was much higher than those of other developed 
countries over the period 2000-2002 (Allen et al. 2007),  if we focus on the bank credit 
directed to the hybrid sector (which includes non-state, non-listed firms with different types 
of ownership structures), the ratio plunges to 24%. This suggests that most of the bank credit 
is offered to the state-owned, public and large firms. Yet, non-state SMEs contribute to most 
of China’s prominent growth and actually require more capital to grow (Aziz & Duenwald 
2002).
4
 
 
1.1.2.1.2. China’s stock markets 
In order to introduce modern corporate governance practices and to revitalize its ailing state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), China established two main stock exchanges in the early 1990s: 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Most listed 
firms are carve-outs or spin-offs from former large stated-owned enterprises. To prevent the 
state from losing the control and influence on these firms, a split share structure was 
introduced. The government itself or government entities typically held two-thirds of the 
listed shares, which were not publicly tradable. Domestic individuals and institutional 
investors held the remaining tradable shares (Allen et al. 2007).
5
  Given the same voting and 
                                                          
    
4
 There is also evidence from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) that between 1999 and 2000, 
80% of private firms considered financing constraints to be a main barrier to grow (Claessens & Tzioumis 2006). 
Consequently, non-state enterprises have to rely more on self-financing and informal credit markets, due to the 
inefficient capital allocation intermediated by China’s banking sector (Allen et al. 2005). 
    
5
 A-shares trade alongside B-shares, which were issued by Chinese listed firms, on either the SHSE or SZSE. 
The key distinction of two types of shares is that A-shares, which were generally only available to domestic 
citizens, are traded in RMB, while B-shares, which were initially only available for purchase by overseas 
investors including those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, are traded in US dollars in the Shanghai 
exchange and in Hong Kong dollars in the Shenzhen exchange. In order to boost the B-share market, after 
February 2001, the Chinese authorities allowed both overseas investors and domestic investors to purchase B-
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cash flow rights assigned to non-tradable shares (NTS) and tradable shares, the split share 
structure increased the probability of expropriation of minority shareholders by the 
controlling shareholders holding NTS, and impeded the quality of corporate governance and 
firms’ performance. In May 2005, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) 
implemented the split share structure reform, by floating the non-tradable shares through the 
open markets. Under the mutual agreement of the holders of tradable shares and NTS, the 
reform obliged the latter to compensate the former through a share conversion process. As a 
result, the reform significantly diluted the government-owned share portion and relieved 
government-related agency costs.
 
By the end of 2007, the restructuring process was almost 
completed, having affected 1,254 firms, which constitute over 97% of the Chinese A-share 
market capitalization. By the end of 2011, the transfer of NTS was completed, and thus non-
tradable shares no longer exist (Li et al. 2011). 
Although China’s stock market has been growing fast since it was established in 1990, 
there is abundant evidence showing that the role of stock markets in financing and allocating 
resources has been limited. For example, Fan et al. (2005) document that the development of 
stock markets does not play a positive role in China’s economic growth in the long run. The 
inefficiencies in the Chinese stock markets can be attributed to several factors. First, before 
the split share structure reform in 2005, two thirds of Chinese shares were untradeable. 
Second, stock prices and shares are usually driven by speculation rather than investment, and 
thus do not reflect their fundamental value. According to Elliott & Yan (2013), the average 
annual turover rate in the Chinese markets over the past 5 years was 205%. Given that large 
portions of Chinese shares are restricted on sales as the government wants to have control 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
shares, as long as investors could provide legal investment accounts in the proper currency. Besides, many 
Chinese companies float their shares (simultaneously) on the Hong Kong Exchange (H-shares) and on the New 
York Stock Exchange (N-shares). 
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over the firms, this high turover rate suggests extremely frequent changes of hands of shares, 
as well as a speculative motive among investors.
6
 Third, given poor minority investor 
protection, corporate opacity, and lack of sound auditing, controlling shareholders tend to 
expropriate resources from minority investors. Fourth, poor and unprofessional regulation 
leads to frequent illegal insider trading and manipulations (Allen et al. 2007). Fifth, the wide 
existence of bureaucracy as well as size requirements prevent private enterprises from going 
public and accessing equity markets. For this reason, most listed firms are former state-
owned enterprises. Last but not least, although it has been growing fast over last three 
decades, the size of China’s stock markets (32% of GDP) as of 2005, in terms of total market 
capitalization, is much smaller than that of the banking sector (111% of GDP), and that of 
most of the stock markets in the LLSV sample countries
7
, whose weighted average size is 
102% of GDP and of other major emerging economies whose weighted average size is 65% 
of GDP. If only tradable shares in the markets are taken into account, the percentage of 
China’s stock market to GDP plummets to 11% (Allen et al. 2007; Barth et al. 2009). Even 
after the split share reform, the size of China’s stock markets only provided credit equivalent 
to 44% of China’s GDP in 2012, compared to 118% in the US (Elliott & Yan 2013). 
Accordingly,  especially for non-state firms, the Chinese stock market only provides narrow 
support to the financing of companies and the growth of the economy  (Allen et al. 2007).  
 
                                                          
    
6
 If we only consider tradable shares in the markets, the average turover rate jumped to 341%, compared to an 
annual rate of 188% in the US. 
    
7
 Based on a sample of 49 countries (but Chins is excluded),  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny  
(LLSV) (1997, 1998)  investigate the legal protection of investors and its consequences. 
 
Chapter 1                                                                                              Introduction 
16 
 
1.1.2.1.3. China’s bond market 
China’s bond market, which includes treasury (government) bonds, policy financial bonds, 
and corporate bonds, is relatively under-developed, due to lack of independent auditing and 
high-quality credit-rating agencies as well as a poor legal system. The ratio of total bonds to 
bank credit was around 33% at the end of 2008, suggesting that the bond market in China is 
less important in terms of size relative to the banking sector. Additionally, compared to the 
West or other Asian countries, the size of the Chinese bond market is fairly small: it only 
represented 41% of GDP in 2012, compared to the US percentage of 243% (Elliott & Yan 
2013).  
Although the size of China’s bond market is relatively small, the growth rate of 
government bonds has been high, reaching an average annual rate of 25.3% over the period 
1990-2009. Total government bonds reached $721.3 billion US dollars at the end of 2008, 
which accounts for about 50.1% of total bonds. The policy financial bonds, the second largest 
component of the bond market, made up around 36.9% of the total bonds at the end of 2008. 
Under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance, these bonds are issued by the government 
and used to fund expenditures such as infrastructure construction or public projects. The 
corporate bond market in China is rather trivial relative to the other types of bonds: due to the 
existence of bureaucracy, undue government regulation, and lack of sound bond-rating 
agencies, these bonds made up only around 12.9% of the total bonds in China at the end of 
2008 (Allen et al. 2012). 
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1.1.2.1.4. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
Foreign direct investment can be seen as one form of equity finance. It can take the form of 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs), joint ventures (JVs), or of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). There are different pros and cons across these different entry modes. A 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises as a limited liability company and wholly owned by 
foreign investors, has gradually gained its popularity and became the most common mode of 
foreign investment structure due to the launch of the WFOEs law in 1986 and China’s joining 
the WTO in 2001. The advantage of setting up WFOEs (i.e. a 100% subsidiary) is to offer 
foreign investors greater flexibility and control over the firms and avoid a number of 
problematic issues with uncooperative partners or leakage of the foreign firm’s intellectual 
property rights and trade secrets. However, compared with other modes of FDI, WFOEs face 
more restrictions to enter certain industries or business areas and limited support from the 
government (Ng 2013).   
A joint venture is a company jointly owned by foreign and Chinese investors. There are 
two forms of JVs in China, e.g. equity joint ventures (EJVs) and cooperative joint ventures 
(CJVs).
8
 The JVs can benefit foreign investors by enabling them to enter restricted industries 
or business areas; to use  existing facilities, workforce, networks, marketing, and distribution 
channels; to get preferential government support or treatment; to improve local acceptance; 
and to diversify risks and costs with Chinese partners (Luo 2000). However, due to 
conflicting interests with partners, cross-cultural management and communication problems, 
                                                          
    
8
 A main distinction between these two types of JVs is the way of profits and losses are distributed. An EJV, 
as the oldest mode of Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs), is a limited liability company combining a Chinese 
partner with land, building and labor, and a foreign firm with advanced technology, good management skills and 
excess funds. Profits and losses among parties are determined by the proportion of equity contributions in the 
EJVs. A CJV is referred to as a contractual joint venture, in which each party cooperates as a separate legal 
entity in joint projects or other business activities under a variety of agreements in a co-operative-venture 
contract. Unlike EJVs, profits and losses of CJVs are subject to the specific provisions in the contract (Luo 
2000).    
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risks of transferring technology and intellectual property, and the fact that many JVs failed, 
the popularity of JVs has been declining.  
Foreign-inbound mergers and acquisitions are a relatively new form of FDI in China, 
which provide foreign investors with a quick way to break through China’s industrial 
protection line and take over upstream Chinese assets. Due to the liberalization of the 
inbound-M&As regulation, especially for the takeover of state-owned enterprises, M&As 
have gained strength, providing 10% to 15% of FDI inflows into China (Peng 2006). 
According to data provider Dealogic, there were 540 foreign-inbound deals in China in 2013, 
totaling $31 billion (Koons 2014, January 8). 
Thanks to China’s open-door policy in which foreign-financed enterprises have superior 
legal status, as well as  tax benefits compared to other private companies, FDI inflows have 
surged dramatically from the mid-1990s (Greenaway et al. 2013). Over the last 20 years, 
China has been the leading destination for foreign direct investment in the developing world. 
According to a report by The World Bank (The World Bank 2014), China received between 
131 billion and 280 billion US dollars FDI inflows during the period 2009-2012, accounting 
for between 2.6% and 4.1% of GDP.
9
 As pointed out by Allen et al. (2007), FDI contributed 
to around 10% of Chinese firms’ total funding over the period 1994-2002. Prasad & Wei 
(2007) document that China made up one-third of gross FDI flows to all emerging markets 
and 60% of flows to Asian emerging markets between 1993 and 2003. As such, China 
became one of the largest foreign direct investment recipients in the word. 
 FDI inflows can be used to ease the financing constraints associated with the inefficient 
banking sector, particularly for private domestic firms, and could be an important channel to 
                                                          
    
9
 It is noteworthy that the pattern of FDI has been changing over the recent years. The proportion of 
manufacturing has been decreasing from over 70 percent of total FDI in 2005 to around 43.7 percent in 2012. 
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support economic growth (Havrylchyk & Poncet 2007; Prasad & Wei 2007; Guariglia & 
Poncet 2008; Héricourt & Poncet 2009). De Mello (1997) points out that FDI plays an 
extremely important role in the economic growth of developing countries. Based on a study 
by Aziz & Duenwald (2002), FDI exhibits a positive effect on per capita income of China’s 
provinces, suggesting that FDI is a vital source of support for economic growth in China. 
Hung (2003) notes that the primary benefits of FDI inflows is to help China’s privatization 
processes and to alleviate private firms’ financial stress. Greenaway et al. (2013) find that the 
degree of foreign ownership has a positive effect on corporate performance in the Chinese 
context.  
 
1.1.2.2. The informal financial system  
According to Allen et al. (2012), the informal system in China comprises “informal financial 
intermediaries, internal financing and trade credits, and coalitions of various forms among 
firms, investors, and local governments” (p.3). At the beginning of the Chinese opening-up, 
the scale and influence of the financial sector were restricted. With the development of the 
market economy and the rapid boom of the private sector, a sizable informal financial sector 
has played a crucial role in supporting the growth of China’s economy in the last 30 years, 
especially for private sector firms and rural areas. Elliott & Yan (2013) propose several 
reasons to explain the rapid growth of the informal sector in China. The first is the lending 
bias of China’s banking sector. The majority of bank loans often go to state-owned firms or 
government infrastructure projects. The second reason is due to the under-developed stock 
and bond markets. Therefore, many small- and medium- sized firms (SMEs) or individuals 
with opportunities have to rely on informal finance to relieve their financial constraints. The 
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third reason is the negative real deposit rates observed over the last few years. To avoid the 
government-mandated ceiling on deposit interest rates and high inflation, large amounts of 
money go into the informal sector.  
Informal finance is accompanied by trusts or wealth management products (WMPs), 
which are mainly sponsored by banks that engage in indirect financing and lend money out to 
businesses. This is referred to as the “shadow banking” sector. The shadow banking system in 
China has quadrupled since 2008 and reached $3.2 trillion in 2013. It accounts for 40% of 
gross domestic product (GDP) (Rabinovitch 2013, February 26). The explosive expansion of 
shadow banking, to an extent, provides new sources of funding and liquidity and boosts 
China’s economic growth. However, it also poses an increasing risk to Chinese economic 
stability due to its quality, complexity and transparency. Given the high yields they often 
promise, many wealth management products are heavily based on the cash flow from 
overheated real estate properties, long-term infrastructures, or other high-risk projects, which 
are highly exposed to repayment, refinancing and even default risks. Furthermore, the 
explosion of shadow banking causes a rapid increase in local government debt (Noble 2013, 
February 26). Many have warned that these complicated wealth management products that 
spurs unhealthy debt and lending could pose a significant risk to the whole financial system.
10
 
In short, access to inform finance alongside alternative governance mechanisms such as 
competition in product and input markets, and networking through reputation, relationships, 
and trust, help Chinese firms overcome to some extent the inefficient banking sector, the 
                                                          
    
10
 Given the large size, the lack of transparency about how the funds are used, and the high risk characterized 
by the WMPs, there are fears that some elements of wealth management products resemble the toxic 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which triggered the 2008 financial crisis. (Tatlow 2013, January 17).  
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undeveloped contract enforcement and creditor-rights protection mechanisms, and the 
severity of asymmetric information. 
 
1.1.2.2.1. Internal finance 
Internal finance or self-fundraising, which  includes retained earnings, cash reserves, internal 
funds and funds from family, friends and other investors constitutes a huge portion of the 
financing needs for the growth of the overall economy. The size of internal finance reached 
$2,213.2 billion at the end of 2009, which is much larger than domestic bank loans ($565.7 
billion) for the same year (Allen et al. 2012). Thus, internal finance is the most vital source of 
finance for many Chinese firms, particularly the financially constrained ones e.g. small firms 
or firms in the private sector (Poncet et al. 2010; Guariglia et al. 2011). For example, 
Ayyagari et al. (2010) document that internal finance has a positive effect in firms’ 
productivity growth and reinvestment. According to Allen et al. (2012), roughly 60% of total 
financing raised by non-state and non-listed firms are generated internally. Even for SOEs, 
45% of total financing comes from internal finance. This suggests that internal finance 
alleviates the costly premium of raising external finance, particularly faced by private firms, 
and allows these firms to finance their NPV investment. Numerous studies confirm positive 
effects of internal funds on investment or assets growth, especially for non-state firms (Chow 
& Fung 1998; Chow et al. 2010; Poncet et al. 2010; Guariglia et al. 2011).  
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1.1.2.2.2. Informal financial intermediaries 
Informal financial intermediaries consist of interpersonal lending (minjian jiedai) and non-
delegated monitors, such as pawnbrokers (diandang) and money lenders, and informal 
delegated lenders that operate without state charters, such as private money houses (siren 
qianzhuang), underground lending originations, informal banks, and rotating credit 
associations (hui)
 11
. These various forms of informal lending have proliferated in the last ten 
years, which enables small- and medium- sized firms in China to borrow short-term money 
from wealthy households or lenders, overcoming in this way liquidity problems. These 
financial intermediaries are often not registered with any authorities and charge rather high 
lending rates. Furthermore, most of these lending is in violation of Chinese law, and is not 
sanctioned by in parts of China. However, the Chinese government usually turns a blind eye 
and allows them to remain operating unless they are involved in serious crime or endanger 
the harmony or stability of the society and economy. Without supervision, the underground 
operation of informal financial intermediaries is difficult to trace, and it is therefore hard to 
estimate the accurate aggregate scale of this lending. However, according to Elliott & Yan 
(2013), a rough size of private lending was around 4 trillion RMB ($635 billion) in 2012, 
accounting for around 10% of gross domestic product (GDP). 
 
                                                          
    
11
 Rotating credit associations (hui) are organized based on a relatively small group of people. Each member 
pools a certain amount of money at regular intervals, which is, in turn, used by another member in order to 
guarantee mutual assistance. Rotating credit associations (hui) are based on personal credit, and lacking legal 
support, are highly likely to be exposed to fraudulent schemes, particularly with the increase in membership 
enrollment (Li & Hsu 2009). 
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1.1.2.2.3. Trade credit  
Trade credit can be seen as an important informal financing mechanism in China, due to the 
country’s poor legal system and weak financial institutions. 12  Trade credit can provide 
finance through inter-firm transactions. In other words, firms are able to extend trade credit to 
their customers and receive trade credit from their suppliers, via this implicit contractual 
relationship. By investigating how high growth of the non-state sector can be sustained by 
informal financing channels, Ge & Qiu (2007) find that non-state-owned firms utilize more 
trade credit than state-owned firms. They argue that high usage of trade credit helps non-
SOEs bypass the limited access to formal banks and meet their financing needs. Further, 
according to Cull et al. (2009), SOEs with poor performance tend to redistribute bank loans 
via trade credit to prop up their faltering customers. On the contrary, they find a positive 
relation between trade credit and bank loans for profitable private firms, suggesting that 
profitable private firms are more likely to extend trade credit.  
 
1.1.2.3. Other evidence about formal versus informal finance 
A large economics literature has argued that the Chinese financial system has not 
significantly contributed to its exceptional economic growth, due to its under-development. 
Private firms and/or SMEs tend to face limited access to external finance, and have to rely on 
alternative informal financing channels. Therefore, the informal financial system in China is 
likely to serve a more important role, compared to the formal financial sector. However, there 
are some conflicting opinions on the economic effects of different financing channels when 
                                                          
    
12
 Trade credit is more likely to be considered to be formal finance in developed countries. 
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authors use different indicators, time periods, and techniques. For instance, according to some 
authors, financial development has significantly benefited China’s economic growth (Liang 
2005; Hasan et al. 2009). Further research from Liang (2006) shows that financial 
development only positively affects economic growth in coastal areas, but not in interior 
regions. Cull & Xu (2005) declare that access to bank loans is positively connected with 
China’s profit reinvestment. The authors argue that, first, investment projects tend to be 
lumpy and thus require a vast amount of both internal and external funds. Second, the cost of 
external funds in China is not necessarily higher than that of internal funds because of 
China’s excessive regulation in interest rates. Third, valuable investment even from non-
SOEs can be supported by loans. This is confirmed by the fact that better performing private 
firms have more chances to receive loans.  
Chen (2006) states that China’s financial intermediation nurtures economic growth 
mostly by means of the substitution of loans for state budget appropriation and the 
accumulation of household saving, rather than inefficient loan expansion. Using two 
components of economic growth (physical capital accumulation and productivity 
improvement), Li (2009) detects a correlation with the development of China’s financial 
sector. Specifically, their empirical analysis shows that there is a strong positive correlation 
between financial development and economic growth in the long run. This may be explained 
by the fact that financial development is likely to facilitate the allocation of savings to the 
corporate sector, thus allowing more capital to be used for physical investment. Moreover, 
financial development can reduce information costs, improve capital allocation, and increase 
competition, which in turn may improve China’s productivity.  
Focusing on the role of informal finance, Ayyagari et al. (2010) find that informal 
financing and governance mechanisms are not able to fully explain high growth of Chinese 
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private sector. However, there is evidence that private firms benefit from utilizing bank loans. 
Formal finance through banks can therefore indeed facilitate Chinese firms’ efficient growth, 
which is confirmed by the positive relationship observed between bank financing and firms’ 
growth rates and reinvestment rates.  
 
1.1.3. Financial constraints hypothesis  
Under a perfect and complete capital market, firms’ investment decisions are not affected by 
their financing conditions (Modigliani & Miller 1958). In this framework, firms will 
implement all profitable investment opportunities because external finance is able to provide 
a perfect substitute for internal funds.   
However, in the real world, the cost of external finance is often higher than the cost of 
internal finance, due to imperfections in capital markets. According to this view, firms’ 
investments tend to be constrained by the availability of their internal finance, due to the 
existence of asymmetric information between firms and suppliers of finance; to agency 
problems between managers and shareholders, and between controlling shareholders and 
minority investors; to transaction costs (market liquidity), moral hazard (risk taking over 
investment) and so on. Therefore, a firm’s investment decisions in fact depend on its financial 
position. The effect could be particularly relevant for small- and medium- sized enterprises 
(SMEs), whose investments are often constrained by lack of finance. Substantial empirical 
evidence has documented that financial variables (e.g. cash flow) play an important role in 
explaining corporate investment expenditure (Kuh & Meyer 1957; Myers & Majluf 1984; 
Fazzari et al. 1988; Stein 2003; Pawlina & Renneboog 2005; Bond & Van Reenen 2007).  
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1.1.3.1. Financial constraints and investment  
According to the financial constraints hypothesis proposed by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(FHP hereafter) (1988), a high sensitivity of investment to internal funds can be seen as a 
measure of financing constraints. In this influential paper, FHP use firm-level US data to 
estimate investment equations (as a function of Tobin’s Q and cash flow) and find that cash 
flow has a stronger impact on the investment of low-dividend firms rather than that of high-
dividend firms. They interpret this fact as supporting the financing constraints hypothesis 
since firms that pay low dividends are typically smaller and younger firms, for which it is 
difficult or expensive to obtain external financing. Therefore, if cash flow declines for these 
firms, investment will go down as well.  
However, FHP’s hypothesis was followed by a  heated debate  (Kaplan & Zingales 1997; 
Bond & Cummins 1999; Erickson & Whited 2000; Fazzari et al. 2000; Kaplan & Zingales 
2000; Cummins et al. 2006). Kaplan & Zingales (1997) use different criteria based on 
information from the firms’ annual reports to reclassify the subset of low-dividend firms from 
FHP (1988) into categories characterized by different degree of financing constraints. They 
find that firms with less financial constraints exhibit higher sensitivities of investment to cash 
flow. Based on this finding, they claim that the investment-cash flow sensitivity provides no 
evidence of the presence of financing constraints.  
A further main challenge to FHP (1988) came with Cummins et al. (2006). They suggest 
that a high sensitivity of investment to cash flow arises because, within a Q model, 
investment opportunities are poorly captured by Tobin’s Q. In order to construct more 
accurate measures of the fundamentals and ensure that cash flow does not pick up the effects 
of future growth opportunities incorrectly measured by Tobin’s Q, they propose a new 
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measure of investment opportunities, i.e. a direct estimate of the present discount value of 
expected future profit based on securities analysts’ earnings forecasts, and find that once this 
new measure is included in their investment regressions, the relationship between investment 
and cash flow is no longer significant. This result holds even when firms are divided into 
more and less likely to face financing constraints. Thus, the authors argue that a high 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow cannot be interpreted as an indicator of the presence of 
financing constraints.  
Despite being a huge matter for debate,  a large literature following FHP supported  the 
hypothesis according to which a positive and significant relationship between cash flow and 
investment can be interpreted as evidence that firms are more financially constrained 
(Schiantarelli 1996; Hubbard 1998; Bond et al. 2003; Carpenter & Guariglia 2007; Carpenter 
& Guariglia 2008; Guariglia 2008). Carpenter & Guariglia (2007) point out that Cummins et 
al. (2006) do not represent a real challenge to the financing constraints hypothesis. They 
argue that the different results obtained when using the traditional Q and the analysts’ Q 
possibly derive from the fact that the firms included in Cummins et al.’s data are typically 
large and unlikely to face financial constraints, thus cash flow has no explanatory power to 
begin with. In order to overcome the fact that Tobin’s Q represents a poor measure of 
investment opportunities  that only captures outsiders’ evaluation of opportunities, Carpenter 
& Guariglia (2008) augment the investment model with a new proxy, which measures the 
firm’s contracted capital expenditure and  picks up the insiders’ evaluation of opportunities. 
They find that even after adopting this new measure for the investment opportunities, cash 
flow remains significant, especially for small firms, which confirms the role of cash flow in 
investment equation as an indicator of financial constraints.   
 
Chapter 1                                                                                              Introduction 
28 
 
1.1.3.2. Financing constraints and other firm behavior 
Apart from investigating the links between financing constraints and fixed investment, the 
studies of financing constraints have been extended to other aspects of firm behavior such as 
working capital investment (Fazzari & Petersen 1993; Ding et al. 2013), assets growth  
(Carpenter & Petersen 2002; Guariglia et al. 2011), R&D investment (Harhoff 1998; Hall 
2002; Bond et al. 2003), accumulation of inventories (Blinder & Maccini 1991; Carpenter et 
al. 1994; Kashyap et al. 1994; Carpenter et al. 1998; Guariglia 1999, 2000; Benito 2005; 
Guariglia & Mateut 2010), employment (Sharpe 1994; Nickell & Nicolitsas 1999), cash 
holdings (Opler et al. 1999; Almeida et al. 2004; Riddick & Whited 2009; Denis & Sibilkov 
2010), exports (Campa & Shaver 2002a; Greenaway et al. 2007; Guariglia & Mateut 2010), 
acquisitions (Martin 1996; Faccio & Masulis 2005; Chen et al. 2009b; Alshwer et al. 2011; 
Du et al. 2013; Erel et al. 2014), and capital structure choices (Hennessy & Whited 2007). 
This research generally supports the financing constraints hypothesis. 
Studies on how different firms respond to financial constraints provide a better 
understanding of the relationship between financial development and economic growth as 
well as of how monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy from a macro perspective. 
From a micro perspective, these studies also help to better understand firm behavior in the 
presence of asymmetric information problems and agency costs in the capital markets.  
 
1.1.4. Financial constraints and firm behavior in China   
China is a special case study for testing the financial constraints hypothesis since it achieved 
a rapid growth rate despite a malfunctioning financial system. Furthermore, there is a large 
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imbalance in the allocation of financial resources in China: although firms from the private 
sector have been expanding very fast and contribute most to China’s growth, the majority of 
domestic bank credit goes to the less efficient state-owned sectors, hence depriving most of 
the private firms from the access to credit (Allen et al. 2007; Héricourt & Poncet 2009; 
Guariglia et al. 2011).  
Yet, surprisingly, the effect of financial constraints for Chinese firms has been largely 
neglected in the literature. There are only a handful of papers, which have attempted to study 
this issue.  Among these, Chow & Fung (1998) first test the financial constraints hypothesis 
based on a sample of manufacturing firms in Shanghai during the period 1989- 1992. They 
find that firm investment is positively related to cash flow. This effect manifests itself for 
private firms, while international joint ventures are least financially constrained due to better 
access to overseas credit. The authors attribute the higher sensitivities of investment to cash 
flow that private firms exhibit to the lending bias of China’s banking sector:  private firms are 
more likely to be deprived of the access to external financing because of political reasons. In 
addition, their higher responsiveness of investment to cash flow might be due to the fact that 
private firms with good investment prospects and high growth rates need to rely more on 
internal funds. In contrast, state-owned enterprises are less efficient and have poor investment 
prospects, and thus do not need to heavily rely on internal finance.  
Based on the same data set as in their 1998 paper, Chow & Fung (2000) test the 
financing constraints hypothesis for various firm size classes. They find that small firms are 
more likely to display lower responsiveness of investment to cash flow compared to their 
larger counterparts, which contradicts most of the previous results in a developed market. 
They explain that their apparently contradictory findings may be due to the fact that the 
majority of small firms operate in the more profitable and efficient non-state sector, and may 
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have access to other informal channels to obtain credit for their investment.  
Using an Euler equation approach, Poncet et al. (2010) test the conditions of financial 
constraints for Chinese firms during the period 1998-2005. They find that financial 
constraints are an important impediment to Chinese private firms’ investment. In contrast, 
being favored by the formal banking sector, SOEs are not subject to liquidity constraints. In 
addition, the large number of SOEs tends to crowd private firms out of credit markets and 
magnify the latter’s financial stress. Moreover, their paper points out that FDI in China can 
be seen another source of financing that eases the financial constraints faced by private firms 
and thus stimulate their investment.  
These findings are also consistent with Chen (2008) who find that the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity for non-state firms is higher than that of state-firms. In addition, Chen (2008) 
finds that due to China’s regional development policies, this sensitivity is larger for firms in 
eastern and central China compared to the ones in the west. Xu et al. (2013) argue that 
Chinese family firms tend to reduce their financial frictions and overcome the under-
investment problem via political connections to the Chinese government. This conclusion is 
based on the significant drop in the sensitivity of investment to cash flow that they observe 
for firms with politically connected management.  
Instead of concentrating on the connection between firm investment and cash flow, 
Guariglia et al. (2011) focus on the growth of firms’ total assets, which incorporates all 
possible uses of cash flow. They use a panel of 79,841 Chinese firms over the period 2000-
2007 and demonstrate that after accounting for investment opportunities, the growth of state-
owned enterprises and collective firms is not associated with cash flow due to soft budget 
constraints. Yet, the opposite happens for private and foreign firms. This implies that SOEs 
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face less financing constraints compared to private firms, and can be explained by the fact 
that because SOEs need to carry on the role of maintaining social stability and keep low 
unemployment rates, they are favored by state banks. Conversely, due to restricted access to 
external funds, private firms and especially those from the coastal regions and with a 
negligible degree of foreign capital suffer most from financial constraints. However, these 
highly productive firms have the ability to generate massive internal finance to overcome the 
financial constraints that they face and achieve high growth rates.  
These findings are again supported by Héricourt & Poncet (2009), who find that two 
firm-level indicators of financial constraints (the debt-to-asset ratio and interest coverage 
ratio) have positive effects on investment for private firms, but not for state-owned firms. 
Additionally, they demonstrate that FDI inflows can relieve the credit constraints for private 
firms.  
Cull et al. (2009) use a large panel of firms over the period 1998-2003 to demonstrate 
that the bias of formal credit against the profitable private sector still exists, but is declining 
over time. Furthermore, trade credit is likely to be used by poor-performing SOEs to prop up 
connected firms with less access to formal finance. The lending bias and the less efficient 
allocation of formal credit tends to promote trade credit, as a substitute for bank loans 
However, according to the authors, trade credit cannot economically significantly explain 
China’s dramatic growth. 
Ding et al. (2012) investigate Chinese firms’ divestment behavior. They conclude that 
negative investment by SOEs is largely associated with the efficiency explanation, according 
to which assets need to be relocated in more productive firms. On the contrary, divestment by 
non-SOEs can be explained by the financing explanation, according to which these firms 
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have to divest to raise capital and relieve their financial constraints. Using a panel of 116,000 
Chinese firms over the period 2000-2007, Ding et al. (2013) investigate whether working 
capital serves as a substitute to liquidity to overcome the financial constraints faced by 
Chinese firms. They confirm that non-SOEs suffer more from significant financial constraints 
than SOEs, suggested by the evidence that the former displays higher sensitivities of 
investment in fixed capital to cash flow (FSK) and higher sensitivities of investment in 
working capital to cash flow (WKS). Further, firms with high level of working capital exhibit 
lower sensitivities of investment in fixed capital to cash flow (FSK) and higher sensitivities 
of investment in working capital to cash flow (WKS). The authors conclude that using 
working capital can ease the effects of cash flow shocks on fixed capital investment. 
Therefore, in addition to the finding from Guariglia et al. (2011) that high cash flow 
contributes the high growth, active management of working capital may also help to explain 
the Chinese growth miracle.  
Contrary to most of the literature that suggest state-ownership can relax the degree of 
financial constraints faced by Chinese firms, Lin & Bo (2012) find that listed firms with 
higher state ownership actually exhibit higher sensitivities of investment to cash flow and a 
higher level of the KZ index, and do not have more access to bank loans. These findings 
suggest that Chinese listed firms do not benefit from state ownership in terms of preferential 
access to bank loans. 
Based on listed manufacturing firms over the period 1999-2008, Firth et al. (2012) find 
that the relationship between investment and cash flow is U-shaped: when cash flow is 
negative (positive), the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is significantly negative 
(positive). Additional analyses show that the investment-cash flow sensitivities are greater for 
government controlled listed firms, compared to privately controlled ones, especially when 
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cash flow is negative. However, the difference in the sensitivities between state firms and 
private firms appears only among low Q firms. This effect suggests that on the one hand, 
given by multiple social and political objectives, state-owned firms with low investment 
opportunities tend to use the cash flow to finance their investment projects when they have 
excess cash flow.  On the other hand, even facing a cash-flow deficit, these firms nevertheless 
find ways to increase capital expenditures. Therefore, the U-shaped investment-cash flow 
curve can be attributed to the over-investment by SOEs with poor investment opportunities.  
The study of financing constraints in this thesis provides an opportunity to better 
understand how financial conditions affect Chinese firms’ activities and performance.  
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1.2. Research objective  
Generally financial development is positively correlated to economic growth (Levine, 2005). 
However China, as a transitional economy and an emerging country, achieved a rapid growth 
rate despite a malfunctioning financial system. This puzzle has attracted worldwide attention. 
To rationalize this puzzle, our study attempts to assess how serious the liquidity conditions 
faced by Chinese firms, and the extent to which these firms act in response to the financing 
constraints. In particular, we focus on three aspects of listed firms’ behavior: investment in 
fixed capital, cash holdings, and acquisition behavior. This thesis also takes corporate 
governance and ownership structure into account, since China still operates under a 
government-led and relationship-based system. In addition, the dominating state ownership 
and lack of legal professionals and effective law enforcement have been a major obstacle for 
firm growth. The aim of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of the behavior of 
Chinese firms in a world characterized by capital market imperfections and imperfect 
governance mechanisms, and to offer some policy recommendations for the improvement of 
the performance of Chinese firms.  
The interpretation of the influence of cash flow on investment is controversial. In 
chapter 2, we attempt to shed light on this issue by using a large panel of Chinese listed firms 
over the period 1999-2010. We find robust support for the fact that higher sensitivities of 
abnormal investment to free cash flow can be caused by financial constraints or agency costs. 
Specifically, our results suggest that given an indication of the acute impact of free cash flow 
on under-investment, firms with free cash flow below their optimal levels tend to under-
invest, which is consistent with to the financing constraints (FC) hypothesis. Moreover, in 
line with the agency costs (AC) hypothesis, firms whose free cash flow exceeds their optimal 
level are more likely to over-invest, which is confirmed by the sharp impact of free cash flow 
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on over-investment. Furthermore, based upon our well-supported hypotheses, we also find 
that there exists significant heterogeneity in the degree of financial constraints and agency 
problems faced by Chinese firms with different financial conditions, ownership structure. 
Whether or not firms engage in exporting or mergers and acquisitions (M&As) also affects 
the degree of financing constraints and agency problems that they face. Finally, we 
demonstrate that the 2005 exogenous split share structure reform significantly reduced the 
agency costs faced by state-owned firms, particularly those controlled by local governments.  
In chapter 3, we examine the behavior and the implications of corporate cash holdings 
for Chinese listed firms over the period 1998-2010. First, the chapter seeks to identify 
whether Chinese firms actively manage their cash holdings. We find that cash holdings are 
generally in line with those of US and UK firms and that facing adjustment costs, Chinese 
firms tend to actively rebalance their cash holdings towards the targets, which can best be 
explained by the trade-off model. Second, given the impact of adjustment costs on cash 
policy, we find that the adjustment of cash holdings is imperfect but continuous. Based on a 
dynamic framework, we further show the cross-sectional variation in the adjustment speeds 
of cash holdings due to the presence of various adjustment costs. Third, our study attempts to 
explore the consequences of active management of cash holdings. We find that the marginal 
value of cash decreases with larger cash holdings, and is lower for firms attempting 
acquisitions, and for state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, a higher marginal value of cash 
holding appears for financially constrained firms, suggesting that cash accumulation plays a 
crucial role for constrained firms, preventing them from bypassing value-increasing projects. 
In chapter 4, we seek to investigate the extent to which corporate liquidity affects 
Chinese listed firms’ acquisition decisions, method of payment choices, and performance 
following mergers. Based on a panel of Chinese listed firms during the period 1998-2011, we 
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find that acquisitions in China are motivated by the agency costs of free cash flow, as cash-
rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions. In addition, there is obvious evidence that 
cash-rich firms that are more likely to conduct tunneling have a higher probability to make 
acquisitions. Finally, in line with the opportunity cost of cash hypothesis, we demonstrate that 
financially constrained bidders with greater growth prospects tend to use stock rather than 
cash as a method of payment. This effect is consistent with the under-performance of cash 
acquisitions in both the short and long-term. 
The rest of the thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 examines 
whether investment inefficiency in China is caused by financial constraints or agency costs. 
Chapter 3 details the adjustment behavior and value of corporate cash holdings. Chapter 4 
discusses how corporate liquidity impacts firms’ acquisition decisions and their 
consequences. Chapter 5 concludes.  
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Chapter 2 
A balancing act: managing financial constraints and agency costs        
to minimize investment inefficiency in the Chinese market 
 
Using a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 1999-2010, we document strong 
sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow. Specifically, we observe that firms 
with free cash flow below (above) their optimal level tend to under- (over-) invest due to 
financial constraints (agency costs). We also highlight significant heterogeneity in the 
sensitivities depending on firms’ financial conditions, ownership structure, and on whether or 
not they engage in exporting or Mergers & Acquisitions. Finally, we find that the 2005 
exogenous split share reform reduced the agency problems faced by state controlled firms, 
particularly those controlled by local governments. 
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2.1. Introduction  
Problems of information asymmetry between management and financial markets, and agency 
conflicts between management and shareholders, as well as between controlling shareholder 
and minority investors have been found to significantly influence firms’ investment decisions 
(Myers & Majluf 1984; Jensen 1986; Fazzari et al. 1988; Abhyankar et al. 2005; Jiang et al. 
2010). These problems are particularly severe in emerging markets. Given the capital market 
imperfections characterizing it and its poor corporate governance mechanisms (Allen et al., 
2005), the Chinese setting provides an ideal laboratory to study firms’ investment decisions 
in the presence of both financial constraints and agency problems
13
.  
China has been seen as a counterexample to most of the literature, which suggests a 
positive relationship between financial development and economic growth (Levine 2005).  Its 
under-developed financial system is in fact seriously out of step with its thriving growth 
(Allen et al. 2005).
14
 Internal finance, trade credit, and other informal funds might speak 
louder in explaining the Chinese growth miracle than bank or equity finance. In other words, 
the role of China’s external markets in financing and allocating resources has been limited. 
This is due, first of all, to the fact that dominant state-owned banks are not efficient since 
they have plenty of nonperforming loans (NPLs) and an outstanding government debt. More 
                                                          
    
13
 Some researchers (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) refer to agency costs as those deadweight losses, which, 
in the presence of asymmetric information, prevent to reach optimal financial arrangements between borrowers 
and lenders. These agency costs translate themselves in a higher cost of external finance compared to internal 
funds. Hereafter, we will refer to these as financing constraints, and will only consider as agency problems those 
arising from conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, or between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders.  
    
14
 China has experienced a rapid growth rate, which reached 14.4% per year over the 1999-2009 period in 
terms of GDP (gross domestic product). Data source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Statistical Yearbook 
of China, various issues, Beijing, China Statistical Press. 
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importantly, they need to support massive unprofitable state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is 
consequently difficult for private firms to access external funding (Allen et al. 2005; 
Héricourt & Poncet 2009; Guariglia et al. 2011). Credit markets in China have therefore not 
been playing a very efficient role in allocating resources and relieving financial constraints, 
which are a significant issue for several Chinese firms, and may lead them to under-invest.  
Second, although it has grown in recent years, the Chinese stock market is still 
relatively small compared with the banking sector. Due to poor regulation and to  the fact that 
a substantial number of listed firms are controlled by the state, the stock market is not very 
efficient and stock prices do not reflect fundamental values (Allen et al. 2005; Wang et al. 
2009). These problems were exacerbated before the split share reform in 2005, at which time 
a large proportion of shares could not be traded freely
15
.  
China’s incredibly fast growth relies heavily on investment. Over the period 1999-
2009, China experienced an investment boom (the average annual growth rate for total fixed 
investment was 22.5%), which was responsible for around 50% of GDP growth.
16
 Roaring 
growth and excessive investment might cause over-heating and over-capacity, and generate 
inefficiency, which could impair the sustainable development and future wellbeing in China. 
Given the faint legal system as well as poor corporate governance mechanisms in terms of the 
weakness of creditor rights and legal protection for shareholders including minority and 
outside shareholders, the lack of legal professionals and effective law enforcement, and the 
frequent government intervention, agency problems in China’s listed sector are rather severe 
and likely to lead to over-investment (Allen et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2011). For instance,  
                                                          
    
15
 See section 2.5.6.1 for more details. 
    
16
 Data source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues, Beijing, 
China Statistical Press. 
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government bureaucrats may use their influence to over-invest in order to achieve their 
political objectives (Firth et al. 2012), and politically connected directors sitting on company 
board tend  to exploit minority shareholders. These effects may be amplified by the presence 
of soft budget constraints
17
, and widespread corruption (Chow et al. 2010; Firth et al. 2012) . 
Our work makes several contributions to the literature. First, we distinguish for the 
first time the extent to which investment inefficiency (intended as the sensitivity of abnormal 
investment to free cash flow) may be induced by financial constraints, agency problems, or a 
combination of both.
18
  
Second, unlike most prior research, which examines sensitivities of investment to 
cash flow (Fazzari et al. 1988; Kaplan & Zingales 1997; Cleary 1999; Cummins et al. 2006), 
our work focuses on the sensitivity of “abnormal” investment to “free” cash flow. By 
deducting required (maintenance) and expected investments from capital expenditure and 
removing mandated components from cash flow, this approach prevents cash flow to pick up 
future investment opportunities. Consequently, in the absence of financing constraints and 
agency costs, under- and over- investment should not display a systematic response to free 
cash flow. Our approach provides therefore a powerful and unambiguous test which will help 
shed light on whether investment inefficiencies in the unique Chinese context can be 
explained by financial constraints and/or agency problems.  
                                                          
    
17
 In the presence of soft budget constraints, state-owned enterprises are in fact always bailed out even if they 
suffer from chronic losses. 
    
18
 In this study, we define over-investment (under-investment) as investment expenditure beyond (below) its 
optimal level. Hereafter, we will refer to both under- and over-investment as abnormal or excessive investment. 
In addition, we argue that the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash flow can be seen as evidence of 
inefficiency due to financial constraints and/or agency problems. 
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Third, our analysis provides evidence as to whether the levels of financial constraints 
and agency costs faced by firms (respectively measured through the sensitivities of under- 
and over-investment to free cash flow) can be differentiated on the basis of firms’ 
characteristics, such as ownership, financial conditions, exporting, and Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&As) activities. Finally, for the first time in the Chinese context, we propose 
a number of policies aimed at reducing investment inefficiency in China. 
Our study is conducted using a panel of data from the listed sector in China over the 
period 1999-2010. We analyze the sensitivity of (under- and over-) investment to free cash 
flow across groups of firms sorted according to different characteristics. In doing so, we 
adopt the framework proposed by Richardson (2006) to construct firm-level under- and over- 
investment and free cash flow measures. Our empirical results show that a combination of 
both financing constraints and agency problems explain investment inefficiency in the unique 
Chinese context. In particular, our findings are consistent with the financial constraints (FC) 
hypothesis (Fazzari et al. 1988): higher sensitivities of under-investment to free cash flow can 
be found for the firms with free cash flow below their optimal levels. Our results are also in 
line with the agency costs (AC) hypothesis (Jensen 1986): higher sensitivities of over-
investment to free cash flow can be spotted in firms with free cash flow above their optimal 
levels. These results are robust to the use of alternative measures of abnormal investment and 
free cash flow, of different estimation methodologies, and of various criteria to define 
financial constraints and agency costs. 
We also find that abnormal investment-free cash flow sensitivities vary across 
different types of Chinese firms. First, non-SOEs face higher financial constraints than their 
state controlled counterparts, and have to rely more on their internal finance for their 
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investment. Second, given the weak supervision and management that characterizes them, 
SOEs affiliated with local governments (SOELGs) face higher agency costs and are more 
likely to invest beyond their optimal levels than SOEs affiliated with the central government 
(SOECGs) and non-state controlled firms
19
. Last, exporting contributes to relieving Chinese 
listed companies’ financial constraints. 
Finally, we find that the 2005 split share structure reform, which represented an 
exogenous shock to Chinese firms’ governance system, affected local-government-controlled 
enterprises more than other firms, by reducing their agency costs. Decreasing sensitivities of 
over-investment to free cash flow are in fact evident after 2005 for SOELGs.  
The remainder of this chapter is laid out as follows. Section 2.2 develops testable 
hypotheses regarding firms’ investment behavior and its relationship with financial 
constraints and agency problems. Section 2.3 illustrates our baseline specification and 
estimation methodology. Section 2.4 describes the main features of the data and presents 
summary statistics. Section 2.5 discusses and examines the main empirical results and further 
tests, while Section 2.6 discusses the policy and managerial implications of our findings. 
Section 2.7 concludes. 
  
                                                          
    
19
 In the sub-sample of our dataset which contains detailed information on firm ownership (2003-2010), we 
observe that 15.83% of all observations represent SOEs controlled by the state (SOECGs); 50.54%, SOEs 
affiliated with local governments (SOELGs); and 33.63%, non-SOEs.  
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2.2. Development of hypotheses 
In a perfect and complete capital market, investment decisions are not affected by the way 
firms finance themselves (Modigliani & Miller 1958), suggesting that in order to maximize 
their value, firms will implement investment projects until the marginal revenue of 
investment equals the marginal costs. However, substantial empirical evidence has 
documented a significantly positive correlation between cash flow and investment 
expenditure (Fazzari et al. 1988; Hubbard 1998; Stein 2003; Bond & Van Reenen 2007). The 
reason for the existence of this positive relation remains, however, controversial.  
First, there exists considerable evidence to suggest that the positive correlation 
between investment and cash flow stems from asymmetric information between corporate 
insiders and outside creditors (Myers & Majluf 1984; Fazzari et al. 1988; Carpenter & 
Guariglia 2008; Butler & Cornaggia 2011). This explanation is consistent with the financial 
constraints (FC) hypothesis where the imperfections in capital markets lead to a cost 
premium when external finance such as bank loans, debt and equity are used. The cost or 
availability of external funds force firms to use internal finance, like retained earnings, in 
preference to external finance. In these circumstances, financially constrained firms may have 
to forego good investment projects to avoid the excessively high cost premiums. Thus, when 
firms face financial constraints, the more internal funds they have, the more they can invest, 
while negative cash flow shocks may lead to under-investment. A high sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow can be therefore seen as evidence of financial constraints. 
Second, the positive correlation between investment and cash flow may reflect agency 
problems between managers and shareholders and between controlling shareholder and 
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minority investors (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990; Pawlina & Renneboog 2005). This explanation 
is in line with the agency costs (AC) hypothesis, according to which managers might not have 
the same objective as shareholders. Managers may in fact focus more on the growth of their 
firm rather than on maximizing shareholders’ wealth, to build empires, since their 
compensation and wealth are generally positively associated with their firm’s growth and 
expanding the firm would increase the resources in their hands and enhance their power. 
Moreover, the interests of controlling shareholder may not be aligned with those of other 
investors due to weak legal system as well as poor minority shareholder protection. Given the 
high restriction of share trading and the prevalence of dominant shareholders in China, the 
risk of controlling shareholder to expropriate resources from minority investors (tunneling) is 
rather severe. As a result, controlling shareholders may make self-interested and entrenched 
decisions and prefer to spend the firm’s free cash flow on unprofitable projects rather than 
paying dividends to shareholders, resulting in over-investment. In summary, when firms face 
agency problems, the more free cash flow they have, the more they prefer to invest. The 
positive relationship between investment and free cash flow can be hence interpreted as 
evidence of the presence of agency costs. 
Taken together, financial constraints and agency problems can prevent firms from 
making optimal investment decisions. Both financial constraints and agency problems may 
therefore increase the sensitivity of investment expenditure to cash flow and induce 
investment inefficiency. To discriminate between these two scenarios within the Chinese 
context, we will test the following two hypotheses.   
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H1: The Financing Constraints (FC) Hypothesis: Under-investing firms with negative FCF 
exhibit significantly positive investment-free cash flow sensitivities resulting mainly from 
financial constraints. 
H2: The Agency Cost (AC) Hypothesis: Over-investing firms with positive FCF exhibit 
significantly positive investment-free cash flow sensitivities resulting mainly from agency 
costs. 
Both hypotheses are focused on the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash 
flow, which is defined as the cash flow beyond what is required to maintain assets and 
finance expected new investments (Richardson 2006). H1 assumes that firms with negative 
free cash flow, who are already under-investing, are more likely to face financing constraints, 
while H2 posits that over-investing firms with positive free cash flow are more likely to face 
agency costs.
20
 In the section that follows, we will outline the methodology that we adopt to 
test these two hypotheses. 
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 It is important to note that firms can face both financial constraints and agency costs at the same time. 
However, for firms under different stages, either one may be more pronounced. 
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2.3. Baseline specification and estimation methodology  
2.3.1. Baseline models 
2.3.1.1. A framework to measure abnormal investment and free cash flow (Richardson 2006) 
We measure both under- and over-investment (abnormal investment) and  free cash flow 
using Richardson’s (2006) accounting-based framework. We then test whether the 
relationship between abnormal investment and FCF (investment inefficiency)  is caused by 
financial constraints and/or agency costs. 
Fig. 2.1 outlines our methodology. Total investment (I_totali,t) is defined as capital 
expenditure less receipts from the sale of property, plant, and equipment. I_totali,t can be 
decomposed into two main parts: new investment expenditure (I_new
i,t
), and required 
investment expenditure to maintain assets in place (I_main.i,t), which is given by the sum of 
amortization and depreciation.
21
   
[Insert Fig. 2.1] 
New investment expenditure (I_new
i,t
) can be further split into two components: 
expected investment expenditure in new positive NPV projects (I
e
_newi,t) and unexpected 
investment or abnormal investment (under- or over- investment, I
u
_newi,t).  
                                                          
21
 Using the sum of amortization and depreciation to proxy for maintenance investment may not be appropriate 
for all firms. For example, if a firm invests in R&D, its maintenance investment cannot be estimated by 
amortization and depreciation. In order to overcome these limitations, we include prior investment expenditure 
and time dummies in our dynamic investment expectation model (Eq.2.1). These should contribute to capturing 
omitted maintenance investment. 
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We then define firms’ optimal level of cash flow as the sum of maintenance 
investment (I_main.i,t) and expected investment expenditure (I
e
_newi,t). Free cash flow (FCF) 
is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow (I_main.i,t + I
e
_newi,t) from net 
cash flow from operating activities (CFO).
22
 Accordingly, FCF can be either positive or 
negative, depending on whether net cash flow from operating activities (CFO) exceeds the 
optimal level of cash flow. 
 
2.3.1.2. Dynamic expectation models of investment expenditure 
Following Richardson (2006), a dynamic investment expectation model is used to predict the 
expected investment expenditure in new positive NPV projects (I
e
_newi,t), which can be 
interpreted as the optimal level of investment expenditure
23
. Specifically, denoting with 
I_new the firm’s new investment expenditure; with Q (Tobin’s Q), its market-to-book ratio;24 
with Cash, its ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets; with Size, the natural 
logarithm of its total assets; with Age, the number of years elapsed since its listing; with ROA, 
                                                          
    
22
 The reason why we deduct expected investment expenditure (I
e
_newi,t) to calculate FCF rather than deduct 
actual CAPEX is because actual CAPEX can be influenced by financial constraints or agency costs. 
 
23
 All investment expenditure variables are scaled by total assets. 
24
 The shares of listed firms in China can be either tradable or non-tradable. Following the literature (Chen et 
al. 2011; Huang et al. 2011), we calculate Tobin’s Q as the sum of the market value of tradable stocks, the book 
value of non-tradable stocks, and the market value of net debt divided by the book value of total assets. Our 
results were robust to using the growth of real sales instead of Tobin’s Q to proxy for investment opportunities 
(Konings et al. 2003; Ding et al. 2010). This test is motivated by the fact that in the Chinese context, Tobin’s Q 
may be an imperfect measure of investment opportunities. For brevity, these results are not reported, but are 
available upon request. . 
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its return on assets
25
; and with Leverage, the ratio of its short-term and long-term debt to total 
assets, we estimate the following  equation:  
    
       
i,t 0
        
1 i,t 1 2 i,t 1 3 i,t 1 4 i,
     
t 1 5 i,t 6 i,t 1
  
7 i,t 1 i i t
 
,
 
I_new =a +a I_new +a Cash +a Q +a Size +a Age +a ROA
+a Leverage + Year+ Industry Year*Industry+  ( 2.1) 
    

   
      
where the subscript i indexes firms; and t, years (t=1999-2010). We use a dynamic model to 
allow for a partial adjustment mechanism and to control for unobserved factors not included 
among other regressors. We lag all our independent variables (except Age) to alleviate the 
simultaneity issue (Polk & Sapienza 2009; Duchin et al. 2010).
26
 
Eq. (2.1) also incorporates time dummies (∑Year), which account for the possible 
effects of business cycles as well as the impact of change in interest rates. Industry dummies 
(∑Industries) are included to capture the industry fixed effects associated with firms’ 
investments.
27
 In addition to aggregate time dummies, we incorporate time dummies 
                                                          
    
25
 As firms in an less-developed market may not make investment decisions based on market valuation (Wang 
et al. 2009), contrary to Richardson (2006), we use the return on assets (ROA) instead of stock returns in our 
dynamic investment model. See Appendix 2.2 for complete definitions of all variables. 
    
26
 Similar results were obtained using contemporaneous variables. For brevity, these results are not reported, 
but are available upon request. 
 
27
 According to the industry classification taken from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
firms in China’s listed sector are assigned to one of the following twelve industrial sectors: Farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry & fishing; Mining; Manufacturing; Utilities; Construction; Transportation & warehouse; 
Information technology; Wholesale & retailing; Real estate; Social services; Communications & cultural;  
Conglomerates; Finance & insurance. Following previous literature, we exclude the Finance & insurance sector 
from our study. 
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interacted with industry dummies (∑Year*∑Industries) to control for industry-specific 
business cycle effects.
28
    
The error term in Eq. (2.1) consists of two components:   , a firm-specific component, 
embracing any time-invariant firm characteristics which tend to influence firms’ investment, 
as well as any time-invariant component of the measurement error which may affect any 
variable in our regression; and     , which represents an idiosyncratic component. 
The fitted values of Eq. (2.1) can be interpreted as a proxy for optimal investment 
(I
e
_newi,t).
29
 The difference between real investment and optimal investment (I
u
_newi,t) is 
then computed and interpreted as unexpected investment. I
u
_newi,t can be either positive or 
negative, corresponding to over-investment or under-investment, respectively.  
 
2.3.1.3. Relationship between under- or over-investment and free cash flow  
To analyze the sensitivities of under- or over-investment to free cash flow, we initially 
estimate the following regression: 
 
                                                          
    
28
 Because of collinearity, industry dummies (∑Industries) cannot be included in the equations when the fixed 
effects estimator is used. 
    
29
 Because free cash flow is defined as operating cash flow net of depreciation and amortization and net of 
I
e
_newi,t, positive sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow are unlikely to be caused by free cash 
flow picking up investment opportunities.  
, 0 1 0 2 , 0 3 , 0
,
  
                                                                         
_ * *
 (2.2)
u
i t FCF i t FCF i t FCF
i i t
I new a a Dum a FCF Dum a FCF Dum
Year Industry  
     
    
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We partition firm-years into those characterized by over-investment or under-
investment on the basis of their I
u
_newi,t. More specifically, over-investing firms are those 
who have positive abnormal investment (I
u
_newi,t). On the contrary, under-investing firms are 
characterized by negative abnormal investment (I
u
_newi,t). As in Richardson (2006), we 
assume abnormal investment is a function of free cash flow (FCF) and investigate whether 
the sensitivity of I
u
_newi,t to FCF differs for firms facing positive and negative FCF. To this 
end, we interact FCF with the dummy DumFCF>0 (DumFCF<0), which is equal to 1 if the firm 
has positive (negative) free cash flow, and 0 otherwise.
 30
 Therefore, a2 and a3 can be used to 
proxy investment inefficiency. In accordance with the financing constraints hypothesis, we 
expect a2 to be positive and precisely determined for under-investing firms, which are likely 
to suffer from financing constraints, while, in line with the agency costs hypothesis, a3 should 
also be positive and significant for over-investing firms, likely to suffer from agency cost 
problems. We also include DumFCF>0 in the regression, to account for the direct effect that it 
might have on firm investment. Finally, we control for year, industry and firm fixed effects, 
as well as industry-specific business cycle effects.  
 
2.3.1.4. Are under- or over-investment-free cash flow sensitivities due to financial constraints 
or agency costs? 
To further test for the financial constraints (FC) hypothesis of under-investment and the 
agency costs (AC) hypothesis of over-investment, we estimate the following regression: 
                                                          
    
30
 Since we partition firm-years into under-/over- investing  observations, and positive/negative free cash flow 
observations, our sample can be broken down into 4 sub-groups (2×2): Group1 (under-investing observations 
with negative FCF); Group 2 (under-investing observations with positive FCF); Group3 (over-investing 
observations with positive FCF); and Group 4 (over-investing observations with negative FCF) (See Fig. 2.2). 
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where Dum represents a dummy proxying for the degree of financial constraints (based in 
turn on traditionally used financing constraints indexes, size, and dividend payments) or 
agency costs (based in turn on the ratio of operating expenses to total assets, the ratio of other 
receivables to total assets, and ownership structure) faced by firms. Specifically, we separate 
firms into different groups on the basis of their a priori likelihood of facing financial 
constraints or agency problems measured on the basis of different criteria, with the aim of 
investigating the extent to which different groups of firms have different investment behavior 
and sensitivities of under- and over-investment to free cash flow. These further tests should 
enable us to shed more light on whether the financing constraints and agency costs 
hypotheses hold in the Chinese context. 
 
2.3.2. Estimation methodology 
2.3.2.1. Dynamic panel models 
As it is dynamic, we estimate Eq. (2.1) using the system Generalized Method of Moments 
(system GMM) approach developed by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond 
(1998). This estimator enables us to control for omitted variables bias, the possible 
, , ,0 1 2 3
,
 
                                                       (2.3)                
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endogeneity of the regressors, as well as firm-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity
31
. The 
GMM estimator is designed for dynamic panel analysis with few time periods and many 
individuals (small T and large N). The system GMM builds up a system of two equations (the 
first-differenced equations and the level equations). Adding the original equation in levels to 
the system has been shown to dramatically improve the precision and the efficiency of the 
estimator compared with the simple first-difference GMM estimator.
32
 First-differencing is 
aimed at controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Lagged values of the independent 
variables are used as instruments to control for the potential endogeneity of the regressors 
(Bond et al. 2001; Baum 2006; Roodman 2006). 
In order to evaluate the validity of instruments and the correct specification of the 
model, two diagnostic tests are used in our GMM estimations. The first is the Hansen (J) test 
for over-identifying restrictions. The test statistic asymptotically follows a Chi-square 
distribution with the value of degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying 
restrictions (number of instruments less number of parameters). A rejection of the null 
hypothesis of instrument validity implies that the instruments are correlated with the error 
term or are being incorrectly included in the regression. The second diagnostic test, m(n), 
tests for the n
th
 order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, and provides a further test 
                                                          
    
31
 Some statistical problems may arise when a model includes a lagged dependent variable. First, the presence 
of a lagged dependent variable leads to serial correlation of the error term. Second, the lagged dependent 
variable is as stochastic as the dependent variable. This violates the classical assumptions of the linear 
regression model that both independent variables and error term should be independent. Thus, the estimation of 
a dynamic model using a conventional approach like the pooled OLS estimator will lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Maeshiro 1996; 1999). 
    
32
 According to Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell et al. (2001), when regressors are persistent over time 
and the number of time periods is relatively small, the first-difference GMM estimator has been found to have a 
large finite sample bias and poor performance in simulation experiments. However, the system GMM greatly 
reduces the finite sample bias and is more asymptotically efficient as it is not dependent on relatively harsh 
restrictions on the initial condition. 
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for the validity of the specification of the model and the legitimacy of instruments. The m(n) 
test asymptotically follows a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis of no n
th
-
order serial correlation of the differenced residuals. If the m(n) test rejects the null hypothesis, 
the instruments need to be lagged at least n+1 times.
33
 Since the models in this study 
generally reject the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation, levels of endogenous 
variables dated t-3 and further are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, and 
first-differences of the endogenous variables dated t-2 are used as additional instruments in 
the level equations (Baum 2006; Roodman 2006).
34
 
For robustness, we also estimate Eq. (2.1) using the pooled OLS (OLS) and the fixed 
effects (Fe) estimators. It is worth noting that in a dynamic panel model, the pooled (OLS) 
estimator does not appropriately account for the unobserved firm characteristics and the 
possible endogeneity of the regressors. Moreover, the fixed effects (Fe) estimator might 
suffer from endogeneity problems in a dynamic panel setting. Under the circumstance, the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable obtained from the pooled OLS estimator will be 
upwards biased, and the one obtained from the fixed effects (Fe) estimator will be 
downwards biased. Estimating our dynamic models via different approaches enables us to 
check the validity of our estimates: the true estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable should lie between the estimates obtained from the pooled OLS and the fixed effects 
(Fe) estimators (Bond et al. 2001). 
                                                          
  
33
 It is worth noting that using too many lags of endogenous variables as instruments is likely to generate a 
possible loss of efficiency (Baum 2006). 
  
34
 Neither the Hansen J test nor the m(n) test can distinguish poor specification of the model from instrument 
invalidity. 
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2.3.2.2. Static panel models 
For the static panel regression models in Eq. (2.2) and Eq. (2.3), we use the fixed effects (Fe) 
estimator to control for time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity.
35
 In some cases, we also 
provide pooled OLS estimates for comparison.
36
  
                                                          
    35 
The key variables in Eq. (2.2) and Eq. (2.3) (unexpected investment and free cash flow) are constructed 
using the residuals from the estimation of Eq. (2.1). For this reason, they can be considered as exogenous, which 
justifies the use of a fixed-effects estimator. 
    36 
All estimates using the pooled OLS estimator in our study are generated as cluster-robust. In a panel data 
setting, it is important to control for cluster heterogeneity. In this study, we allow for arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
and intra-cluster correlation at the firm-level. With a large number of clusters (1,168) and relative small cluster 
size (maximum 12), the asymptotic framework is well developed, and the cluster-robust standard error estimator 
converges to the true value. Even if there is no serial correlation in the error process, the inference is still robust 
as long as the number of clusters is large (Wooldridge 2003). 
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2.4. Main features of the data and descriptive statistics  
2.4.1. The dataset 
The data used in this chapter are drawn from the China Stock Market Trading Database 
(CSMAR) and China Economic Research Service Centre (CCER). They cover Chinese 
companies that issue A-share stocks on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) or the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), during the period 1999-2010.
37,38
 We exclude financial 
institutions since the operating, investing and financing activities of these firms are distinct 
from others. Furthermore, observations in the one percent tails for the main regression 
variables are excluded in order to minimize the potential influence of outliers.
39
 Finally, we 
drop all firms with less than three years of consecutive observations. All variables are 
deflated using the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China). 
The information on acquisitions for our listed Chinese companies is derived from the 
Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Both successful and 
unsuccessful deals announced between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2011 are included. 
                                                          
    37 
All firms listed on either the SHSE or SZSE market issue tradable shares (which are called A-shares) to 
domestic investors. Alongside A shares, some of these firms also issue B-shares, which were initially only 
available to overseas investors including those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. After February 2001, B-
shares have been made available to both overseas investors and domestic investors, as long as investors can 
provide investment accounts in the proper currency. B-shares listed on the SHSE market trade in US dollars and 
those on the SZSE market are settled in Hong Kong dollars. Besides, many Chinese companies float their shares 
(simultaneously) on the Hong Kong Exchange (H-shares) and on the New York Stock Exchange (N-shares).  
     38 
The cash flow statement in the databases is not available until 1998. 
    39 
Similar results were obtained using winsorizing instead of truncating to reduce the bias created by possibly 
spurious outliers. For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
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As far as data cleaning is concerned, our final panel consists of 1,263 listed firms, 
which corresponds to 9,508 firm-year observations. The number of firm-year observations of 
each firm varies from three to twelve, with number of observations varying from a minimum 
of 415 in 1999 to a maximum of 1,081 in 2008.
40
  
 
2.4.2. Initial summary statistics 
As mentioned in section 2.3.1.3, in order to study the relationship between abnormal (under- 
or over-) investment and free cash flow, we partition firm-years into 4 sub-groups (2×2): 
Group1 (under-investing firms with negative FCF), Group 2 (under-investing firms with 
positive FCF), Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive FCF), and Group 4 (over-
investing firms with negative FCF). Means and medians for the entire sample and four sub-
samples based on their abnormal investments and free cash flow are presented in Table 2.3.  
It can be seen that relative to total assets, the average total investment and new 
investment expenditure in our sample are respectively 5.3% and 2.7%. This suggests that new 
investment represents a large portion of total investment (around 50%). Moreover, the 
average free cash flow for all firm-years observations is -0.002. This small value might 
suggest that listed firms in China are short of free cash flow, which could be due to financial 
constraints. 
[Insert Table 2.3] 
                                                          
40
 See Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for details about the structure of our sample. Around 15 percent of firms have the full 
12-year observations. Our panel is unbalanced, allowing for both entry and exit. This can be seen as evidence of 
dynamism and may reduce potential selection and survivor bias. 
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Interestingly, the total new investment for Group 2 (under-investing firms with 
positive FCF) is negative. This happens because the depreciation plus amortization of firms 
in this group exceeds their total investment. Depreciation and amortization can be considered 
as non-cash expenses: if firms are profitable, they might accelerate depreciation and 
amortization in order to reduce reported profits.  
Coming to unexpected investment and free cash flow, we find firms in Group 1 
(under-investing firms with negative FCF) have the highest negative unexpected investments 
and free cash flow, which is in line with our Hypothesis 1, according to which, due to 
financial constraints, firms with negative FCF tend to under-invest. As for firms in Group 3 
(over-investing firms with positive FCF), they have the highest positive unexpected 
investment and free cash flow, which is in line with our Hypothesis 2, according to which 
firms with positive FCF tend to over-invest, due to agency costs. 
As for other financial and operating variables, the statistics show that firms in Group 
1 (under-investing firms with negative FCF) are relatively younger, smaller, have lower 
Tobin’s Q and ROA, and higher cash reserves. This could suggest the presence of financial 
constraints. On the other hand, firms in Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive FCF) are 
relatively mature, large, have higher Tobin’s Q and ROA, and hold less cash reserves, which 
might suggest higher agency problems.
41
  
                                                          
    
41
 The p-values associated with the t-tests and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test show significant differences in 
most variables between firms in Group 1 and those in Group 3. Two exceptions are the variables Size and Cash 
when focusing on the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
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Finally, it is interesting to note that the number of firms in Group 1 (3,120), is larger 
than that in Group 3 (1,884), suggesting that there are more firms facing  financial constraints 
than firms  susceptible to agency problems.  
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2.5. Empirical results 
2.5.1. Baseline results 
2.5.1.1. Dynamic model of investment expenditure 
Table 2.4 provides the pooled OLS, fixed effects, and system GMM estimates of our dynamic 
model of investment expenditure outlined in Eq. (2.1). 
[Insert Table 2.4] 
Column 1 reports the pooled OLS estimates based on cluster-robust standard errors, 
which take into account arbitrary heteroscedasticity and intra-cluster correlation. The 
coefficients on all explanatory variables are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
According to the adjusted R-square, the model is able to explain 31% of the variation in 
firms’ new investment expenditure (I_newi,t). However, as discussed in section 2.3.2.1, the 
pooled estimates are more likely to be biased because of unobserved firm-specific 
herogeneity and possible endogenous regressors. 
Column 2 reports the fixed effects estimates, which remove the effect of time-
invariant firm characteristics. The ρ coefficient indicates that around 37% of the total error 
variance is explained by unobserved heterogeneity.  
Column 3 presents the estimates using our preferred system GMM estimator, which 
takes the two possible biases (unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity) simultaneously 
into account. More specifically, we take first differences of the regressors and treat I_newi,t-1, 
Cash i,t-1, Qi,t-1, Sizei,t-1, ROAi,t-1 and Leveragei,t-1 as potentially endogenous variables. Given 
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the relatively large number of time periods available, to keep the number of instrument 
manageable, we specify that the GMM instruments are only constructed for lags 3 to 6 of 
these endogenous variables. First-differences of these same variables lagged twice are used as 
additional instruments in the level equations. Statistical diagnostics (the Hansen J test and the 
m(3) test) do not reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity and/or model specification, 
suggesting that our estimates based on the system GMM regression are convincing. The 
system GMM estimate of the coefficient associated with the lagged dependent variable, 
I_newi,t-1, is 0.314, which precisely lies within the range attained using the fixed effects 
(0.254, lower bound) and the pooled OLS (0.441, upper bound) estimators. The positive and 
precisely determined prior investment expenditure coefficient suggests that investment 
behavior is sluggish and smooth. In addition, firms’ new investment expenditure (I_newi,t) 
goes up following increases in cash holdings, ROA, and declines with age.
42
 It is interesting 
to note that Tobin’s Q exhibits a poorly determined coefficient, while ROA has a positive and 
precisely determined coefficient. The point estimate (0.165) indicates that the elasticity of 
new investment reacting to a change in ROA, evaluated at sample means is 0.173 (the mean 
of I_new is 0.0267 and the mean of ROA is 0.028).
43
 This suggests that a 10 % increase in the 
return on assets is associated with a 1.73% rise in investment. The profitability of Chinese 
firms has therefore a greater impact on their investment than the market valuation on 
investment. This is consistent with the finding from Wang et al. (2009), who show that in 
less-developed markets like China, higher profits are associated with higher investment.   
                                                          
42
 As mentioned before, since market value might not be able to proxy for firms’ real performance in the 
Chinese context, we replace stock return in our dynamic investment model with return on assets (ROA). 
43
 The elasticity of ROA is defined as the ratio of the change of I_newi,t for a relative change in ROA, and is 
given by 0.173=0.165*0.028/0.0267. 
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Although our results based on the three estimators are quantitatively consistent, we 
use the system GMM estimates to predict expected investment expenditure in new positive 
NPV projects (I
e
_newi,t) and unexpected investment (I
u
_newi,t). Hence, the subsequent 
analysis, based on the partitioning of our observations into groups of over-investing and 
under-investing firms, is based on the estimates of I
u
_newi,t obtained from the system GMM 
estimates of Eq. (2.1). Results based on the OLS and fixed effects estimates are also 
presented for robustness. 
 
2.5.1.2. The effects of free cash flow on (under- and over-) investment 
Table 2.5 presents the key results from the estimation of the relationship between under- and 
over-investment and negative/positive free cash flow obtained using the fixed effects and the 
pooled OLS estimators (Eq. (2.2)). Columns 1 to 4 are based on estimates of I
u
_newi,t, which 
are obtained from the system GMM estimates of Eq. (2.1). Column 1 and 2 report fixed 
effects estimates. We observe that the free cash flow coefficients are only significantly 
positive (at the 1% level) for the under-investing firms with negative free cash flow (Group 1, 
column 1) and the over-investing firms with positive free cash flow (Group 3, column 2). 
Similar results are obtained when the pooled OLS estimator is used (columns 3 and 4). The p-
values associated with the Wald tests show significant differences of the free cash flow 
coefficients between firms facing negative and positive FCF. 
[Insert Table 2.5 and Fig. 2.2] 
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To check robustness, we also run fixed effects and pooled OLS estimates of Eq. (2.2), 
based on estimates of I
u
_newi,t obtained using the fixed-effects and OLS estimators, 
respectively.
44
 The results, reported in columns 5 to 8, confirm our previous findings. 
Additionally, Fig. 2.2 compares fitted values of the sensitivities of abnormal investment to 
free cash flow among the four groups of firms. Positive trends of fitted values only appear for 
Group 1 firms (under-investing firms with negative FCF) and Group 3 firms (over-investing 
firms with positive FCF).
45
 
Our findings can be explained considering that firms tend to adjust their investment to 
changes in FCF differently during the four stages outlined in Fig. 2.3 and 2.4. These stages 
are discussed below. 
[Insert Fig. 2.3 and 2.4] 
Stage1: When firms’ free cash flow becomes negative (FCF<0), these firms tend to 
have poor liquidity positions, and are likely to face more severe financial constraints, which, 
hence contribute to their under-investment.
46,47 
According to the financial constraints (FC) 
hypothesis, these firms might not be able to access capital markets and have to rely on their 
                                                          
    
44
 In other words, both Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (2.2) are estimated using the same estimator (either the fixed effects 
or the pooled OLS estimator). 
    
45
 Similar results were obtained when we estimated a relatively parsimonious version of Eq. (2.1) that just 
contained lagged investment and Tobin’s Q to measure optimal investment. The rationale for this test comes 
from the fact that variables such as Cash and Leverage may be associated with financing constraints or agency 
costs (which are not optimal). For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
46
 The decrease of free cash flow and liquidity may result in adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
This increases the risk of firms going bankrupt and makes it more difficult for lenders to know whether the firms 
are able to pay their bills. Therefore, lenders might be less willing to lend, and the firms are more likely to face 
financial constraints. 
47
 In this stage, firms experience the highest negative free cash flow and unexpected investment. 
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free internal finance due to the cost premium to use external finance. Thus, when their free 
cash flow rises, they tend to increase investment in order to bring it to the desired level and 
generate sufficient revenue. This leads to the significantly positive responsiveness of 
abnormal investment to free cash flow shown for firms in Group 1. 
Stage2: As firms are able to generate more free cash flow (FCF>0), the 
responsiveness of under-investment to free cash flow starts to shrink as the firms are no 
longer financially constrained (Group 2). Positive free cash flow can be seen as evidence that 
the firms are in the right direction and are able to generate enough revenue. Under these 
circumstances, lenders are willing to provide more loans. The firms are able to close the gap 
between their existing and desired stock of capital through external funding for investment 
rather than by heavily relying on internal finance. This explains why firms in Group 2 
generally exhibit poorly determined sensitivities of under-investment to FCF in Eq. (2.2).  
Stage3: During this phase, firms accumulate a substantial amount of free cash flow 
(FCF>0). According to the agency costs (AC) hypothesis, being endowed with substantial 
amounts of free cash flow, these firms might face rather severe agency costs. Specifically, in 
order to reduce their personal undiversified risk and increase the scale and scope of operating 
assets in their hands, managers are more likely to use their excess cash flow to make self-
interested and entrenched decisions on low-benefit projects, resulting in over-investment.
48
 In 
other words, when they have more free cash flow at hand, managers tend to increase 
investment for their personal interest. This explains the positive and significant FCF 
coefficients obtained for Group 3 firms in Eq. (2.2).   
                                                          
48
 In this stage, firms have the highest positive free cash flow and unexpected investment.  
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Stage 4: Once firms’ free cash flow becomes negative, the strength of the relation 
between over-investment and free cash flow is muted as these firms generally face less 
agency conflicts and have less cash flow at hand (Group 4). Namely, when firms are subject 
to cash shortfalls from operating activities, managers might invest their internal finance more 
rationally in order to bring their free cash flow back to the optimal levels. Another reason can 
be that when firms are short of free cash flow, they might be forced to access more external 
finance to enhance liquidity and avoid bankruptcy. Capital markets lead to more frequent 
monitoring and disciplining of free internal funds for investment, which could explain the 
poorly determined over-investment FCF sensitivities observed for firms in Group 4 in Eq. 
(2.2).
49
 
 
2.5.2. Robustness tests 
2.5.2.1. Using alternative measures of under- and over- investment and free cash flow 
To address concerns about the robustness of these primary findings, we first use an 
alternative approach taken from Bates (2005) to compute under- and over-investment and 
free cash flow.
50
 Following this approach, we compute the abnormal investment for a given 
firm in a given year (I
u’
_newi,t) as the difference between the firm’s new investment 
expenditure (I_newi,t) and the industry median level of new investment (I_newj,t) in that year. 
                                                          
 
49
 This explanation is confirmed by evidence from our summary statistics, which show that firms in Group 4 
have the highest leverage. 
    
50
 The expected investment estimated based on the approach from Bates (2005) is an out-of-sample estimate 
in a group of peer companies, which can tackle the concern that the expected investment based on the model 
from Richardson (2006) might be endogenous. 
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This difference (I
u’
_newi,t) can be either positive or negative, corresponding respectively to 
over-investment or under-investment. As for free cash flow (FCF’), we compute it as the 
difference between CFAIP,i,t for each firm in each year and the industry median level in that 
same year (CFAIPj,t).
51
 Accordingly, FCF’ can be either positive or negative. 
To test for the relationship between (under- or over-) investment and free cash flow, 
we estimate the following dynamic investment expectation model, where DumFCF’>0 is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the firm has positive free cash flow (FCF’), and 0 otherwise: 
u' u'
i,t 0 1 i,t 1 2 FCF' 0 3 i,t FCF' 0 4 i,t FCF' 0
 
5 i,t 1 6 i,t 1 7 i,t
              
1 8 i,t 9 i,t 1 10 i,t 1
 
                       
     
I _new =a +(a I _new )+a Dum a FCF' * Dum a FCF' *(1 Dum )
a Cash +a Q +a Size +a Age +a ROA +a Leverage
   
    
  

                                                                                
i
     
i,t
               + Year+ Industry Year*Industry+  ( 2.4 )    
 
 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.6, we report the fixed effects estimates using a static 
version of the investment expectation model in Eq. (2.4). The results show that the impact of 
free cash flow on abnormal investment is only significantly positive for the firms in Group 1 
and Group 3. To further check robustness, in columns 3 and 4, we use the system GMM 
approach to estimate the dynamic version of Eq. (2.4), accounting for the possible 
endogeneity of the regressors, as well as for firm-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity. 
Once again the results confirm our hypotheses.
52, 53
  
                                                          
51
 CFAIP,i,t is calculated as (CFO,i,t - I_main,i,t) and represents cash flow generated from assets in place. 
52
 Given that sales growth can be used to control for investment opportunities, we replace Q by sales growth in 
Eq. (2.4). The results were robust to making this change. For brevity, these results are not reported, but are 
available upon request. 
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[Insert Table 2.6] 
 
2.5.2.2. Using a quantile estimator 
To further test the robustness of our results, we estimate Eq. (2.2) using a quantile estimator.  
Specifically, we run separate regressions for the 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 quantiles of the 
distribution of I
u
_newi,t, calculated separately for firms with negative and positive FCF. The 
results, which are reported in columns 1 to 6 of Table 2.7, are in line with our prior findings: 
we observe a positive and significant relationship between free cash flow and abnormal 
investment, stronger for the under-investing firms with negative FCF and the over-investing 
firms with positive FCF. The advantage of using this estimator is that it enables us to 
examine how free cash flow influences firms’ abnormal investment for firms with different 
levels of abnormal investment.  
Specifically, for under-investing firms, we observe a decreasing trend of the 
coefficients associated with DumFCF<0 when we move from the smallest quantile of abnormal 
investment (0.056) to the largest (0.012). This suggests that firms with free cash flow below 
their optimal level exhibit higher FCF sensitivities when they suffer from more under-
investment.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
53
 For the dynamic model, the J-tests reject the null that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. This could 
be due to the fact that the presence of intra-cluster correlation or heteroskedasticity causes standard statistics to 
over-reject the null (Arellano & Bond 1991; Hall & Horowitz 1996; Hoxby & Paserman 1998). However, since 
the m(n) tests do not indicate any serial correlation of the differenced residuals, we believe that our instruments 
and specification are generally acceptable.  
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For over-investing firms, we find evidence of an increasing trend for the coefficients 
associated with DumFCF>0 moving from the smallest quantile of abnormal investment (0.012) 
to the largest (0.07). This indicates that the more over-investment firms experience, the 
higher their FCF sensitivities. The p-values associated with the test for the equality of the 
free cash flow coefficients between firms with positive and negative FCF show that, with one 
exception (column 2), these differences are significant.
54
 This confirms the robustness of our 
previous results.
55
 
[Insert Table 2.7] 
Bergstresser (2006) notes that the distinction between under-investment and over-
investment based on Richardson (2006)’s approach might have some flaws, as ex-post over-
investment (under-investment) may be suspected to follow ex-ante under-investment (over-
investment) in a dynamic setting, which causes mean reverting properties. To take this 
problem into account, as a further robustness test, we define under- and over- investing firms 
as those firms with two consecutive years of under- and over- investment, respectively. The 
results, reported in columns 7 and 8 of Table 2.7, are once again consistent with our prior 
findings: significant differences in free cash flow sensitivities are found between firms facing 
negative and positive FCF, for both under- and over-investing firms. 
                                                          
54
 The insignificance of the Wald statistic for the equality of the coefficients in column 2 may be associated 
with the fact that neither the FCF coefficients are precisely determined. 
55
 Additional evidence shows that that the sensitivities of under-investment to free cash flow for the 5
th
 and 
95
th
 quantile regressions are 0.109 and 0.006, respectively; while those of over-investment are 0.006 and 0.266, 
respectively. We also find similar results using the 20
th
, 40
th
, 60
th
 and 80
th
 quantile regressions. These results are 
not reported for brevity, but are available upon request. 
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In summary, we have followed Richardson (2006) to construct measures of under- 
and over-investment and free cash flow, and found a positive and significant  relationship 
between investment and free cash flow only for Group 1 firms (under-investing firms with 
negative FCF) and Group 3 firms (over-investing firms with positive FCF). We interpreted 
these findings as evidence in favor of financing constraints (FC) and agency costs (AC) 
hypotheses, respectively. We next dig deeper into these interpretations by analyzing these 
sensitivities for firms facing higher/lower degrees of financing constraints and agency costs, 
measured using a variety of different criteria. 
 
2.5.3. Financial constraints, agency costs and the sensitivity of abnormal investment to 
FCF: further tests 
2.5.3.1. The financing constraints (FC) hypothesis of under-investment 
We now provide further tests of the financing constraints hypothesis of under-investment. To 
this end, we focus on under-investing observations. 
 
2.5.3.1.1. Using the KZ and WW indexes to measure financing constraints 
To further investigate the role of financial constraints on firms’ investment behavior, we use 
two indexes to measure firm-specific levels of the constraints: the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) 
index (Lamont et al. 2001) and the Whited and Wu (WW) index (Whited & Wu 2006). 
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Focusing on the former, we note that Kaplan & Zingales (1997) classify their sample 
of firms into five groups on the basis of their degree of financial constraints via qualitative 
information contained in the firms’ annual reports, as well as quantitative information 
regarding management’s statements on liquidity. Motivated by Kaplan & Zingales (1997), 
Lamont et al. (2001) perform an ordered Logit estimation of the categories of constraints on 
five financial ratios using the original KZ sample: cash flow (CFt, net income + depreciation); 
dividends (DIVt); cash and cash equivalents (Casht) deflated by beginning of year capital (Kt-
1); Tobin’s Q (Qt, market value of equity +market value of net debt)/(total assets-net 
intangible assets));
 
and debt (Debtt, the sum of the short-term and long-term debt) to total 
capital (TKt, sum of debt and equity). We use the estimated coefficients that they obtain to 
construct the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index of financial constraints in the following way:  
                      
 
A firm with a higher value of the KZ index can be intended to be more financially 
constrained. 
An alternative index of constraints (the WW index), constructed by Whited and Wu 
(2006), is also used to measure for financial constraints in our study. Their index is 
constructed using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of a structural 
investment model on COMPUSTAT quarterly data. Specifically, based on the Euler equation 
incorporating the shadow cost of scarce external finance, the WW index is a linear function of 
six observable firm characteristics: cash flow [CFt/BAt-1, (net income + 
depreciation)/beginning-of-year book assets]; a dividend indicator (DIVPOSt, indicating 
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positive dividends); long-term debt (TLTDt/CAt-1, long-term debt to total current assets); 
Tobin’s Q (Qt); size (LNBAt, natural log of the book value of assets); firm real sales growth 
(SGRt); and industry sales growth (ISGt). We compute the WW index as follows, using the 
estimated coefficients from their specification: 
 
 
Once again, a higher value of the WW index is representative of a higher level of financial 
constraints. 
We then investigate whether the degree of financial constraints faced by firms matters 
for the free cash flow sensitivity of under- and over-investment. To this end, as in Almeida et 
al. (2004), we classify firms as facing relatively low, medium and high financial constraints 
in a given year if their KZ or WW indices in that year fall respectively in the bottom three, the 
middle four, and the top three deciles of the distribution of the indexes of all firms operating 
in the same industry they belong to.
56
 In this way, we allow firms in our sample to transit 
among financial constraint categories each year. As a robustness check, we also use a 50% 
threshold.  
Table 2.8 presents summary statistics of the two firm-specific indexes of financing 
constraints across the four groups of firms based on their abnormal investments and free cash 
                                                          
56
 It is worth mentioning that we do not mean that firms ranked in the top three deciles of the distribution of 
the KZ and WW indices are absolutely financially constrained, while firms in the bottom three deciles are 
absolutely financially unconstrained. Instead, we argue that those firms in the top three deciles are likely to face 
more severe financing constraints than those in the bottom three deciles.    
2 6
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flow. The higher these indexes, the higher the degree of financing constraints faced by the 
firms. We conduct statistical tests for equality of both sample means (t-test) and sample 
medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) across groups of firms.  
[Insert Table 2.8] 
According to the financial constraints (FC) hypothesis, firms are more likely to under-
invest if they face a higher degree of financing constraints. To test this hypothesis, we 
compare the two indexes across under-investing firms in Group 1 and Group 2. We find that, 
regardless of whether we use the mean or the median, the level of financial constraints 
(measured using both the KZ and WW indices) for Group 1 (under-investing firms with 
negative FCF) is larger than that for Group 2 (under-investing firms with positive FCF). As 
can be seen from the p-values of both tests, the differences in the means and the median of 
the indicators are generally significant at the 5% level. Consistent with our Hypotheses 1, this 
suggests that differences in the financial constraints faced by firms are a key factor in 
distinguishing between the firms in Group 1 and Group 2. Thus, as discussed in the former 
section, financial constraints may contribute to the higher responsiveness of under-investment 
to negative free cash flow for the firms in Group 1. 
Table 2.9 presents fixed effects estimates of Eq. (2.3), which intends to test the effects 
of free cash flow on under-investment for firms characterized by different degrees of 
financial constraints, calculated using the KZ index (columns 1 and 2) and the WW index 
(columns 3 and 4). In columns 1 and 3, under-investing firms are partitioned into three 
categories, based on terciles of the two indices, while in columns 2 and 4, they are partitioned 
into two categories, based on the median of the two indices. 
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[Insert Table 2.9] 
Columns 1 and 3 reveal that for under-investing firms, the higher the KZ index or the 
WW index, the larger the sensitivities of investment to free cash flow. This suggests that 
sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow tend to increase monotonically with the 
degree of external financial constraints faced by firms. Similar results are found in columns 2 
and 4 when we use a 50% threshold. The p-values of the Wald tests reject the equality of the 
coefficients of free cash flow between more and less financially constrained groups. This 
supports our Hypotheses 1, according to which the more financial constraints under-investing 
firms face, the higher their responsiveness of abnormal investment to free cash flow. 
 
2.5.3.1.2. Can conventional variables for financial constraints be used to explain the 
financing constraints (FC) hypothesis of under-investment? 
In this section, we use different variables based on the a priori likelihood of being financially 
constrained to test our Hypothesis 1. If our hypothesis holds, we should expect a stronger 
relationship between under-investment and free cash flow for firms which are more likely to 
face financial constraints. Specifically, we focus on the a priori likelihood of being 
financially constrained based on firms’ size (total real assets and number of employees) and 
dividend payout (ratio and indicator), which are commonly used in the literature to partition 
firms into financially constrained and unconstrained. Focusing on firm size, small firms 
might not have a sufficiently long track record, leading to increased asymmetric information. 
In addition, small firms are typically characterized by high idiosyncratic risk and high 
bankruptcy costs, which might exclude them from credit markets, or make their access to 
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external finance more costly (Gertler & Gilchrist 1994; Beck et al. 2005; Clementi & 
Hopenhayn 2006; Guariglia 2008).  
We measure firms’ size by their total real assets and number of employees. 
Specifically, we define as small in a given year (Smalli,t=1)  those firms whose total real 
assets or number of  employees fall in the bottom three deciles of the distribution of the assets 
and number of employees of all firms operating in the same industry as that firms in that 
given year. Similarly, we define as medium-sized firm-years (Mediumi,t=1) those 
observations falling in the middle four deciles of the distribution, and as large firm-years 
(Largei,t=1), those with total real assets or number of employees in the top three deciles of the 
distribution. 
Columns 1 (where size is measured using total assets) and 2 (where the number of 
employees is used as a proxy for size) of Table 2.10 show a decreasing clear trend for the 
coefficients of free cash flow, moving from small, to medium sized, to large firms. The Wald 
tests show these differences in the FCF coefficients between large and small groups are 
significant at the 1% level. Hence, using firm size as a criterion of financial constraints also 
supports our Hypothesis 1. 
[Insert Table 2.10] 
Focusing on dividends, prior literature shows that low-dividend payout is also likely 
to reflect tighter financial constraints (Fazzari et al. 1988; Kaplan & Zingales 1997; Cleary 
1999; Almeida et al. 2004; Almeida & Campello 2007). When firms are more susceptible to 
capital market imperfections, they are likely to cut or reduce dividend payout. Since low-
dividend firms cannot generate enough internal funds or obtain enough external funds for 
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their desired investments, they have to retain all low-cost internal finance, at the expense of 
paying dividends. We rank firms based on their dividend payout ratio, which is measured as 
the ratio of cash dividends to net income.
57
 Low-dividend firm-years (Low_Divi,t =1) are 
those, whose payout ratio in a given year falls in the bottom three deciles of the distribution 
of the corresponding ratio of all firms operating in the same industry they belong to in that 
year. Similarly, medium-dividend firm-years (Medium_Divi,t =1) are those whose dividends 
fall in the middle four deciles of the distribution, and high-dividend firm-years (High_Divi,t 
=1), those in the top three deciles of the distribution. In addition, we also proxy whether a 
firm has a propensity of being liquidity constrained in a given year according to its dividend 
payout status with a dummy variable (Div_yesi,t), which equals 1 if the firm has made any 
cash dividend payment in the year, and 0, otherwise. In all cases, we interact free cash flow 
with these dummies and examine the coefficients on the interaction terms in our abnormal 
investment regressions. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.10 report the estimates after we categorize firm-years 
respectively based on their dividend payout ratio and dividend payout policy. The FCF 
coefficients for the under-investing firm-years who have low dividend payout ratio or do not 
pay any dividends are larger than those of observations with high dividend payout ratio or 
that pay dividends. This confirms once again our prediction that the sensitivity of investment 
to free cash flow increases in the degree of financial constraints encountered by under-
investing firms. The differences between the coefficients for firms with high dividend payout 
ratio (paying dividends) and those with low dividend payout ratio (not paying dividends) are 
significant at the 1% level. 
                                                          
    
57
 The reason why we only consider cash dividends is that paying stock dividends in China may reflect firms’ 
financial constraints. 
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In summary, the results we obtained using conventional variables as proxies for 
financial constraints are highly consistent with the previous results and our Hypothesis 1, 
which suggests that for under-investing firms, the sensitivities of investment to free cash flow 
increase with the firm’s degree of financial constraints. 
 
2.5.3.2. The agency costs (AC) hypothesis of over-investment 
We now focus on testing the agency costs (AC) hypothesis of over-investment. To this end, 
we focus on over-investing observations.  
 
2.5.3.2.1. Using the ratio of operating expenses to total assets and the ratio of other 
receivables to total assets to proxy for agency costs 
Following the literature (Ang et al. 2000; Singh & Davidson III 2003; Henry 2010), we first 
use the ratio of operating expenses to total assets (AC1) to proxy for agency costs. This ratio 
measures the efficiency with which the firm’s management controls operating costs, which 
include direct pay to the managers as well as perquisite consumption. This criterion focuses 
on the principal-agent problems, namely the conflicts between firm managers and 
shareholders. AC1 can be seen as a measure of the extent to which firms are susceptible to 
agency problems. Generally, relatively higher ratios are associated with higher managerial 
discretion as well as agency misalignment.  
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Our second measure of agency costs emphasizes the conflict between controlling 
shareholder and minority investors, which is referred to as “tunneling”. It has been argued 
that tunneling is highly widespread in emerging markets like China since most listed 
companies tend to have a concentrated ownership structure. In addition, corporate 
governance mechanisms and the legal system in China offer few options to protect minority 
shareholders from controlling shareholders (Liu & Lu 2007; Jiang et al. 2010). Following 
Jiang et al. (2010), we use the ratio of other receivables to total assets (AC2) to measure how 
likely controlling shareholders are of expropriating minority investors
58
. A higher value of 
AC2 implies therefore a higher level of agency costs. Average other receivables in our sample 
constitute about 5% of total assets, and the maximum value of the ratio is around 60%, 
suggesting a high level of agency costs.  
In order to investigate the extent to which agency costs matter for the sensitivities of 
under- or over- investment to free cash flow, we partition firms each year on the basis of the 
two agency costs ratios (AC1 and AC2). Specifically, we classify a firm as facing relatively 
low, medium or high agency costs in a given year if its ratios in that year fall respectively in 
the bottom three, the medium four, or the top three deciles of the corresponding ratios of all 
firms operating in the same industry it belongs to. As an additional check, we also use a 50% 
threshold.  
Table 2.11 presents summary statistics of two firm-specific indicators of agency costs 
after we categorize firms into the four groups based on their abnormal investments and free 
cash flow. The ratio of operating expenses to total assets (AC1) and the ratio of other 
                                                          
    
58
 According to Jiang et al. (2010), “during 1996-2006, tens of billions in RMB were siphoned [through inter-
corporate loans] from hundreds of Chinese listed firms by controlling shareholders” (p.2). The authors explain 
that these inter-corporate loans are typically reported as “other receivables”. 
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receivable scaled by total assets (AC2) are used to proxy for the two types of agency 
problems that firms face, which are in turn the conflicts between firm managers and 
shareholders and those between controlling shareholder and minority investors. As in Table 
2.8, we conduct statistical tests for the equality of both sample means (t-test) and sample 
medians (the Wilcoxon rank-sum test).  
[Insert Table 2.11] 
Comparing Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive FCF) with Group 4 (over-
investing firms with negative FCF), we observe that the level of agency costs (AC1 or AC2) 
of the former group is larger than that of the latter group. All statistical tests indicate that the 
differences in the means and medians between the two groups are significant at the 1% level. 
These statistics are in line with the agency costs (AC) hypothesis, and hence with our 
Hypothesis 2, according to which firms endowed with excess free cash flow are likely to 
overinvest. The summary statistics demonstrate that the level of agency costs is a crucial 
factor in differentiating between the firms in Group 3 and those in Group 4.  
To explore this issue further, Table 2.12 presents the fixed effects estimates of Eq. 
(2.3), aimed at testing the effects of changes in free cash flow on over-investment for firms 
characterized by different levels of agency costs. In columns 1 and 3, a firm is assumed to 
face more (less) agency problems in a given year if its AC1 or AC2 index lies in the top 
(bottom) three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding index for all firms belonging to 
its same industry in that year. In columns 2 and 4, we consider a firm to face more (less) 
agency costs if its AC1 or AC2 exceed (are below) the median value within its industry in a 
given year.  
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[Insert Table 2.12] 
We observe that, with only one exception in column 3, the sensitivity of investment to 
free cash flow tends to increase monotonically with the degree of agency costs faced by 
firms.
59
 The Wald tests generally reject the equality of the coefficients of free cash flow 
between high-agency-cost and low-agency-cost firms. This provides support for our 
Hypothesis 2, according to which for over-investing firms, higher agency costs are associated 
with a higher responsiveness of abnormal investment to free cash flow.  
 
2.5.3.2.2. Can ownership structure be used to explain the agency costs (AC) hypothesis of 
over-investment? 
To better understand the extent to which agency costs matter for the sensitivity of abnormal 
investment to free cash flow, in this section, we partition firms on the basis of their ownership 
structure. Following the literature, and especially Ang et al. (2000) and Jiang et al. (2010), 
we construct a series of ownership structure variables to proxy for the agency costs faced by 
firms. Our first measure is motivated by international evidence that agency costs may arise 
when the managerial interests are not in line with those of the firm’s shareholders. 
Managerial ownership (Shareholding_CEOi,t) tends to relieve principal-agent problems 
between (outside) shareholders and managers. Thus, agency costs (arising from the conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders) should be lower at firms managed by a 
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 Even in column 6, though, it is the firms characterized by high agency costs which exhibit the highest 
sensitivity of over-investment to free cash flow. Firms with low or medium agency costs display insignificant 
FCF coefficients. 
Chapter 2                       A balancing act: managing financial constraints and agency costs 
to minimize investment inefficiency in the Chinese market 
79 
shareholder.
60
 In order to test whether this is the case, we construct a dummy variable 
Insideri,t (Outsideri,t), which is equal to one if a firm is managed by a shareholder (outsider), 
and 0 otherwise. Specifically, if the top executives including CEO are holding any of their 
own shares, they will be considered as insiders. We then interact free cash flow with the 
Insideri,t and Outsideri,t dummies and examine the differences in the coefficients associated 
with the two interaction terms in our abnormal investment regressions. 
The second measure focuses on the percentage of shares controlled by the largest 
shareholder (Blockholderi,t). It has been argued that concentrated ownership is positively 
associated with firm’s agency costs. As mentioned before, agency costs, arising from the 
conflict of interest between controlling shareholder and minority investors, may arise when 
controlling shareholder extract private benefits from minority shareholders (which is referred 
to as “tunneling”). The ability of the primary owner to expropriate minority investors is 
expected to increase with his/her ownership. When the interests of controlling shareholders 
are not aligned with those of other investors, there is in fact good reason to believe that the 
former may use their power to influence the firm’s investment decisions to promote their 
interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Therefore, a high concentration of 
ownership at the firm level may indicates a strong incentive to tunnel and a high level of 
agency costs (Liu & Lu 2007). However, primary owners in China, often have rather large 
power to control the company’s operation even by only holding a relatively low stake of 
                                                          
    
60
 This can be explained considering that inside managers may have more closely aligned interests with the 
firm’s shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose a hypothesis of convergence of interest between 
shareholders and managers and improvement of corporate performance as the managerial ownership increases. 
Kren and Kerr (1997), Ang et al. (2000), Singh and Davidson (2003), and McKnight and Weir (2009) also 
provide support for the argument that managerial ownership reduces agency costs. 
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shares, through pyramid structures and cross-holding among firms. When the primary 
owner’s controlling right is greater than his/her ownership right, he/she tends to derive more 
benefits from tunneling activities. Thus, a lower incentive to tunnel, and lower agency costs 
are expected when the highest percentage of shares is held by the primary owner, with lower 
separation of voting rights and cash-flow rights (Jiang et al. 2010). Additionally, investors 
with a large ownership stake generally have a strong interest in the firm’s profit maximization 
and have a higher incentive to oversee or monitor the manger. Hence, agency costs intended 
as the conflict between firm managers and shareholders, tend to decline with the ownership 
stake of controlling shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Ang et al. 2000). The ownership 
stake of the controlling shareholder has therefore an ambiguous effect on the overall agency 
costs faced by the firm. 
Our next measure of agency costs is constructed to capture the intensity of 
competition between controlling shareholder. A distinct characteristic of Chinese listed firms 
is that the largest shareholder has dominant control over the firm, while the rest of largest 
owners have relatively small ownership. The risk that the controlling shareholder might 
expropriate minority investors or tunnel is likely to decrease when large shareholders other 
than the largest one are able to oversee or put pressure on the largest shareholder. This form 
of coalition or challenge can help to overcome the agency problems arising from tunneling. 
Additionally, large shareholders also have incentives to monitor the management, which 
reduces the principal-agent problems. In other words, these large shareholders might be able 
to fight for corporate control if the management is under-performing. Following (Liu & Lu 
2007), we construct a Herfindahl-type index Share2_10i,t (Concentrationi,t), which is the sum 
of squares of shareholding percentage of the second to the tenth largest shareholders. This 
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index measures corporate control by the concentration of shares in the hands of top 10 
shareholders excluding the largest shareholder.
61
  
For the last two measures of firms’ ownership structure, we construct the dummies 
Low_sharei,t, Medium_sharei,t, and High_sharei,t, which are in turn equal to 1 if Blockholderi,t 
or Share2_10i,t of firm i in year t lies respectively in the bottom three deciles, the middle four 
deciles, and the top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding ratios of all firms 
operating in the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise. We then interact these 
dummies with free cash flow and examine the coefficients of the interaction terms in our 
abnormal investment regressions. 
The results are reported in Table 2.13. In column 1, we observe that a firm managed 
by an outsider has a significantly higher sensitivity of over-investment to free cash flow. This 
can be explained considering that outside managers may not have closely aligned interests 
with the firm’s shareholders. Furthermore, managerial ownership is negatively associated 
with firm’s principal-agent problems.62 This is in line with our expectation that, for over-
investing firms, agency problems between entrenched managers and shareholder contribute to 
higher sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow.  
                                                          
   
61
 We find similar results using alternative indexes, such as, for instance, the sum of the shareholding 
percentage of the top 10 shareholders excluding the largest shareholder. Our results were also robust to using the 
ratio of the sum of the shareholding percentages from the second largest to the tenth largest shareholders to the 
shareholding percentage of the largest shareholder. The latter index measures the likelihood of the largest 
shareholder being challenged by other large shareholders. These results are not reported in this chapter for 
brevity.  
   
62
 In our sample, there is separation between management and ownership. Only 33.6% of firm-years have 
managers who are also shareholders in their companies. It is worth noting that in our sample, managers only 
hold on average around 0.27% of their own shares. Relative low ownership stakes prevent managers from 
pursuing their own interests at the expense of firms, as they are supervised and controlled by the board, as well 
as by capital markets.  
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[Insert Table 2.13] 
In column 2, we conduct a test using the shareholding from the largest shareholder 
(Blockhoder) as a proxy for agency costs. Observations are divided into large (top three 
deciles), medium (medium four deciles) and low (bottom three deciles) shareholding. 
Interestingly, we find that the coefficient associated with free cash flow is the largest for the 
medium shareholding category. This suggests that, the sensitivity of over-investment to FCF 
initially increases with the shares held by the largest shareholder, then decreases.
63
 These 
differences between categories can be explained in part considering that, as previously 
discussed, there are arguments both in favor and against a positive relationship between 
controlling share ownership and agency problems. This finding is also in line with Jiang et al. 
(2010), according to which agency costs, indicated by tunneling (AC2) are highest when the 
largest shareholder owns a medium percentage (30%) of the firm’s shares.  
Lastly, we use ownership concentration (the sum of squares of shareholding 
percentage of top 10 shareholders excluding the largest shareholder, Share2_10) to test for 
the intensity of competition for controlling shareholder. Once again, observations are divided 
on the basis of deciles of this variable. Column 3 shows that smaller (around 0.03) and 
insignificant free cash flow coefficients exist for over-investing firms with medium or high 
Share2_10, compared with larger (0.13) and significant (at the 1%) coefficients for those 
with low Share2_10. These findings confirm that in countries without good shareholder 
protection such as China, other large shareholders, as potentials contestants, are able to 
effectively monitor and restrain the largest shareholder and managers, reducing in this way 
                                                          
   
63
 It should be noted, however, that p-values associated with the Wald tests cannot significantly reject the 
equality of the impact of free cash flow on investment between firms characterized by different percentages of 
shares owned by the largest shareholders. 
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the firm’s agency costs, intended in terms of the principal-agent problems, as well as the 
expropriation of minority investors.  
In summary, these findings are strongly aligned with the previous results and our 
Hypothesis 2: The sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash flow rises with the degree 
of agency costs faced by over-investing firms. 
 
2.5.4. Exploring firms’ “ST” status and M&A behavior  
In this section, we attempt to provide some further in-depth evidence on whether or not our 
financial constraints (FC) and agency costs (AC) hypotheses can be confirmed. We do this 
focusing on the “Special Treatment” (“ST”) status and firms’ expansion behavior through 
M&As.  
 
2.5.4.1. “ST” status 
Given the unique Chinese context, we use a Chinese-specific indicator called “Special 
Treatment (ST)”, to study the impact of de-listing risks on the degrees of financial constraints 
and agency problems faced by firms. Since 1998, China’s Stock exchanges implemented a 
“ST” (special statement) regulation in order to improve the corporate governance of listed 
firms, by increasing market transparency and warning and protecting investors, especially the 
small and medium-sized ones. When a firm has two consecutive annual losses, it is labeled as 
a “ST” firm and needs an internal audit report. Moreover, during the “ST” period, its stocks 
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are constrained to a 5% daily up and down limit.
 64
 According to Jian & Wong (2010), a firm 
which faces high agency problems, and is particularly involved in tunneling activities is very 
likely to acquire “ST”  status in the future. Thus, “ST” status can be regarded as a measure of 
agency costs. Moreover, given that “ST” firms are under pressure of being de-listed from the 
stock exchanges, “ST” status can also be linked to being financially constrained. We generate 
a dummy variable STi, which is equal to one (STi=1) if a firm has been issued a special 
treatment or a de-listing risk warning, and 0 otherwise. Pre_STi,t (Post_ST i,t) is a dummy 
variable for the pre- (post-) period of “ST”, which equals one in the year before (after) a firm 
is labeled as a “ST”, and zero otherwise. We then interact free cash flow with these dummies 
and examine the behavior of the coefficients associated with the interaction terms in our 
abnormal investment regressions. 
Estimates of our abnormal investment equations differentiating firms into “ST” and 
“non-ST” groups are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.14. We observe that that “ST” 
firms exhibit higher sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow than their 
“non_ST” counterparts. This finding applies both to under- and over- investing firms. In both 
cases, the Wald tests reject the equality of the coefficients between “ST” and “non_ST” 
firms. The likely explanation for this result is that “ST” firms generally face both higher 
financial constrained and agency problems.  
[Insert Table 2.14] 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.14 further differentiate between the pre- and post- periods 
of “ST”.  Interestingly, we observe that firms in the post-ST period display a higher degree of 
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 See Appendix 2.3 for more details. 
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financial constraints and lower agency costs compared to those in the pre-ST period.
65
 These 
findings suggest that firms that have poor corporate governance, indicated by most severe 
agency problems, are more likely to acquire “ST” status in the future. However, after firms 
are designated “ST”, they are edgy to restore profitability in order to avoid being de-listed. 
As argued in Liu & Lu (2007), given the strong incentive to maintain the listed status, 
incumbent controlling shareholders, under the pressure from regulators and the markets tend 
to restructure the firm’s business as well as its corporate governance. However, if the 
incumbent controlling shareholder is not able to force the firm’s performance to turn around, 
under the encouragement from the government, a fierce contest over corporate control will be 
triggered. Typically, other large or potential shareholders may wish to take control of the 
firms by means of mergers and acquisitions or offering a better restructuring process. 
Consequently, the majority of “ST” firms have their controlling shareholders changed one or 
two years after being designated “ST”. Yet, since these “ST” firms are rarely de-listed or go 
into actual bankruptcy, it is believed that improvements in firms’ performance as well as 
governance (such as discipline of firm managers or protection for minority shareholders) are 
triggered after labeling a firm as “ST”.  
Focusing on under-investment, “ST” firms are generally relatively more financially 
constrained than “non-ST” firms both before and after the “ST” warning is issued. The “ST” 
announcement may play a signaling role to the markets and investors, and consequently, 
“ST” firms are likely to face more pressure from credit markets. This may explain why these 
firms display higher sensitivities of under-investment to free cash flow not only before, but 
also after they are designated “ST”. 
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 P-values associated with the Wald tests only reject the equality of the impact of free cash flow on 
investment between firms in the pre- and post- ST periods for over-investing firms. 
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In summary, our results indicate that, on the one hand, acquiring “ST” status is 
associated with higher agency problems. Consequently, in order to avoid being de-listed from 
the exchanges, “ST” firms have strong incentives to improve their governance and restore 
profitability. On the other hand, our results also suggest that “ST” firms generally display 
financial difficulties both before and after the warning is issued. 
 
2.5.4.2. Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As)  
Next, we consider firms’ M&A activity. Following the spirit of Jensen (1986), Harford 
(1999), and Malmendier & Tate  (2008), conducting mergers can be seen as a signal for the 
existence of agency costs, as it may follow from managerial entrenchment or overconfidence. 
The intuition is straightforward: acquisitions are used by empire-building or overconfident 
CEOs or controlling shareholders to spend abundant internal resources for their own benefit. 
We define Bidderi,t as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm becomes a bidder 
in the next fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Bidder_coni,t is a dummy variable for 
frequent bidding firms, which takes the value of 1 if firms have more than one bidding in two 
consecutive years, and 0 otherwise. Once again, we interact free cash flow with these 
dummies and examine the coefficients on the interaction terms in our abnormal investment 
regressions. 
Column 6 of Table 2.14 presents the results differentiating over-investing firms which 
become bidders in the next fiscal year and those who do not. As expected, the FCF 
coefficients are higher for the former. However, the difference in the sensitivities between the 
two groups is not statistically significant. As a further check, we define as agency 
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problematic or aggressive those frequent acquirers, i.e. those firms that have more than one 
bidding activity in two consecutive years. In column 8, those frequent bidding firms have 
much higher coefficient (0.104) associated with free cash flow than other firms (0.046). The 
Wald test here rejects the equality of the estimates in the two sub-groups. In brief, our results 
suggest that frequent bidding increases the likelihood of agency problems faced by firms. 
Alternatively, the finding may suggest that firms with higher agency costs are more likely to 
engage in multiple acquisitions. Alternatively, the finding may suggest that firms with higher 
agency costs are more likely to engage in multiple acquisitions. This is consistent with Billett 
& Qian (2008), who show that frequent acquisitions are value-destructive. A possible 
explanation may be that due to hubris or entrenchment, managers or controlling shareholders 
rely on multiple acquisition transactions to pursue private benefits. 
Turning to the under-investing firms, we observe similar sensitivities of investment to 
free cash flow between bidding and non-bidding firms: participating in M&As does not seem 
to affect firms’ financial constraints status.66 
 
2.5.5. Exploring other dimensions of firm heterogeneity 
We next explore whether financial constraints and agency problems have different effects 
across firms which differ according to state/non-state ownership, location, and exporting 
status. 
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 Our results indicate that the difference in sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow between 
bidding and non-bidding firms is restricted to firms with over-investment, which are more likely to experience 
higher agency problems, but not under-investing firms. 
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2.5.5.1. Estimating Eq. (2.3) differentiating firms into state/non-state owned 
The literature finds substantial evidence of wide imbalances across various ownership 
categories in China (Allen et al. 2005). For example, firms from the state sector obtain the 
majority of domestic bank credit, while it is difficult for non-state firms to access  external 
funding (Allen et al. 2005). However, firms from the non-state sectors have been expanding 
much faster than those from other sectors and contribute most to China’s growth (Allen et al. 
2007). Therefore, the variance in ownership structures plays a crucial role in determining the 
extent to which Chinese firms face financial constraints and agency problems (Ding et al. 
2010; Poncet et al. 2010; Guariglia et al. 2011; Huang et al. 2011).  
In order to evaluate the sensitivities of under- and over-investment to free cash flow 
for different types of Chinese firms, we initially distinguish the firms into two ownership 
categories according to their ultimate controlling shareholder: the SOE sector and the non-
SOE sector. The former group includes all companies held by state-controlled entities, which 
constitute the majority of listed firms.
67
 The non-state sector has non-state entities as 
controlling shareholder. Among these, there are six types of ownership groups: domestic 
private, foreign, collective, employees’ union, non-profit organizations or institutes, and 
others.
68
  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.15 present estimates of Eq. (2.3) for sub-samples split 
based on ownership. Interestingly, for the under-investing group, there seem to be marginally 
significant differences in FCF sensitivities across firms owned by different agents: the 
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 SOEs constitute the majority of our sample firms (72.2%). This is why we only consider two ownership 
categories in our study, grouping all non-stated firms into one sector. 
68
 Within the non-SOE sector, domestic private companies constitute 84% of the sample firms.  
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sensitivities of under-investment to free cash flow for state-owned enterprises are lower than 
those for non-SOEs (column 1). This suggests that state-controlled enterprises face less 
financial constraints compared with non-state-controlled firms. This result may be explained 
considering that SOEs have a duty to maintain social stability and achieve other political 
objectives. For this reason, they find it easier to obtain credit from state-owned banks  
(Boyreau-Debray 2003; Bai et al. 2006). This is in line with Allen et al. (2007), who  point 
out that state-controlled firms take up the majority of loans, and with  Guariglia et al. (2011), 
who show that the growth of SOEs is not affected by the availability of internal funds. 
[Insert Table 2.15] 
We also observe a positive FCF coefficient for over-investing state-controlled firms, 
but not for their non-state-controlled counterparts (column 2). This suggests that only listed 
firms, whose controlling shareholders are state entities, are likely to invest above their 
optimal levels and that state-controlled firms face higher agency problems than non-state-
controlled firms. This finding is consistent with Firth et al. (2012), who show that 
government controlled listed firms tend to over-invest compared to privately controlled listed 
firms. Managers of SOEs are in fact more likely to undertake suboptimal projects in order to 
pursue private benefits or better career opportunities. The presence of soft budget constraints 
may also enhance the agency problems faced by Chinese SOEs (Chow et al. 2010). As they 
can always be bailed out by the government, these firms tend in fact to engage in excessive 
investment. Moreover, due to the fact that most of listed firms in China are carve-outs or 
spin-offs from former SOEs, the state shareholders have higher ownership stakes (control 
rights) compared to non-SOEs, thus they are likely to extract resources from these listed 
firms. Another possible explanation might be due to the fact firms with higher state 
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ownership might have political and social objectives, which might not coincide with 
shareholders’ interests. Particularly, the managers of SOEs, who are selected by the 
government, may have to sacrifice efficiency by being asked to increase employment or offer 
more social welfare to their employees, so as to avoid social instability, or to meet output 
growth targets to achieve political objectives (Shleifer & Vishny 1994; Qian 1996; Allen et 
al. 2005; Wei et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2011).
69  
In columns 3 and 5, we separate state-controlled enterprises into those controlled by 
local governments (e.g. town village enterprises) and those controlled by central agencies, 
using a relative small ownership sub-sample from 2003 to 2010. Recent studies show that a 
distinction should be made among SOEs affiliated with the central (SOECGs) or local 
(SOELGs) government (Chen et al. 2009a; Cheung et al. 2010; Jiang et al. 2010). We find 
that both SOEs affiliated with the central and local governments display lower sensitivities of 
under-investment to free cash flow compared those non-SOEs, suggesting that it is much 
easier for SOEs to access credit.   
However, SOEs affiliated with the local governments display the highest sensitivity of 
over-investment to free cash flow. On the contrary, the sensitivity of over-investment to free 
cash flow for SOEs affiliated with the central government is poorly determined. The 
differences in the coefficients between different ownership groups are statistically significant. 
There are four possible explanations for the higher agency problems faced by firms affiliated 
with local governments or state asset management bureaus at the local government level. 
First, despite the fact that local governments manage state assets according to national law 
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 Political costs which come from political interference can be regarded as a form of agency costs as 
politicians can be seen as one of most important agents in the unique Chinese context. 
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and regulations, they have more freedom to make their own influencing policies. Second, it is 
more difficult for the press or central and judicial authorities to apply or enforce laws and 
regulations further away from the center of power, and hence local governments often act 
independently of the central government and are subject to higher corruption, and less likely 
of be prosecuted for misappropriation of state funds. Third, local governments have higher 
incentives to intervene and expand the firms that they control due to higher soft budget 
constraints: when they incur losses, additional financial assistance, cuts in taxes, and other 
compensations are generally offered by local governments to maintain their listing. Finally, 
SOELGs tend to have higher agency problems due to weaker supervision and management 
(Chen et al. 2009a; Cheung et al. 2010).  
By contrast, SOECGs are controlled by the central government under the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). These companies are usually 
large and nation-wide, and operate in strategically vital sectors such as banking, energy, 
utilities, transportation etc., which matter for national economic development and social 
stability.  Under the well-established policy of “grasp the large and let go of the small” (Zhua 
Da Fang Xiao), there is more strict supervision and monitoring for these firms from 
departments under the central government including the National Audit Office (NAO). 
Furthermore, the board of directors or general managers of firms controlled by the central 
government often have higher qualifications and abilities. They have greater incentives to 
perform well in their jobs to prevent them from endangering their chances of promotion to 
higher government echelons. This is indicated by the fact that many of these chairmen 
become vice ministers of the state. Therefore, central-government-controlled enterprises may 
face lower agency costs.  
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Our findings are in line with previous research by Chen et al. (2009a), according to 
which, SOELGs are less effective as controlling shareholders of listed firms than SOECGs 
due to the different objectives and degrees of monitoring they face.  Chen et al. (2009a) also 
find that SOECGs actually perform better than listed non-SOEs. Our results are also 
consistent with Cheung et al. (2010), who point out that entities of local government are 
subject to expropriations through related party transactions, while the presence of central 
government ownership benefits shareholders; and with Jiang et al. (2010), who show that 
SOEs controlled by local governments are more likely to have tunneling problems than SOEs 
controlled by the central government. 
 
2.5.5.2. Estimating Eq. (2.3) for different locations 
Next, as in Guariglia et al. (2011), we divide our sample into two sub-groups: firms operating 
inside and outside the coastal regions.
70
 The rationale for this classification is that China not 
only has a very large territory, but its regional economy is also less than fully integrated. 
Geographical divergence in China may have significant implications on regional resource 
allocations and economic development.
71
 Thus, it is expected that regional variation does 
matter for firms’ investment behavior as well as financial conditions and agency costs. 
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 Firms outside the coastal regions include the ones operating in central or western areas. See Appendix 2.1 
for more details. 
71
 During the transition period from a planned to an open market economy, the coastal regions benefited from 
the open-door policy and the coastal development strategy, which notably increased inter-regional imbalances. 
In order to reduce the imbalances, after the late 1990s, regional development policies such as “the western 
development strategy”, “the northeast revival strategy”, and “the rise of central China strategy” have been 
implemented by the Chinese government in order to speed up the development of central and western regions 
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Estimates for sub-samples split on the basis of location are presented in columns 5 
and 6 of Table 2.15. We observe that the firms located in coastal regions have lower 
abnormal investment to free cash flow sensitivities compared with those in non-coastal 
regions. However, the differences in the sensitivities between the two groups are not 
statistically significant both for under-investing and over-investing firms. Our results are 
different from (Guariglia et al. 2011) who concludes that firms operating in coastal regions 
face higher financial constraints than  those operating in central and western regions. The 
difference in findings may be due to our focus on Chinese listed firms rather than relative 
small non-listed firms operating in the manufacturing and mining sectors, or may be due to 
more recent data used in our research. Although firms in central and western areas may be 
favored by regional development policies, coastal regions have a more developed financial 
system. Our evidence shows that China may have evolved toward a more integrated 
economy. 
   
2.5.5.3. Estimating Eq. (2.3) for exporters and non-exporters 
We next split the firm-years into sub-samples based on whether or not they participate in 
export markets. As discussed in Campa & Shaver (2002b) and Greenaway et al. (2007), 
global engagement such as exporting generally improves firms’ financial conditions.   
The results, presented in column 7 of Table 2.15, show that the effect of free cash 
flow on under-investment is significantly smaller for exporters compared with non-exporters. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and reduce regional imbalance. Through such regional coordination, a substantial amount of state funds has 
been invested in these areas especially in infrastructure, energy, and natural resources projects (Chen 2008). 
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This finding is in line with Campa & Shaver (2002b), Greenaway et al. (2007), and Guariglia 
& Mateut (2006), suggesting that exporting relaxes the financial constraints faced by firms. 
There are several possible explanations for this finding. First, it is easier for exporters to 
access international finance, which allows them to diversify their financial resources and ease 
liquidity stress. Second, exporting can reduce the effects of negative domestic demand 
shocks.
72
 Third, exporting can help firms relieve their financial constraints by stabilizing their 
sales, smoothing their income, and generating more internal funds. Fourth, exporters are more 
likely to be favored by Chinese authorities, and to benefit from policies such as export tax 
rebates (Ganesh-Kumar et al. 2001; Girma et al. 2004; Garcia-Vega & Guariglia 2011). 
73
 
Column 8 shows insignificant differences between the free cash flow sensitivities for 
over-investing exporters and non-exporters. This suggests that in the Chinese context, 
participating in exporting does not influence firms’ degree of agency costs.  
 
2.5.6. Split share structure reform  
2.5.6.1. Background of China’s split share structure reform  
One of the major problems of China’s stock markets after its establishment in 1990, was the 
split share structure characterizing it. This structure stemmed from the “politicization of 
privatization” ideology. In the early 1990s, the Chinese government allowed state-owned 
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 This relies on the assumption that business cycles and demand shocks are not perfectly correlated across 
countries. 
    
73
 Alternatively, it might be the case that when firms face less financial constraints, they are more likely to 
engage in exporting activities.   
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enterprises to sell a small portion of ownership to private investors. This constituted the 
majority of tradable shares. Yet, the Chinese government still retained influence on these 
firms by making the majority (two thirds) of their shares non-tradable. These non-tradable 
shares were typically held by the government itself or government entities (Allen et al. 2007; 
Jiang et al. 2010; Li et al. 2011).
74, 75
 
This split share structure hindered the quality of corporate governance and firms’ 
performance for the following reasons. First, the lack of market trading enabled the non-
tradable holders, who typically owned the majority of shares, to be indifferent to market 
performance. Thus, controlling shareholders were likely to expropriate minority shareholders 
(tradable holders). Second, a prominent feature of the split share structure was the “one-share, 
one-vote” scheme, in which the non-tradable shares were entitled the same voting and cash 
flow rights as tradable shares. The government or government entities were therefore able to 
appoint board members based on political and social objectives, and did not use incentive-
based compensation to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Third, due 
to a lack of large number of owners responsible for the consequence of poor firms’ 
performance and efficiency, the management of the firms with a split share structure was less 
likely to be monitored against opportunistic behavior, which could reduce firms’ value. 
Hence, non-tradable shares were harmful to the corporate governance of the listed firms, 
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 Prior to the reform (in 2005), the ratio of the non-tradable shares to total shares was 62% (59% in our data 
sample). Restricted shares include state-owned shares and those owned by legal entities. Both of them are 
mainly held by central and local governments via their agencies or affiliated state-owned enterprises. The latter 
can be also held by private entities (Firth et al. 2006). However, in line with prior literature, in this study, we 
separate Chinese listed firms into SOEs and non-SOEs according to their ultimate controlling shareholders. 
    
75
 Prior to the reform, non-tradable shares were only allowed to trade or auction under the authorities’ 
approval and thus their trading price was far below than the stock price and was often set close the book value 
(Firth et al. 2006). 
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causing higher agency costs (Beltratti & Bortolotti 2007; Li et al. 2011) and conflict between 
the controlling (non-tradable) and minority (tradable) shareholders or outside investors.  
In order to improve corporate governance and facilitate the privatization process, in 
May of 2005, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) initiated the split 
share structure reform, by floating the non-tradable shares through the open markets. In order 
to make government-owned shares legally tradable, state shareholders were required to 
compensate tradable shareholders through a share conversion process. This effectively 
diluted the government-owned share portion, attenuating government-related agency costs.
76
 
By the end of 2007, 1,254 firms which constitute over 97% of the Chinese A-share market 
capitalization had completed the structure reform (Li et al. 2011).
77
 
It has been shown that the impact of this reform on agency costs was pronounced 
among companies held by state-controlled entities or with higher state ownership, as it 
allowed restricted shares held mainly by state shareholders to become tradable, and enhanced 
the incentives of controlling state shareholders to monitor managers (Cumming et al. 2012; 
Hou et al. 2012). In addition, following the reform, equity-based compensation for executives 
or directors was allowed. In this way, their interests and wealth became aligned with stock 
return performance and decreased their conflicts of interest with outsider investors. 
Specifically, given higher incentives to boost their stock performance, controlling state 
shareholders needed to enhance investors’ confidence and strengthen firms’ corporate 
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 Generally, SOEs have a larger dominant/controlling state shareholder compared to non-SOEs, whose non-
state controlling shareholding is relatively small. Larger control rights may increase blockholders’ misconduct. 
However, following the reform, the controlling holding from the government dropped significantly, increasing 
monitoring of SOEs by other competing shareholders or institutions, and, consequently, reducing political 
interference from the state, and agency problems. 
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 In our data sample, 89% of the firms had started their structure reform by the end of 2010. 
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governance by disciplining management against opportunistic behavior and refraining from 
the expropriation of outsider investors.   
On the other hand, the reform is expected to have a smaller influence on non-state-
owned firms in terms of their agency costs for the following reasons. First, blockholders in 
these companies are relatively small compared with those in SOEs. They are therefore less 
likely to suffer from tunneling problems since they can be overseen by other competing 
shareholders. Second, controlling shareholders in non-SOEs are typically individuals or 
private entities or institutions, whose wealth is aligned with the movement of the stock prices. 
Third, non-SOEs investors normally have good education and are able to monitor 
management and run the company more efficiently. In order to maximize firms’ value, these 
controlling shareholders are usually active improving corporate governance and likely to sit 
on the board to monitor managers. For these reasons, non-SOEs have been found to have 
lower agency problems compared with SOEs even before the reform (Qian 1996; Allen et al. 
2005; Chen et al. 2011).
78
  
 
2.5.6.2. Difference-in-difference analysis 
The split share structure reform offers us a natural experiment to examine changes in agency 
costs through changes in the sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow. Specifically, 
we hypothesize that the split share structure reform eases the agency costs faced by SOEs 
more than those faced by non-SOEs. In other words, we expect that the changes in the 
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 As mentioned in section 2.5.5.1, we also find that agency costs are higher for SOEs compared with non-
SOEs. 
Chapter 2                       A balancing act: managing financial constraints and agency costs 
to minimize investment inefficiency in the Chinese market 
98 
sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow following the reform to be significantly 
higher among state-controlled listed firms than non-state-controlled listed firms.  
To examine the change in the sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow 
before and after the reform, we use a difference-in-differences approach. This method offers 
a way to assess the effects of the introduction of the split share structure reform, which can be 
seen as an exogenous shock, on the sensitivity of under- or over-investment to free cash flow.  
To test our hypothesis, we estimate the following regression: 
 
 
where Treat is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if a firm has a state entity as its ultimate 
controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. Post denotes a dummy for the post-reform time 
period:  it equals one in the year of and the years after a firm announced the structure reform, 
and zero otherwise. The coefficient on FCF*Post, α2, captures changes in the sensitivities of 
abnormal investment to free cash flow over time. The coefficient on FCF*Treat, α3, captures 
the ownership effect on the sensitivities of investment to free cash flow prior to the reform. 
We expect this term to be positive because the agency problems for our treatment group 
(SOEs) are expected to be higher than those for the control group (non-SOEs). The 
coefficient of interest is that associated with the term FCF*Treat*Post, α4 (the difference-in-
differences effect). This term measures the change in the sensitivities of investment to free 
cash flow between SOEs and non-SOEs due to the reform. Naturally, this method removes 
biases in the sensitivity differences that could be the result from permanent differences 
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between SOEs and non-SOEs, as well as biases from differences over time that could be the 
result of trends. According to our hypothesis, we expect this term to be negative, which 
means that the split share structure reform is associated with a decline of state-owned firms’ 
agency problems (measured by the sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow) 
compared to those of non-state-owned firms.  
[Insert Table 2.16] 
Column 1 of Table 2.16 shows the results focusing on over-investing firms. As 
expected, we observe that the coefficient on FCF*Treat is significantly positive, which 
suggests that, prior to the reform, state-controlled firms have higher agency problems than 
their non-state-controlled counterparts. The coefficient on the triple interaction term 
(FCFi,t*Treat*Post) is significantly negative (-0.11), which indicates that following the 
reform, the sensitivity of over-investment to free cash flow declined for the treatment group 
(SOEs) compared to non-SOEs. This finding can be explained considering that by 
eliminating the trading restriction on shares, the reform eased agency problems in SOEs in 
comparison with those of non-state-controlled firms. The magnitude of the coefficient of the 
triple interaction term is economically nontrivial: it is around 17% larger than the coefficient 
(α3) measuring the difference in the coefficient of free cash flow between SOEs and non-
SOEs prior the reform.  
These results support our hypotheses that the reform reduced SOEs’ agency costs, and 
are in line with Cumming et al. (2012) and Hou et al. (2011; 2012) who show that the split 
share structure reform significantly strengthened state-controlled listed firms’ corporate 
governance in terms of improving their managerial accountability and share price 
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informativeness, as well as the relationship between executive pay and stock market 
performance.  
Still focusing on over-investing firms, column 2 of Table 2.16 further separates state-
owned firms into those controlled by local and central governments, using a restricted sub-
sample of data over the period 2003-2010. We classify non-SOEs as the control group and 
both SOEs affiliated with the central (SOECGs) and local (SOELGs) government as the 
treatment group. We find that the coefficient on FCF*Treat(SOELG) is significantly positive, 
which  confirms that prior to the reform, SOEs affiliated with local governments had higher 
agency problems than non-SOEs. By contrast, The coefficient on FCF*Treat(SOECG) is 
negative but insignificant, which suggests that prior to the reform, there were no significant 
differences in the agency problems faced by SOEs affiliated with the central government and 
non-SOEs. In addition, we find that coefficients on the triple interaction terms are only 
significantly negative for SOEs affiliated with the local (SOELGs) government. This finding 
can be explained considering that lifting the trading restriction had a lower impact on 
SOECGs. Under the policy of “grasp the large and let go of the small”, the Chinese 
government tried in fact to maintain central government control of SOECGs, which are more 
concerned with national interests. Thus, even though the shareholders in SOECGs were 
allowed to be free to trade, they were not willing to sell their stakes. Moreover, SOECGs may 
be less sensitive to the reform due to lower agency problems compared with other 
counterparts. Therefore, SOECGs benefited less form the split share structure reform in terms 
of agency costs. The finding is consistent with Chen et al. (2012), who show the reform-
induced governance improvements were greater for Chinese firms with more severe 
governance problems prior to the reform.  
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Column 3 of Table 2.16 reports the result when we only focus on under-investing 
firms. We find significantly negative coefficient on FCF*Treat, which suggest that state-
controlled firms faced lower financial constraints compared with non-state-controlled firms 
prior to the reform. However, based on the insignificant triple interaction term 
(FCF*Treat*Post) as well as (FCF*Post) term, we conclude that the split share structure 
reform did not have significant impact on the level of financial constraints faced by listed 
firms in China. 
In summary, our results indicate that following the reform, there has been a drop in 
the sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow, which was, however, restricted to 
over-investing firms (proxying for firms’ agency costs). Furthermore, the fall in the 
sensitivities affected state-controlled firms, and more specifically, firms controlled by local 
governments, rather than their non-state-controlled counterparts. The most important appeal 
of our DID approach is to circumvent endogeneity issues. The exogenous policy reform was 
in fact expected to reduce agency costs for SOEs, decreasing their sensitivities of over-
investment to free cash flow. Other competing alternative hypothesis could be related to over-
investment (agency costs) only, to the split share structure reform only, or to state-controlled 
firms (particularly SOELGs) only, but not to all of these factors together. Finally, by 
providing comparison with a control group, this approach rules out time-invariant unobserved 
factors such as omitted investment opportunities.  
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2.6. Policy and managerial implications  
Our findings provide a portrait of the nature and balance of financial constraints and agency 
problems in China, giving a picture of the extent to which the economy has suffered from 
efficiency losses due to both under- and over-investment. Two significant conclusions 
emerge from our main findings: On the one hand, the limited access to capital markets which 
characterizes many Chinese firms leads to significant under-investment. On the other hand, 
the weak corporate governance structures lead to managers or controlling shareholders to 
over-invest their free cash flow in projects with negative NPV.   
Specifically, we have found that different types of ownership have different 
influences on the investment inefficiency of Chinese listed firms. First, under a state-
dominated financial system, non-SOEs competing with dominant state-owned enterprises 
face higher financial constraints and have to depend more on their internal funds for their 
investment, which hinders their growth. Thus, for the sake of economic efficiency, an 
effective capital market (including banking and intermediation sectors) should be put in place 
to allocate financial resources in a more productive or market-based way.  
Next, in addition to politically-motivated issues and a dominant share holding, SOEs, 
and especially those affiliated with local governments, tend to expropriate their positive free 
cash flow and invest above their optimal level, which is not in the best interests of minority 
shareholders. In order to improve firms’ investment efficiency, further ownership 
transformation and a more transparent corporate disclosure in related party transaction (e.g. 
tunneling) would be beneficial. In addition, more effective supervision and legal protection 
including better law enforcement mechanisms for shareholders should be established to 
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increase managerial incentives to maximize profits, reduce potential expropriation from 
controlling shareholders, and foster investment efficiency. 
Our findings also provide insights about the value of some more targeted policies for 
the solution of investment inefficiency in China. First, the “ST” policy effectively gives a risk 
warning to outside investors by signaling the abnormal financial situation of listed firms. Our 
findings support the view that weak corporate governance and higher agency problems are 
likely to be reasons why firms experience financial distress. Thus, higher quality of 
information disclosure and democratic accountability should be promoted to improve investor 
protection rights. Second, relying on multiple acquisitions rather than managing own assets 
may not be a very efficient way to grow due to possible hubris or entrenchment issues. Third, 
export promotion policies may further ease Chinese listed firms’ financial constraints. 
Last but not least, despite considerable progresses made to date, and despite the 
positive effects of the split share structure reform in reducing agency costs, we still find a 
high degree of both financing constraints and agency costs in the Chinese economy. Since 
China’s financial system is still dominated by under-developed state-owned banks, in order to 
sustain the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, especially in the private sector, more 
widespread access to credit markets should be a priority in order to increase firms’ 
investment efficiency. In the long run, the establishment of an effective credit-rating system 
and the development of equity finance could be a way to achieve this target.   
In addition, considering that China’s listed firms are still dominated by state 
shareholders, a further reduction in state ownership may need to be carried out to reduce 
conflicts of interests among controlling shareholders and outside shareholders, and to 
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increase the intensity of monitoring by other blockholders or independent institutions. This is 
particularly important at the local level. Imposing constraints or more restrictive regulations 
to local government bureaucrats to prevent them from making adverse decisions such as 
expropriation and misappropriation of funds, which ultimately lead to over-investment should 
therefore be on the political agenda. In addition, more market-based executive remuneration 
schemes should be offered to align the interests between managers and investors. Finally, a 
shake-up of the legal system aimed at improving the protection of property rights would also 
be beneficial. 
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2.7. Conclusions 
Using a panel of Chinese listed firms, we provide evidence that both financial constraints and 
agency problems result in investment inefficiency. To this end, we test how financial 
constraints and agency costs affect the sensitivities of under- and over-investment to free cash 
flow, for firms with different characteristics. We find strong evidence of investment being 
positively and significantly associated with free cash flow for under-investing firms with 
negative free cash flow. This is consistent with the financing constraints hypothesis. We also 
find a significantly positive association between investment and free cash flow for over-
investing firms with positive free cash flow, which is consistent with the agency costs 
hypothesis.  
We also show some evidence that in the Chinese context various conventional 
variables like firm size and dividend payout ratio (policy) can be used to assess the degree of 
financial constraints faced by firms. We find a clear decreasing trend for the sensitivities of 
under-investment to free cash flow with firm size and dividend payout ratio. We subsequently 
study how the ownership structure of Chinese firms influences the degree of agency problems 
faced by firms. Specifically, first, we find that managerial ownership reduces Chinese listed 
firms’ agency costs (measured as the sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow). This 
can be explained considering that managers who own the firm are more likely to have closely 
aligned interests with shareholders. Second, the relationship between blockholder ownership 
and agency costs is not linear due to the offsetting effects of incentive alignment and 
entrenchment. It is firms with a medium percentage of shares owned by the largest 
shareholders which tend to face higher agency costs. Third, a higher ownership share of the 
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top ten shareholders excluding the largest increases the intensity of competition and the 
efficiency of the monitoring of controlling shareholders, reducing firms’ agency problems. 
We next focus on the effects of firms’ “ST” status on the degree of financing 
constraints and agency costs that they face. First, we find that “ST” firms generally have 
higher sensitivities of under-investment to free cash flow, suggesting they face higher credit 
constraints. Financial difficulties become worse once a firm’s “ST” status is announced. 
Second, agency costs are significantly positively associated with the likelihood of being 
designated “ST”.  However, after being given “ST” status, under the pressures of being de-
listed from the stock exchanges, firms are more likely to achieve improvements of 
governance and profitability, and we observe reduced sensitivities of over-investment to free 
cash flow. Furthermore, focusing on M&A activity, we find that frequent bidding positively 
affects the extent to which firms’ over-investment depends on free cash flow, suggesting 
higher likelihood of agency problems. We argue that a possible reason for this may be due to 
hubris or entrenchment of managers or controlling shareholders, who rely on multiple 
acquisition transactions to pursue private benefits rather than managing assets to grow. 
Our results also suggest that financial constraints and agency problems have different 
effects across firms which differ according to state/non-state ownership, as well as exporting 
status. Specifically, we find that non-SOEs are more subject to financing constraints than 
their state-owned counterparts, probably because of a “crowding out” effect. In contrast, 
state-owned firms face relatively few financial constraints due to the support they receive 
from the government and state-owned banks, as a consequence of their role in maintaining 
social stability and achieving political and economic objectives. In addition, SOEs affiliated 
with local governments face higher agency problems than their counterparts affiliated with 
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the central government and non-SOEs. This may be explained by less effective management, 
supervision, and legal enforcement.  
We also find that the divergence of the degrees of financial constraints and agency 
costs between coastal and interior regions is not significant, which may be due to regional 
development policies. Moreover, Chinese listed companies ease their financial constraints by 
engaging in exporting. 
Finally, using a difference-in-differences (DID) method, we find that the exogenous 
split share structure reform, which took place in China in 2005, affected local-government-
controlled enterprises more than other firms, by reducing their agency problems. Decreasing 
sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow are in fact evident after 2005 for SOELGs.  
The identification of financial constraints and agency problems as explanations for 
under- and over-investment suggests that in order to improve investment efficiency in China, 
both the financial and the legal system need to be reformed.  
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Appendix 2.1. Chinese provinces and the division of the Chinese territory in three broad 
regions 
From an administrative viewpoint, China consists of 31 provincial units, which are divided 
into three categories: 22 provinces or sheng; 4 autonomous regions or zizhiqu (Xinjiang,Inner 
Mongolia, Tibet, Ningxia, and Guangxi); and 4 municipal cities or zhixiashi, under direct 
supervision of the central power (Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, and, since 1997, Chongqing).  
According to the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, the 31 provinces can be split 
into another three categories by means of geography: Coastal (Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, 
Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang); Central 
(Chongqing, Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, and Shanxi); and 
Western (Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Neimenggu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, 
Xinjiang, and Yunnan ).  
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Appendix 2.2. Definitions of the variables used  
Market value of assets: sum of market value of tradable stocks, book value of non-tradable 
stocks, and market value of net debt. 
Tobin’s Q: ratio of market value of assets to book value of total assets. 
Return on assets (ROA): ratio of net income to total assets. 
Leverage: ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debt to total assets. 
Cash: ratio of the sum cash and cash equivalents to total assets. 
Size: natural logarithm of total assets. 
Age: number of years since listing. 
Sales growth: rate of growth of real sales. 
Payout ratio: ratio of cash dividend payments to net income 
CAPEX: capital expenditures, i.e. cash paid to acquire and construct fixed assets, intangible 
assets and other long-term assets. 
SalePPE: sale of property, plant and equipment, i.e. net cash received from disposals of fixed 
assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets. 
I_total: total investment, i.e. capital expenditure less receipts from sale of property, plant and 
equipment (CAPEX – SalePPE). 
I_main.: investment to maintain existing assets in place (depreciation + amortization). 
I_new: total investment less investment to maintain existing assets in place 
 (I_total - I_main.).  
I
e
_new: expected investment expenditure in new positive NPV projects.  
I
u
_new: unexpected or abnormal investment expenditure.  
CFO: Net cash flow from operating activities, i.e. difference between cash inflow from 
operating activities and cash outflow from operating activities. 
CFAIP: cash flow generated from assets in place (CFO - I_main.). 
FCF: free cash flow (CFO- I_main. -I
e
_new). 
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A GDP deflator, which is obtained from National Bureau of Statistics of China, is used to 
convert all variables to real terms. 
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Appendix 2.3. Special treatment regulation in China’s Stock Exchanges (rules governing 
the listing of shares on the Shanghai/Shenzhen Stock Exchanges)  
Since 1998, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) implemented the 
Special Treatment (ST) or the Particular Treatment (PT) regulation as a mechanism to signal 
the abnormal financial situation of listed companies and give a risk warning to investors.
79
 
The so-called “abnormal financial situation” refers to an unusual financial position, which 
exposes a firm to the risk of its shares being de-listed. 
The Exchange is entitled to issue a special treatment condition (ST) on the stocks of 
listed companies which suffer from at least one of the following circumstances: 
(1) The audited reports for the two most recent financial year reveal negative net income; 
(2) The audited reports for the latest financial year show negative shareholders’ equity 
(i.e. shareholders’ equity  is lower than registered capital); 
(3) Based on the audit results for the most recent financial year, a disclaimer of opinion or 
adverse opinion by a Certified Public Accounting (CPA) firm is issued. 
“ST” or “*ST” stocks operate under various trading and financial restrictions, which 
are:  
(1) Putting “ST” or “*ST” in front of the names of their stocks to distinguish them to 
those of healthy firms;   
(2) Their daily share movements are limited to 5% (10% for normal stocks); 
(3) Their interim reports are required to be audited. 
                                                          
    
79
 According to Chinese Company Law, “ST” listed companies are the ones which have been making losses 
for two consecutive years, whereas, “PT” (particular treatment) firms are the ones which have three-
consecutive-year losses. These “PT” firms are suspended from the exchanges and only allowed to be traded on 
Fridays, with a maximum of 5% limit to the previous Friday’s close price. “PT” firms will be permanently 
terminated from the stock exchanges if they cannot make a turnaround within one year. The “PT” regulation 
was abolished on 1st of May 2005, and replaced with a “*ST” regulation. 
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After being issued a delisting risk warning, if the company successfully engages in 
major asset restructuring in accordance with the relevant regulations of the CSRC (China 
Securities Regulatory Commission), and if its principal business activities are back to normal 
and its net income (after deducting non-recurring gains and losses) becomes positive, the firm 
may apply to the exchange for lifting the special treatment (ST) or de-listing risk warning 
(*ST). 
Firms which fail to disclose their annual or interim report or fail to turn around after 
being issued a de-listing risk warning, might be suspended or even permanently excluded 
from the stock exchanges. 
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Table 2.1 
Structure of the unbalance panel 
No. of obs. Per firm No. of obs. Percent Cumulative 
3 411 4.32% 4.32% 
4 400 4.21% 8.53% 
5 540 5.68% 14.21% 
6 912 9.59% 23.80% 
7 882 9.28% 33.08% 
8 1,032 10.85% 43.93% 
9 1,116 11.74% 55.67% 
10 1,620 17.04% 72.71% 
11 1,155 12.15% 84.85% 
12 1,440 15.15% 100.00% 
Total 9,508 100.00%   
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Table 2.2 
Distribution of the number of firm-year observations by year 
Year No. of obs. Percent Cumulative 
1999 415 4.36% 4.36% 
2000 521 5.48% 9.84% 
2001 609 6.41% 16.25% 
2002 667 7.02% 23.26% 
2003 737 7.75% 31.02% 
2004 793 8.34% 39.36% 
2005 836 8.79% 48.15% 
2006 851 8.95% 57.10% 
2007 927 9.75% 66.85% 
2008 1,081 11.37% 78.22% 
2009 1,075 11.31% 89.52% 
2010 996 10.48% 100.00% 
Total 9,508 100.00%   
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Table 2.3 
Sample means and medians (in parentheses) 
 
G1 G2 G3 G4 Total 
Diff 
(G1 vs. G3) 
I_total 0.0283 0.0249 0.0859 0.1013 0.0529 0.00*** 
 
(0.0238) (0.0208) (0.0774) (0.0935) (0.0383) 0.00*** 
I_new 0.0034 -0.0035 0.0586 0.0771 0.0267 0.00*** 
 
(0.0012) (-0.0035) (0.0483) (0.0687) (0.0129) 0.00*** 
I
e
_new 0.0305 0.0208 0.0183 0.0374 0.0267 0.00*** 
 
(0.027) (0.0186) (0.0196) (0.0368) (0.0247) 0.00*** 
I
u
_new -0.0271 -0.0243 0.0403 0.0397 0.0000 0.00*** 
 
(-0.0231) (-0.0204) (0.0261) (0.0266) (-0.0086) 0.00*** 
FCF -0.0534 0.0509 0.0546 -0.0495 -0.0021 0.00*** 
 
(-0.04) (0.0396) (0.0408) (-0.0386) (-0.0032) 0.00*** 
Cash 0.150 0.176 0.143 0.139 0.154 0.01** 
 
(0.127) (0.147) (0.124) (0.122) (0.131) 0.29 
Q 1.606 1.737 1.772 1.644 1.683 0.00*** 
 
(1.334) (1.391) (1.449) (1.357) (1.372) 0.00*** 
Size 20.56 20.59 20.57 20.68 20.59 0.82 
 
(20.48) (20.47) (20.49) (20.57) (20.50) 0.84 
Age 8.10 9.20 9.34 8.04 8.64 0.00*** 
 
(8) (9) (9) (7) (8) 0.00*** 
ROA 0.016 0.036 0.038 0.027 0.028 0.00*** 
 
(0.024) (0.036) (0.038) (0.03) (0.031) 0.00*** 
Leverage 0.233 0.194 0.232 0.265 0.228 0.95 
 
(0.229) (0.180) (0.227) (0.260) (0.224) 0.80 
Observations 3,120 2,657 1,884 1,847 9,508  
Notes: Firms are classified into four groups according their level of abnormal investment and FCF (free cash 
flow): Group1 (under-investing firms with negative FCF); Group 2 (under-investing firms with positive FCF); 
Group3 (over-investing firms with positive FCF); Group 4 (over-investing firms with negative FCF). Total 
investment (I_totali,t) is defined as capital expenditure less receipts from the sale of property, plant and 
equipment. I_new is total investment less investment to maintain existing assets in place. I
e
_new represents the 
expected investment expenditure in new positive NPV projects. I
u
_new represents the abnormal investment 
(under- or over- investment). FCF is free cash flow which is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash 
flow from operating activities (CFO). Cash is the ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. Q 
is the market-to-book ratio. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the number of years elapsed since 
the firm listed. ROA is return on assets. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total 
assets. All variable except Size and Age are expressed in percentage terms. All investment expenditure variables 
are scaled by total assets. All variables except Age are deflated using a GDP deflator. See Appendix 2.2 for 
complete definitions of all variables. Diff is the p-value associated with the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test for differences in means and equality of medians of corresponding variables between firms in Group 1 and 
those in Group 3. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.4 
Dynamic model of investment expenditure 
Dependent variable: I_newi,t 
(1) (2) (3) 
OLS (pooled) Fixed effects GMM_system 
I_newi,t-1 0.441*** 0.254*** 0.314*** 
 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.049) 
Cash i,t-1 0.055*** 0.113*** 0.048* 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.028) 
Q i,t-1 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.0001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Size i,t-1 0.003*** -0.004*** 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age i,t -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
ROA i,t-1 0.059*** 0.039*** 0.165*** 
 
(0.017) (0.007) (0.043) 
Leverage i,t-1 0.003 -0.036*** -0.006 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.017) 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes 
Industry-fixed effects yes no yes 
(Year-fixed)* (Industry-fixed) effects yes yes yes 
R
2
 0.32 0.47  
Adjusted R
2
 0.31 0.38  
ρ 
 
0.37  
F-value 26.84 12.89 10.59 
Hansen J test (p-value) 
  
0.18 
m3 test (p-value) 
  
0.45 
Observations 9,508 9,508 9,508 
Notes: Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically 
robust to heteroscedasticity. Adopting the method of Richardson (2006), the dependent variable is I_newi,t, the 
difference between Itotal and Imain.. All variables except Qi,t-1, Sizei,t-1 and Agei,t are scaled by total assets. For the 
pooled regression, standard errors (in parentheses) are asymptotically cluster-robust to heteroscedasticity and 
intra-cluster correlation is accounted for at the firm level. For the fixed effects regression, ρ represents the 
proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. For the system GMM 
regression, m3 is a test for third-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed 
as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We treat I_newi,t-1, Cash i,t-1, Qi,t-1, Size i,t-1, ROAi,t-1  and 
Leveragei,t-1 as potentially endogenous variables; levels of these variables dated t-3 and further are used as 
instruments in the first-differenced equations and first-differences of these same variables lagged twice are used 
as additional instruments in the level equations. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Notes: The specifications were estimated using the fixed effects (column 1, 2, 5 and 6) and the pooled OLS (column 3, 4, 7 and 8) estimators. Test statistics and standard 
errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (I
u
_newi,t) 
calculated adopting the method of Richardson (2006), where under-investing (over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (I
u
_newi,t). 
FCF is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). Dum_FCF<0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year 
t if a firm’s free cash flow in that year is below its optimal level (FCF<0), and 0 otherwise. Dum_FCF>0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a firm’s free 
cash flow in that year exceed its optimal level (FCF>0), and 0 otherwise. Under_gmm (Over_gmm), Under_fe (Over_fe) and Under_ols (Over_ols) refer to abnormal 
investment being obtained by estimating in Eq. (2.1) using the system GMM, the fixed effects and the pooled estimators, respectively (see Table 2.4). For the pooled 
regression, standard errors (in parentheses) are asymptotically cluster-robust to heteroscedasticity and intra-cluster correlation is accounted for at the firm level. For the fixed 
effects regression, ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Diff is the p-values of the Wald statistics for the equality 
of the free cash flow coefficients for firms facing positive and negative FCF. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 2.5 
The effects of free cash flow on (under- and over-) investment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: I
u
_newi,t Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_fe Over_fe Under_ols Over_ols 
Dum_FCF>0 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0019) 
FCF*Dum_FCF<0 0.055*** 0.002 0.054*** -0.034 0.030*** -0.020 0.072*** -0.0326 
 
(0.008) (0.027) (0.014) (0.022) (0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.0212) 
FCF*Dum_FCF>0 0.013 0.103*** 0.002 0.108* 0.018* 0.043*** 0.009 0.0460** 
 (0.009) (0.022) (0.008) (0.061) (0.009) (0.016) (0.007) (0.0222) 
Firm-fixed effects yes yes No No yes yes No No 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry-fixed effects No No yes yes No No yes yes 
R
2
 0.37 0.40 0.06 0.03 0.45 0.43 0.06 0.04 
Adjusted R
2
 0.19 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.27 0.19 0.06 0.03 
ρ 0.39 0.36 
  
0.44 0.42 
  F-value 11.31 3.82 10.93 3.42 5.01 2.55 13.91 4.68 
Diff 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.03** 0.32 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.012** 
Observations 5,777 3,731 5,777 3,731 5,266 4,242 5,716 3,792 
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Table 2.6 
The effects of free cash flow on (under- and over-) investment: using Bates (2005)’s 
definitions of unexpected investment and free cash flow 
Dependent variable: 
I
u’
_newi,t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Under_ fe Over_ fe Under_ gmm Over_ gmm 
I
u’
_newi,t-1   0.452*** 0.320*** 
 
  (0.040) (0.049) 
Dum_FCF’>0 -0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
FCF’*Dum_FCF’<0 0.020** 0.028 0.184*** -0.025 
 
(0.008) (0.027) (0.045) (0.084) 
FCF’*Dum_FCF’>0 0.008 0.050** -0.046 0.131* 
 
(0.009) (0.023) (0.050) (0.077) 
Cash i,t-1 0.025*** 0.092*** 0.045* 0.114*** 
 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.027) (0.033) 
Q i,t-1 0.001 0.001 0.007*** -0.005 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Size i,t-1 0.006*** -0.012*** 0.001 0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Age i,t -0.003*** 0.008* 0.000** 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA i,t-1 0.020*** 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.061 
 
(0.003) (0.020) (0.029) (0.054) 
Leverage i,t-1 -0.008*** -0.027*** 0.004 0.019 
 
(0.003) (0.009) (0.012) (0.022) 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Industry-fixed effects No No yes yes 
(Year-fixed)* 
(Industry-fixed)effects 
yes yes yes yes 
R
2
 0.52 0.47   
Adjusted R
2
 0.35 0.27   
Ρ 0.64 0.76   
F-value 4.03 3.24 9.19 33.50 
Hansen J test (p-value)   0.01** 0.00*** 
m3 test (p-value)   0.41 0.29 
Diff 0.35 0.54 0.00*** 0.17 
Observations 4,792 4,716 3,951 3,711 
Notes: The specifications were estimated using the fixed effects (column 1 and 2) and the system GMM 
(column 3 and 4) estimators. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions 
are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. Adopting the method of Bates (2005), the dependent variable is 
I
u’
_newi,t ,the difference between a firm’s new investment expenditure (I_new i,t) and that of the median firm in 
the industry (I_newt) in a given year. Specifically, under-investing (over-investing) firms are characterized by 
positive (negative) abnormal investment (I
u’
_newi,t ). FCF’ is calculated as the difference between the firm’s 
cash flow (CFAIP,i,t) and that of the median firm in the industry (CFAIP,i.). Dum_FCF’<0 is a dummy variable, 
which is equal to 1 in a given year if a firm’s CFAIP,i,t is below its optimal level (median industry’s CFAIP,i.), and 
0 otherwise. Dum_FCF’>0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a firm’s CFAIP,i,t exceed its 
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optimal level (median industry’s CFAIP,i.), and 0 otherwise. All variables except Q i,t-1, Sizei,t-1 and Age i,t are 
scaled by total assets. For the system GMM regression, m3 is a test for third-order serial correlation of the 
residuals in the differenced equations, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. We treat I
u’
_newi,t-1, FCF’, Cash i,t-1, Q i,t-1, Size i,t-1,  ROA i,t-1 and Leveragei,t-1 as potentially 
endogenous variables. Levels of these variables lagged 3 or longer are used as instruments in the first-
differenced equations and first-differences of these same variables lagged 2 as additional instruments in the level 
equations. Diff is the p-values of the Wald statistics for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients for firms 
facing positive and negative FCF’. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.7 
The effects of free cash flow on (under- and over-) investment: further tests 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: I
u
_newi,t Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_gmm Over_gmm 
 
25
th
 Quant 25
th
 Quant 50
th
 Quant 50
th
 Quant 75
th
 Quant 75
th 
Quant Conti. Conti. 
 Most under-investment —› Most over-investment   
Dum_FCF>0 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002** -0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) 
FCF*Dum_FCF<0 0.056*** -0.009 0.033*** -0.036 0.012** -0.050 0.035*** 0.017 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.026) (0.006) (0.046) (0.009) (0.031) 
FCF*Dum_FCF>0 0.002 0.012 0.001 0.034* -0.004 0.072* 0.008 0.122*** 
 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.021) (0.007) (0.040) (0.009) (0.025) 
Firm-fixed effects No No No No No No yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes No No 
(Pseudo) R
2
 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.39 0.42 
Adjusted R
2
  
     
0.20 0.13 
ρ       0.36 0.37 
F-value  
     
9.38 3.38 
Diff 0.00*** 0.15 0.00*** 0.04** 0.09* 0.05** 0.03** 0.01*** 
Observations 5,777 3,731 5,777 3,731 5,777 3,731 4,537 3,043 
Notes: The specifications were estimated using the quantile (columns 1 to 6) and fixed effects (columns 7 and 8) estimators. The dependent variable is unexpected investment 
(I
u
_newi,t) calculated using the method of Richardson (2006), where  in columns 1 to 6, under-investing (over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) 
abnormal investment (I
u
_newi,t) and  in columns 7 and 8, under- or over- investment are defined when firms have two consecutive under- or over- investment years. FCF is 
computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). Dum_FCF<0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a 
firm’s free cash flow in that year is below its optimal level (FCF<0), and 0 otherwise. Dum_FCF>0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a firm’s free cash 
flow in that year exceed its optimal level (FCF>0), and 0 otherwise. For the quantile regression, we run separate regressions for the 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 quantiles of abnormal 
investment. For the fixed effects regression, we report ρ, which represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Diff is the p-
values of the Wald statistics for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients for firms facing positive and negative FCF. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.8 
Summary statistics of financial constrains (KZ and WW indexes) for under- and over- investing firms 
  FC index Mean St. Dev. P25 P50 P75 N Obs 
G1 KZ -2.513 6.718 -3.225 -0.48 0.865 3,120 
Under_ FCF<0 WW -0.93 0.064 -0.974 -0.929 -0.882 3,120 
G2 KZ -2.895 7.166 -3.784 -0.796 0.706 2,656 
Under_ FCF>0 WW -0.939 0.063 -0.983 -0.939 -0.89 2,657 
Diff (G1 vs. G2) KZ 0.04** 
 
Diff (G1 vs. G2) 0.00*** 
  
(Mean) WW 0.00***   (Median) 0.00***     
G3 KZ -1.703 5.006 -2.566 -0.315 0.942 1,884 
Over_ FCF>0 WW -0.937 0.066 -0.983 -0.938 -0.886 1,883 
G4 KZ -2.257 5.894 -3.135 -0.643 0.791 1,847 
Over_ FCF<0 WW -0.941 0.063 -0.985 -0.942 -0.895 1,847 
Diff (G3 vs. G4) KZ 0.00*** 
 
Diff (G3 vs. G4) 0.00*** 
  
(Mean) WW 0.03**   (Median) 0.03**     
Total KZ -2.41 6.406 -3.188 -0.584 0.827 9,507 
  WW -0.936 0.064 -0.981 -0.937 -0.887 9,507 
Notes: KZ and WW represent the firm-specific levels of financial constraint: the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index of constraints (Lamont et al. 2001) and the Whited and Wu 
(WW) index of constraints (Whited & Wu 2006). Firms are classified into four groups according to the difference between the levels of investment and FCF (free cash flow) 
and their optimal levels: Group1 (under-investing firms with negative FCF); Group 2 (under-investing firms with positive FCF); Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive 
FCF); Group 4 (over-investing firms with negative FCF). P25 (50/75) is the 25
th 
(50
th
/75
th
) percentile of the respective distribution. Diff is the p-value associated with the t-
test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in means and equality of medians of the financial constraints KZ (WW) index between groups of under-investing firms 
(Group 1 and Group 2) or between groups of over-investing firms (Group3 and Group4 ). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.9   
The sensitivity of under-investment to free cash flow accounting for financial constraints 
Dependent variable: I
u
_newi,t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
KZ_under KZ_under WW_under WW_under 
Medium_FC(30-70) -0.000  -0.003***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
High_FC(>70) 0.001  -0.002*  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
FCF* Low_FC(<30) 0.023***  0.017**  
 (0.007)  (0.007)  
FCF* Medium_FC(30-70) 0.037***  0.027***  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  
FCF* High_FC(>70) 0.052***  0.065***  
 (0.008)  (0.007)  
High_FC(<50)  0.001  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
FCF* Low_FC(<50)  0.028***  0.026*** 
  (0.005)  (0.006) 
FCF* High_FC(>50)  0.045***  0.045*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Firm-fixed effects yes Yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes Yes yes yes 
R
2
 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Adjusted R
2
 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 
ρ 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 
F-value 9.76 10.83 11.46 10.85 
Diff 0.00*** 0.04** 0.00*** 0.01*** 
Observations 5,777 5,777 5,776 5,776 
Notes: The specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors 
(in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. ρ represents 
the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is 
unexpected investment (I
u
_newi,t) calculated adopting the method of Richardson (2006), where under-investing 
(over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (I
u
_newi,t). FCF is 
computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). 
High_FC, Medium_FC and Low_FC are dummy variables, equal to 1 in a given year if a firm faces high, 
medium, or low financial constraints, and 0 otherwise. In columns 1 and 3, we consider a firm to be financially 
constrained (unconstrained) if its KZ or WW index lies in the top (bottom) three deciles of the distribution of 
the corresponding variables for all firms belonging to the same industry in a given year. The remaining firm-
years will be the ones, who face a medium level of financial constraints. In columns 2 and 4,  a firm is 
considered to be financially constrained in a given year if its KZ or WW index exceeds the median value of the 
index calculated in the industry that the firm belongs to, and financially unconstrained otherwise. Diff is a test, 
distributed as Chi-square, for equality of the coefficients across various categories of firms. Specifically, we 
report p-values of the Wald statistics for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients associated with under-
investment between financial constrained and unconstrained firm-years. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 2.10 
The sensitivity of under- investment to free cash flow: distinguishing firm-years on the basis 
of conventional proxies for financial constraints 
Dependent variable:  
I
u
_newi,t  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Assets No. of Employees Payout Ratio Dividend Paying 
Medium_ FC(30-70) 0.002* 0.002 -0.000  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Low_ FC(>70) 0.006*** 0.004*** -0.001  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
FCF* High_ FC(<30) 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.047***  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)  
FCF* Medium_ FC (30-70) 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.034***  
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)  
FCF* Low_ FC (>70) 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.019**  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)  
Div_yes    -0.001 
    (0.001) 
FCF* Div_no    0.047*** 
    (0.006) 
FCF* Div_yes    0.025*** 
    (0.006) 
Firm-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
R
2
 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37 
Adjusted R
2
 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 
ρ 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 
F-value 11.03 10.82 9.78 11.07 
Diff 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Observations 5,777 5,514 5,716 5,777 
Notes: The specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. ρ represents the 
proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is 
unexpected investment (I
u
_newi,t) calculated adopting the method of Richardson (2006), where under-investing 
(over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (I
u
_newi,t). FCF is 
computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). Based 
on different criteria: Firm Size (total assets or the number or employees), Age, Payout Ratio, Dividend Payout 
Status, we split firm-years into the following three groups: High_FC, Medium_FC and Low_FC, which are 
dummy variables, equal to 1 respectively if a firm is more likely to face the highest, medium and lowest 
financial constraints relatively to all firms operating in the same industry they belong to in a given year and 0 
otherwise. In columns 1 to 3, we consider a firm to be financially constrained (unconstrained) if its size (total 
assets or the number or employees), age, and payout ratio lies in the bottom (top) three deciles of the 
distribution of the corresponding values of all firms belonging to the same industry each year. The remaining 
firm-years will be the ones, whose face medium level of financial constraints. In columns 4, we partition firms 
according to their dividend payout status, which equals 1 (Div_yes) if the firm is paying dividends in a given 
year, and 0 otherwise. Diff is a test, distributed as Chi-square, for equality of the coefficients across various 
categories of firms. Specifically, we report p-values of the Wald statistics for the equality of the free cash flow 
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coefficients associated with under-investment between firm-years, who are more likely to face financial 
constraints and those, who are less likely to face financial constraints. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 2.11 
Summary statistics of agency costs (AC1 and AC2) for under- and over- investing firms 
 
FC index Mean St. Dev. P25 P50 P75 N Obs 
G1 AC1 0.523 0.398 0.248 0.416 0.679 3,120 
Under_ FCF<0 AC2 0.057 0.080 0.010 0.026 0.071 3,120 
G2 AC1 0.590 0.428 0.286 0.482 0.777 2,656 
Under_ FCF>0 AC2 0.045 0.065 0.008 0.020 0.054 2,657 
Diff (G1 vs. G2) AC1 0.00***  Diff (G1 vs. G2) 0.00***   
(Mean) AC2 0.00***  (Median) 0.00***   
G3 AC1 0.545 0.412 0.251 0.436 0.709 1,884 
Over_ FCF>0 AC2 0.047 0.070 0.008 0.022 0.056 1,884 
G4 AC1 0.477 0.349 0.235 0.386 0.612 1,847 
Over_ FCF<0 AC2 0.041 0.059 0.007 0.019 0.050 1,847 
Diff (G3 vs. G4) AC1 0.00***  Diff (G3 vs. G4) 0.00***   
(Mean) AC2 0.00***  (Median) 0.01***   
Total AC1 0.537 0.402 0.255 0.431 0.699 9,507 
 
AC2 0.049 0.071 0.008 0.022 0.058 9,508 
Notes: AC1 (operating expense scaled by total assets) and AC2 (other receivable scaled by total assets) represent firm-specific levels of agency costs. Firms are classified into 
four groups according to the difference between the levels of their investment and FCF (free cash flow) and their optimal levels: Group1 (under-investing firms with negative 
FCF); Group 2 (under-investing firms with positive FCF); Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive FCF); Group 4 (over-investing firms with negative FCF). P25 (50/75) 
is the 25
th 
(50
th
/75
th
) percentile of the distribution of the relevant variable. Diff is the p-value associated with the  t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in 
means and equality of medians of the firm-level agency costs AC1 (AC2) between groups of under-investing firms (Group1 and Group2) or between groups of over-investing 
firms (Group3  and Group4). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.12   
The sensitivity of over-investment to free cash flow accounting for agency costs 
Dependent variable: I
u
_newi,t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
AC1_over AC1_over AC2_over AC2_over 
Medium_ AC(30-70) -0.002  -0.006***  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
High_ AC(>70) -0.009**  -0.013***  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  
FCF* Low_ AC(<30) 0.020  0.036  
 
(0.021)  (0.022)  
FCF* Medium_ AC(30-70) 0.065***  0.026  
 (0.018)  (0.018)  
FCF* High_ AC(>70) 0.076***  0.092***  
 (0.022)  (0.019)  
High_AC(>50)  -0.005*  -0.012*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
FCF* Low_AC(<50)  0.026  0.033** 
  (0.016)  (0.016) 
FCF* High_ AC(>50)  0.080***  0.068*** 
  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Firm-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
R
2
 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 
Adjusted R
2
 0.13 0.13 0.41 0.14 
Ρ 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
F-value 3.44 3.81 4.50 5.86 
Diff 0.06* 0.02** 0.05** 0.11 
Observations 3,731 3,731 3,731 3,731 
Notes: The specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors 
(in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. ρ represents 
the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is 
unexpected investment (I
u
_newi,t) calculated using the method of Richardson (2006), where under-investing 
(over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (I
u
_newi,t). FCF is 
computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow operating activities (CFO). High_AC, 
Medium_AC or Low_AC are dummy variables, equal to 1 in a given year if a firm faces the highest, medium, 
lowest agency costs in the same industry they belong to and 0 otherwise. In columns 1 and 3, we define a firm 
as facing high (low) agency costs in a given year if its AC1 or AC2 lies in the top (bottom) three deciles of the 
distribution of  the corresponding variables of all firms operating in its same industry in that year. The 
remaining firm-years will be the ones with medium agency costs. As for columns 2 and 4, a firm is considered 
to face high (low) agency costs in a given year if its AC1 or AC2 exceeds (is below) the median value of the 
distribution of the corresponding variables of all firms operating in the same industry it belongs to in that year. 
Diff is a test, distributed as Chi-square, for equality of the coefficients across different categories of firms. 
Specifically, we report p-values of the Wald statistics for the equality of free cash flow associated with over-
investment between sub-samples of firms characterized by high and low agency costs. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.13 
The sensitivity of over-investment to free cash flow: distinguishing firm-years on the basis of 
ownership structure 
Dependent variable: 
I
u
_newi,t 
(1) (2) (3) 
Shareholding_CEO Blockholder Concentration 
Insider -0.001   
 
(0.002)   
FCF* Outsider 0.065***   
 (0.014)   
FCF* Insider 0.013   
 
(0.022)   
Medium_ Share(30-70)  0.001 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
High_ Share (>70)  0.002 -0.000 
 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
FCF* Low_ Share L(<30)  0.043** 0.134*** 
  (0.022) (0.024) 
FCF* Medium_ Share (30-70)  0.084*** 0.032 
  (0.020) (0.022) 
FCF* High_ Share (>70)  0.050** 0.036 
  (0.023) (0.028) 
Firm-fixed effects yes yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes Yes 
R
2
 0.40 0.43 0.45 
Adjusted R
2
 0.13 0.13 0.11 
ρ 0.36 0.39 0.38 
F-value 3.42 3.31 4.52 
Diff(Low VS Medium)   0.17 0.00*** 
Diff (Medium VS High)  0.26 0.90 
Diff (Low VS High) 0.04** 0.83 0.00*** 
Observations 3,721 3,332 2,834 
Notes: The specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. ρ represents the 
proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is 
unexpected investment (I
u
_newi,t) calculated adopting the method of Richardson (2006), where under-investing 
(over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (I
u
_newi,t). FCF is 
computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). In the 
column labeled Shareholding_CEO, Insider(Outsider) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
CEO is (not) holding shares in his/her own company, and 0 otherwise. Blockhoders is the percentage of shares 
controlled by the largest shareholder. High_Share (Low_Share) is a dummy variable equal to 1 in a given year if 
the percentage of shares controlled by blockholders in a given firm lies in the top (bottom) three deciles of the 
distribution of Blockhoders of all firms operating in the same industry in that year. For the remaining firm-years, 
the dummy Medium_Share will be equal to 1. Concentration is a Herfindahl-type of index. Share2_10, is the 
sum of squares of shareholding percentages of the top 10 shareholders excluding the largest shareholder. 
Low_share, Medium_share and High_share refer in turn to dummy variables, equal to 1 if Share2_10 lies in the 
bottom three deciles, the middle four deciles and the top three deciles of the distribution of Share2_10 of all the 
firms operating in the same industry to which the firm belongs to, and 0 otherwise. Diff is a test, distributed as 
Chi-square, for equality of the coefficients across different categories of firms. Specifically, we report p-values 
of the Wald statistics for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients between the indicated groups. *, **, *** 
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.14   
(Under- or over-) investment-free cash flow sensitivity: distinguish firm-years based on whether they become “ST” or bidders 
Dependent variable: 
I
u
_newi,t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ST ST Bidder Bidder_con. 
Under Over Under Over Under Over Under Over 
ST(Bidder)     0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 
    (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
FCF* Non_ST(Bidder)1 0.029*** 0.033**   0.034*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.046*** 
 
(0.005) (0.014)   (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.012) 
FCF* ST(Bidder)2 0.052*** 0.088***   0.046*** 0.073*** 0.032** 0.104*** 
 
(0.007) (0.020)   (0.009) (0.022) (0.014) (0.034) 
Pre_ST   0.004*** -0.005     
   (0.001) (0.005)     
FCF* Non_ST1   0.028*** 0.033**     
   (0.005) (0.014)     
FCF* Pre_ST2   0.050*** 0.131***     
   (0.010) (0.028)     
FCF* Post_ST3   0.061*** 0.034     
   (0.010) (0.029)     
Firm-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R
2
 0.37 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.37 0.40 
Adjusted R
2
 0.19 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.19 0.13 
Ρ 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.36 
F-value 11.81 3.79 10.81 3.71 10.58 3.25 10.51 3.35 
Diff (1VS2)  0.00*** 0.03** 0.06* 0.00*** 0.20 0.27 0.78 0.10* 
Diff (2VS3)   0.44 0.02**     
Diff (1VS3)   0.00*** 0.98     
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Observations 5,777 3,731 5,777 3,731 5,777 3,731 5,777 3,731 
Notes: The specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are 
asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is 
unexpected investment (I
u
_newi,t) calculated using the method of Richardson (2006), where under-investing (over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) 
abnormal investment (I
u
_newi,t). FCF is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from operating cash flow (CFO). ST is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a firm has been issued a special treatment or a de-listing risk warning, and 0 otherwise.  Pre_ST (Post_ST) is a dummy variable, which equals one if a firm is 
in the pre- (post-) period of “ST”, and 0 otherwise. Bidder is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm becomes a bidder in the next fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
Bidder_con is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has been a bidder in two consecutive years, and 0 otherwise. Diff is a test, distributed as Chi-square, for 
equality of the coefficients across different categories of firms. Specifically, we report p-values of the Wald statistics for the equality of free cash flow between the 
indicated groups. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.15 
The effects of free cash flow on (under- and over-) investment: distinguishing firms on the basis of other dimensions of firm heterogeneity 
specific to the Chinese context 
Dependent variable: I
u
_newi,t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ownership Ownership (2003-2010) Region Exporting 
Under Over Under Over Under Over Under Over 
Dum_CH 0.001 0.000   0.003 0.008 -0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.004)   (0.005) (0.017) (0.001) (0.003) 
FCF*(1-Dum_CH) 0.046*** 0.023   0.038*** 0.056*** 0.039*** 0.038** 
 (0.007) (0.021)   (0.007) (0.018) (0.006) (0.019) 
FCF*Dum_CH 0.032*** 0.064***   0.035*** 0.049*** 0.020** 0.036 
 
(0.005) (0.014)   (0.005) (0.015) (0.008) (0.024) 
(SOE_local)2   -0.003 -0.001     
   (0.002) (0.006)     
 (Non_SOE)3   -0.003 0.001     
   (0.003) (0.007)     
FCF* (SOE_Central)1   0.037*** 0.016     
   (0.012) (0.035)     
FCF* (SOE_local)2   0.031*** 0.104***     
   (0.007) (0.020)     
FCF* (Non_SOE)3   0.053*** 0.041*     
   (0.008) (0.025)     
Firm-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R
2
 0.37 0.40 0.47 0.45 0.37 0.40 0.52 0.48 
Adjusted R
2
 0.19 0.13 0.26 0.11 0.19 0.13 0.31 0.12 
ρ 0.38 0.36 0.50 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.57 0.40 
F-value 10.71 3.35 10.89 4.01 10.49 3.18 10.05 1.96 
Diff (1VS2)  0.11 0.10* 0.65 0.03** 0.75 0.76 0.07* 0.94 
Diff (2VS3)   0.04** 0.05**     
Diff (1VS3)   0.27 0.56     
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Observations 5,771 3,728  4,300   2,825  5,777 3,731 3,958 2,601 
Notes: The specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are 
asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity.  ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is 
unexpected investment (I
u
_newi,t) calculated using the method of Richardson (2006), where under-investing (over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) 
abnormal investment (I
u
_newi,t). FCF is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). Dum_CH (Ownership) is a 
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a firm is stated owned, and 0 otherwise. Dum_CH (Region) is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a 
firm is located in the coastal regions of China, and 0 otherwise. Dum_CH (Exporting) is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm participates in exporting in a given 
year and 0 otherwise. SOE_central (SOE_local / non_SOE) is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a firm is a state-owned enterprise affiliated with the 
central government (a stated owned enterprise affiliated with local governments / a non-state-owned enterprise), and 0 otherwise. Due to the data availability, the results of 
different ownership structure in column 1 and 2 are based on a sub-sample from 2003 to 2010.  Diff is a test, distributed as Chi-square, for equality of the coefficients across 
different groups of firms. Specifically, we report p-values of the Wald statistics for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients across sub-samples. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.16 
The effects of the split share structure reform on the sensitivities of (under- and over-) 
investment to free cash flow 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: I
u
_newi,t Over Over(2003-2010) Under 
FCF -0.018 -0.011 0.054*** 
 
(0.030) (0.040) (0.011) 
FCF*Post 0.083** 0.081* -0.017 
 (0.041) (0.048) (0.015) 
FCF*Treat(SOE/SOELG) 0.097*** 0.179*** -0.022* 
 
(0.035) (0.050) (0.013) 
FCF*Treat(SOE/SOELG)*Post -0.114** -0.199*** 0.010 
 (0.049) (0.062) (0.018) 
FCF*Treat(SOECG)  -0.066  
  (0.066)  
FCF*Treat(SOECG)*Post  0.091  
  (0.085)  
Firm-fixed effects yes yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes Yes 
R
2
 0.39 0.45 0.35 
Adjusted R
2
 0.13 0.12 0.19 
ρ 0.35 0.37 0.36 
F-value 3.63 4.99 9.48 
Observations 3,509 2,636 5,487 
Notes: The specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimators. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. ρ represents the 
proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is 
unexpected investment (I
u
_newi,t) calculated adopting the method of Richardson (2006). FCF is computed by 
subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). Treat (SOE) is a 
dummy variable, which equals 1 if a firm has a state entity as its ultimate controlling shareholder, and zero 
otherwise. Treat (SOELG/SOECG) ) is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if  a firm is stated owned enterprise affiliated 
with the local/the central government in a given year,  and zero otherwise. Post is equal to 1 in the year of and 
the years following the firm’s announcement of the restricting reform, and zero otherwise. The triple term 
(FCF*Treat*Post) is aimed at capturing the difference-in-differences effect. Due to the data availability, the 
results in column 2 are based on a sub-sample covering the years 2003 to 2010.*, **, *** indicates significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Note: I_totali,t = CAPEXi,t - SalePPEi,t (Capital expenditure- sale of property, plant, and 
equipment);  
I_main.i,t = Depreciationi,t + Amortizationi,t; 
I_newi,t = I_totali,t - I_main.i,t;  
CFOi,t = Net cash flow from operating activities; 
CFAIP,i,t = Cash flow generated from assets in place; 
FCFi,t =CFAIP,i,t - I
e
_newi,t =CFO i,t - I_main.i,t - I
e
_newi,t. 
Fig. 2.1 Framework for the construction of (under- or over-) investment and free cash flow 
 
 
 
I_totali,t 
I_newi,t 
Ie_newi,t 
Fitted value 
Iu_newi,t 
Residuals 
Over-
investment (+) 
Under-
investment (-) 
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CFOi,t 
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Fig. 2.2 Fitted values of the sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Fig. 2.3 Four groups of firms based on their abnormal investment and free cash flow (FCF) 
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Fig. 2.4 Diagrams of four phases of firms’ abnormal investment and free cash flow 
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Chapter 3 
Adjustment behavior and value of corporate cash holdings:                 
The China experience 
 
Using a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 1998-2010, we examine the 
behavior of corporate cash holdings. Consistent with the cost-benefit trade-off view, we 
document that Chinese firms tend to actively manage their cash balances towards a target 
level. We also observe a considerable heterogeneity in adjustment speeds of cash holdings 
across firms, due to the presence of different adjustment costs. Furthermore, the marginal 
value of cash is shown to decrease with larger cash holdings, and is lower for firms 
attempting acquisitions, and for state-owned enterprises. Finally, we observe that financially 
constrained firms tend to make better use of additional cash compared with firms that have 
easier access to capital markets. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Cash and cash equivalents are an important source of finance for firms, especially in the 
presence of imperfect capital markets. A huge literature has investigated possible reasons 
why companies hold a considerable portion of their assets in the form of cash reserves. 
However, most of this literature focuses on US and European corporations. Yet, Chinese 
firms hold higher levels of cash reserves than firms in most countries, including developed 
ones, and the cash holdings of Chinese firms have been growing over the last decade at rates 
similar to those of US and European companies.
80
 Understanding Chinese firms’ cash 
holding behavior represents therefore an interesting research question. 
Allen et al. (2007) point out that the malfunctioning financial system in China, which 
is mainly bank-based, hinders economic growth. According to Allen et al. (2012), the size of 
China’s banking sector, in terms of total bank credit, represented 111% of its GDP in 2005. 
However bank credit issued to the non-state sector only represented 31% of GDP. This shows 
that non state-owned firms may find it difficult to obtain external finance from the banking 
sector. There is also abundant evidence showing that the role of China’s stock markets in 
financing and allocating resources is limited, and size requirements generally prevent private 
enterprises from accessing equity markets (Allen et al. 2012).  
Given the difficulties they face in accessing external finance, Chinese firms, and 
particularly the non-state ones rely on self-financing, which comprises retained earnings, cash 
                                                          
    
80
 Firms in emerging countries are found to hold more cash than those in developed countries, due to poor 
shareholder protection (Dittmar et al., 2003). In our sample, which covers the period 1998-2010, the median 
level of cash holdings to total assets is 12.2%, much higher than overall median (6.2%) of the 45 countries 
analyzed by Dittmar et al. (2003). In addition, the average level of cash holdings in China almost doubled over 
our sample period (1998-2010).   
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reserves, and loans from family, friends and other investors. The average annual growth rate 
of self-funding in China was approximately 17.8% between 1994 and 2006, and self-funding 
reached $666.5 billion in 2006, which is almost twice the size as domestic bank loans ($364.8 
billion) in the same year. Moreover, roughly 90% of total financing for individually owned 
companies depends on self-funding. Even for SOEs or quasi-state-owned companies, 45%-
65% of total financing comes from self-funding (Allen et al. 2007).  
A number of studies have found positive effects of internal funds on the investment 
and assets growth of Chinese firms (Chow & Fung 1998; Chow & Fung 2000; Guariglia et 
al. 2011). Due its relatively low costs, a sufficient level of internal finance (including cash 
reserves) provides Chinese firms with the ability to invest, despite the difficulties they face in 
accessing external finance. Consequently, unlike the US or European countries, where the 
financial system functions efficiently, cash holdings are likely to play a more crucial role in 
explaining firm behavior and, ultimately, economic growth in China. Yet, to the best of our 
knowledge, only a handful of studies have analyzed corporate cash holding decisions in 
China (Alles et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2012; Lian et al., 2010; and Megginson & Wei, 
2012).
81
 
                                                          
    
81
 It should be noted that Megginson and Wei’s (2012) paper only focuses on the links between state 
ownership and the level and value of cash holdings. Chen et al. (2012), on the other hand, aim at explaining the 
decline in cash holdings and in the cash to cash flow sensitivities observed for Chinese firms after the split share 
reform. Our chapter is closer in spirit to Alles et al. (2012) and Lian et al. (2010). Yet, the former only look at 
the extent to which Chinese listed firms adjust their actual levels of cash towards a target level, without taking 
into account firm heterogeneity, whilst the latter also attempts to explain possible determinants of the 
adjustment speeds. Our work builds on these papers by presenting a more thorough analysis of firms’ speeds of 
adjustment towards an optimal level of cash, by showing how these speeds of adjustment may be different for 
different types of firms, and by proposing a direct horse-race test of the target adjustment model against other 
alternative models. Finally, we also analyze the extent to which cash holdings affect firms’ excess operating 
performance. 
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The aim of this study is to fill this gap in the literature by investigating Chinese firms’ 
cash holding decisions and the effects of cash holdings on their value. Specifically, we 
address the following questions: What are the determinants of cash holdings for Chinese 
firms? Do Chinese firms have cash targets, and if so, how quickly do they adjust towards the 
targets? What factors affect their speeds of adjustment (SOAs) towards these targets?  What 
value or benefits does a firm generate by holding more cash? Is the value of additional cash 
different across firms? 
To this end, making use of a panel of listed companies over the period 1998-2010, we 
first test the time series properties of Chinese firms’ cash holdings. We find that they display 
a tendency towards convergence, suggested by mean reversion. Second, following Opler et al. 
(1999) (hereafter OPSW), we examine different models of corporate cash holdings, and find 
substantial empirical support for the trade-off model. According to this model, firms assess 
the costs and benefits of holding cash and adjust their cash reserves to a target level.  
Third, we account for the potentially dynamic nature of firms’ cash holdings by 
estimating the speed of adjustment (SOA), i.e. the rate at which firms adjust their cash 
reserves towards the target.
82
 We find imperfect adjustments of cash holdings: It takes the 
typical Chinese firm between 1.2 and 2.1 years to complete half of its required cash 
adjustment. This is slightly longer than what is observed for firms from the West, and can be 
explained by the higher adjustment costs faced by Chinese firms. Financing frictions may 
                                                          
    
82
 The static cash holding model used by Kim et al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999) assumes that cash holdings 
are determined by a single period trade-off between the costs and benefits of holding liquid assets. However, the 
performance of the static trade-off model is weakened by not fully accounting for firms’ adjustment costs and 
expectations. In contrast, the dynamic models of cash holdings developed by Ozkan & Ozkan (2004), Han & 
Qiu (2007), and Venkiteshwaran (2011) recognize a sluggish adjustment process of cash holdings due to 
adjustment frictions. In our empirical analysis, we therefore estimate firms’ SOAs using a dynamic cash 
holdings model. 
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prevent firms from keeping their cash levels in line with the optimal level, and thus cause a 
dynamic adjustment of cash holdings. We also find that the SOAs of cash holdings are 
different for firms facing different adjustment costs. Particularly, firms with excess cash 
display higher adjustment speeds than their counterparts with a cash deficit. In other words, it 
is more costly for a firm to build up cash stocks than to deplete excess cash reserves. 
Additionally, higher adjustment speeds associated with a lower level of adjustment costs are 
accompanied by firm’s active management of cash balances by firms through higher 
investment, dividend payments, and debt issuance.  
Fourth,  we adopt the method of Faulkender & Wang (2006) to examine how excess 
operating performance is affected by changes in cash holdings. We find that firms benefit 
from holding additional cash in terms of excess operating performance. However the 
marginal value of cash significantly drops as the level of (excess) cash increases. 
Furthermore, our study reveals that firms that attempt acquisitions or are state-owned display 
lower marginal value of cash holdings. Finally, we find that compared with constrained firms, 
financially healthy firms tend to exhibit a lower marginal value of additional cash holdings. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we briefly review 
the theories of cash holdings and their empirical predictions. Section 3.3 illustrates the main 
features of our data and presents summary statistics. Section 3.4 describes our baseline 
specifications and empirical results. Section 3.5 concludes. 
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3.2. Theories of cash holdings and value implications 
In the sub-sections that follow, we illustrate in turn the three main theories on the motives of 
corporate cash holdings, namely the trade-off theory, the financial hierarchy theory, and the 
free cash flow theory.   
 
3.2.1. Theories of cash holdings 
3.2.1.1. The trade-off theory of cash holdings 
The trade-off theory, which has attracted significant empirical support (Opler et al. 1999; 
Keynes 2006; Lee & Powell 2011; Venkiteshwaran 2011), suggests that given the costs and 
benefits of holding liquid assets, firms tend to rebalance their cash holdings towards a target 
level which maximizes shareholder wealth.  
The cost of holding cash is the opportunity cost of the capital invested in liquid assets, i.e. 
the lower return compared to other investments associated with a similar level of risk (Opler 
et al. 1999; Dittmar et al. 2003). As for the benefit of holding cash, it derives from two 
motives: the transaction cost motive and the precautionary motive. According to the former, 
firms benefit from holding cash to meet business transactions needs or unsynchronized 
expenses. Using cash enables them to make payments without liquidating assets. Consistent 
with this perspective, Mulligan (1997) argues that there exist economies of scale in cash 
holdings since it is more costly for small firms to access capital markets and raise external 
financing and it is more difficult for these firms to sell non-core assets to raise cash in periods 
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of financial distress. Similarly, one would also expect firms with more volatile cash flow to 
hold cash to mitigate the consequences of unexpected earnings shortfalls.  
According to the precautionary motive, liquid assets can be used as a buffer to meet 
unexpected shocks, enabling firms to avoid the cost premium they would have to pay if they 
had to access capital markets. The precautionary motive also suggests that in the presence of 
asymmetric information problems, firms hold cash to avoid the costs of forgoing positive net 
present value (NPV) projects when other sources of finance become either too expensive or 
not available. This motive is likely to be more relevant for firms with better investment 
opportunities.  
The trade-off view suggests that firms have incentives to actively offset deviations from 
their optimal cash levels. However, adjustment costs may prevent them from immediately 
rebalancing towards their target level, since they need to trade-off the adjustment costs 
against the costs of operating with suboptimal cash levels. The speed with which firms adjust 
their cash holdings depends on the adjustment costs they face. With zero adjustment costs, 
firms should always stick to their optimal cash ratios. If adjustment costs are infinite, one 
would expect that there is no reversion of cash changes. 
Focusing on empirical evidence, Opler et al. (1999) find evidence that US firms with 
better growth opportunities, greater cash flow uncertainty, and restricted access to external 
capital tend to hold more cash, which supports the static trade-off theory. Almeida et al. 
(2004) find a relation between the degree of financial constraints that firms face and their 
propensity to save cash out of cash flow. Han & Qiu (2007) find a significantly positive 
responsiveness of cash holdings to cash flow volatility for financially constrained firms. Both 
studies support the precautionary motive for holding cash, suggesting that when firms are 
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constrained by capital market imperfections, they tend to adjust their levels of cash holdings 
to trade-off current against future investments. This intertemporal trade-off allows financially 
constrained firms to save more cash reserves by decreasing current investment in response to 
increased future cash flow uncertainty. Bates et al. (2009) point out that, on average, US 
firms dramatically increased their cash holdings from 1980 through 2006. Their empirical 
study shows that this increase can be explained by the change in firm characteristics over the 
sample period. In particular, they observe that firms display higher R&D expenditures and 
cash flow volatility over time, which implies they are characterized by a higher degree of 
uncertainty. Their findings therefore suggest that firms tend to hold more cash for 
precautionary reasons.  
Focusing on Chinese listed firms, Alles at al. (2012) and Lian et al. (2010) find support 
for the trade-off theory of cash holdings. The latter also show that adjustment from above the 
target is faster than from below, and that adjustment speeds are negatively related to firm 
size, but positively related to the deviation from the target level. Furthermore, they note that 
the adjustment to target is mainly undertaken through internal finance, rather than through 
dividend payments or leverage. Finally, they show that the adjustment behavior can be 
explained by precautionary saving stemming from financing constraints. We build on these 
papers by presenting a more thorough analysis of firms’ speeds of adjustment towards an 
optimal level of cash, by showing how these speeds of adjustment may be different for 
different types of firms, and by proposing a direct horse-race test of the target adjustment 
model against the financial hierarchy and the cash flow models, which we discuss below.  
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3.2.1.2. The financial hierarchy theory of cash holdings 
Myers & Majluf (1984) propose a pecking order model, according to which, in a world 
characterized by imperfect capital markets, firms use first of all retained earnings to finance 
themselves, then debt, and then equity as a last resort. This theory suggests that when a firm 
has a low level of cash flow relative to investment, it will use stockpiled cash holdings before 
seeking for costly external financing. Hence, holding a considerable amount of cash can 
reduce the costs of raising funds externally, and serve stockholders’ interests. According to 
this theory, one would expect that faced with a rise in internal funds, the firm would 
accumulate cash and repay its debt when it is due; while if a firm faces a deficit of internal 
funds, it is more likely to deplete cash reserves and further raise debt. Generally, cash can be 
seen as negative debt. In brief, a firm’s level of cash holdings would rise and fall with its 
profitability (Opler et al. 1999). In contrast with the trade-off theory, this theory does not give 
rise to an optimal cash holding level. 
As suggest by de Haan & Hinloopen (2003), who analyze a sample of Dutch firms 
from 1984 to 1997, the determinants of incremental financing choice can be explained by 
both the financial hierarchy theory and the static trade-off theory. In particular, based on 
ordered probit models for a possible set of financing hierarchies, they find that Dutch firms 
generally follow the rule predicted by the theory according to which internal finance is 
favored over external finance. Focusing on EMU countries, Ferreira & Vilela (2004) find a 
positive impact of cash flow and investment opportunities on cash holdings, which provides 
support for the financial hierarchy theory.  D’Mello et al. (2008) examine the determinants of 
cash allocation decisions around spin-offs for a sample of US listed firms between 1985 and 
2000. They find that consistent with the pecking order theory, the excess cash ratio is 
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positively related to concurrent profitability. Using a large panel of 17,165 Italian unlisted 
firms between 1996 and 2005, Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal (2012) examine cash holdings and its 
determinants in Italian private firms and also find evidence supportive of the financial 
hierarchy theory. 
 
3.2.1.3. The free cash flow theory of cash holdings 
The free cash flow theory suggests that managers might not always have the same interests as 
shareholders due to empire-building or entrenchment motives. Specifically, managers might 
have incentives to stockpile cash as reserves to pursue their own objectives. Holding excess 
cash gives them in fact more flexibility to operate their companies, even at the expense of 
shareholders. As for the financial hierarchy theory, the free cash flow theory does not predict 
an optimal level of corporate liquidity. 
By examining a small sample of firms with a cash windfall, Blanchard et al. (1994) 
find that in order to secure their positions and firms’ long-run survival, managers re-invest 
the cash windfall inside the firm or invest it in value-destroying projects rather than returning  
it to shareholders. Dittmar et al. (2003) show that there are significantly higher cash reserves 
in countries with poor shareholder protection. Similarly, Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) find 
that poorly governed firms have lower marginal value of cash holdings and have a worse 
operating performance associated with excess cash. These findings are consistent with the 
predictions of the free cash flow theory. Additionally, accumulating excess cash may 
decrease market discipline. For example, Harford (1999) documents that firms which are 
holding excess cash are likely to make value-decreasing acquisitions, while they are less 
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likely to be a takeover target. In short, without valuable investment opportunities, the agency 
costs of managerial discretion may lead firms to use their excess cash to finance unprofitable 
projects rather than to pay dividends to shareholders, which decreases the additional value of 
cash holdings.  
Based on the discussion on these motives of cash holdings, we will assess the extent 
to which the cash holdings of Chinese firms can be explained by these theories. Initially, we 
will test for the presence of a cash target. Should we find evidence for the existence of such a 
target, we will investigate what is the adjustment speed with which firms rebalance their cash 
ratio towards the optimal level in the presence of adjustment costs.  
 
3.2.2. Value implications of holding cash 
As mentioned above, cash holdings serve two main purposes: the transaction costs motive 
and the precautionary motive. Thus, cash holdings can be enormously valuable when other 
internal and external funds are insufficient to finance firms’ investment and other activities. 
However, cash holdings can also be converted into private benefits at lower costs compared 
to other types of assets (Myers & Rajan 1998). To reconcile these contradictory predictions, a 
number of papers investigate the valuation effect of cash holdings. Among these, Faulkender 
& Wang (2006) show that the value of liquidity is higher for US firms with lower cash 
holdings, lower leverage, and higher financial constraints. Additionally, firms that distribute 
cash via dividends have lower marginal value of cash holdings than the ones that repurchase 
shares. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) find a lower value of cash holdings in countries with poor 
investor protection, which is supportive of the importance of the agency theory. Similarly, 
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Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Harford et al. (2008) investigate the impact of corporate 
governance on the value of cash holdings. The former find that poor governance can 
significantly reduce the value of cash holdings as well as the operating performance 
associated with excess cash. The latter point out that the value of excess cash is lower for 
firms with low insider ownership. Bates et al. (2009) provide evidence that the increase in 
cash holdings observed for US industrial firms between 1980 and 2004 did not cause a 
decrease in the value of cash over time, which suggests that the increases in cash holdings 
cannot be explained by agency problems. By investigating cash holdings for a sample of 
Chinese privatized firms from 1993 to 2007, Megginson & Wei (2012) find that state 
ownership has a negative effect on the marginal value of cash, which is consistent with the 
soft-budget constraint theory
83
.  
We build on this literature by investigating the extent to which  the marginal value of 
cash varies with: (1) the level of the firm’s cash position, (2) whether or not the firm engages 
in Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) in the next year, (3) the degree of financial constraints 
the firm is like to face, (4) the firm’s ownership structure. The intuition behind these 
conjectures is as follows:   
(1) Firms with a low level of cash holdings are more likely to benefit from an extra 
dollar of cash since cash reserves can increase their ability to invest without accessing costly 
external capital markets. These firms are more likely to face higher transaction and liquidity 
costs compared with firms with high cash balances. Thus, cash-poor firms rely more on cash 
reserves to fund their investments and short-term liabilities and to avoid potentially forgoing 
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 In the presence of soft budget constraints, state-owned enterprises are expected to be bailed out or rescued 
when they suffer from chronic losses or financial problems. 
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their positive net present value (NPV) projects. Consequently, the marginal value of cash is 
expected to decline as cash holdings rise.  
(2) The payoff in terms of marginal value of cash is likely to be lower for firms 
attempting acquisitions in the next year because of the agency conflicts over resources 
between owners and managers. For the sake of reducing their personal undiversified risk and 
increasing the scale and scope of operating assets in their hands, managers may in fact prefer 
spending cash rather than paying it out to the shareholders. Acquisitions can be seen as a 
primary way for managers to spend cash. Therefore, the value of holding cash is expected to 
be lower for firms who are going to engage in acquisitions in the following year.  
(3) According to the costly external financing view, the marginal value of cash tends 
to increase with the level of financial constraints that firms face. That is, when firms face 
financial constraints, they find it more difficult to access to capital markets, and are thus more 
likely to face higher costs of raising external funds. Cash reserves allow these firms to bypass 
the cost premium to undertake positive net present value (NPV) projects. Therefore, we 
expect an extra dollar of cash to be more valuable for financially constrained firms.  
(4) It is well documented that state-owned firms in China are favored by domestic 
banks and typically experience soft budget constraints due to social and political reasons 
(Allen et al. 2007). Therefore, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less likely to face financial 
constraints than their non-state-owned (non-SOEs) counterparts (Bai et al. 2006; Allen et al. 
2007; Guariglia et al. 2011).  Hence, we expect a rise in cash holdings to be associated with a 
lower value enhancement for state-controlled enterprises. 
  
Chapter 3                               Adjustment behavior and value of corporate cash holdings: 
The China experience                                                      
149 
 
3.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.3.1. The dataset 
We use the universe of listed Chinese firms that issue A-shares on either the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) during the period 1998-2010, 
obtained from the China Stock Market Trading Database (CSMAR) and China Economic 
Research Service Centre (CCER)
 84
. Following the literature, we exclude firms in the 
financial sector. Furthermore, to minimize the potential influence of outliers, we winsorize 
observations in the one percent tails for the regression variables. Finally, we drop all firms 
with less than three years of consecutive observations. All variables are deflated using the 
gross domestic product (GDP) deflator (National Bureau of Statistics of China). 
We consider the information on acquisition deals announced between January 1, 1999 
and December 31, 2011 for our listed Chinese companies on the Thomson Financial SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Both successful and unsuccessful deals are taken into 
consideration. 
Our final unbalanced panel consists of 15,349 firm-year observations representing 
1,478 listed firms. The number of firm-year observations of each firm varies between three 
and thirteen, with number of observations varying from a minimum of 708 in 1998 to a 
maximum of 1,478 in 2008.
85
 
                                                          
    
84
 The cash flow statement in the databases is not available until 1998. 
    
85
 See Tables 1 and 2 for details about the structure of our sample. Fewer than 50 percent of firms have the 
full 13-year observations. Our panel is unbalanced, allowing for both entry and exit. This can be seen as 
evidence of dynamism and may reduce potential selection and survivor bias. 
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3.3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.3 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the study. We observe 
that the average cash flow to assets ratio is 4.7%; the average capital expenditure to assets 
ratio, 5.8%; the average leverage ratio, 23.2%; and average cash flow volatility, 8.7%. These 
figures are largely consistent with those reported for US firms by Opler et al. (1999) and 
Venkiteshwaran (2011); for EMU and UK firms, by Ferreira & Vilela (2004) and Ozkan & 
Ozkan (2004); and for Chinese firms, by Alles et al. (2012). Additionally, Table 3.3 shows 
that on average, the return on assets (ROA) is 2.3% and Tobin’s Q is greater than one 
(1.75).
86
 
[Insert Table 3.3] 
Furthermore, we observe that the mean level of cash holdings to total assets in our 
sample is approximately 14.7%. This is comparable to the ratios observed for US and UK 
firms
87
. However, the median cash-to-assets ratio is 12.1%, higher than the median ratios 
observed in the West, which range between 3% for Canadian firms to 9% for French firms 
(Opler et al. 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan 2004; Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith 2007; Harford et al. 2008; 
Riddick & Whited 2009; Venkiteshwaran 2011). Chinese firms also hold a relatively higher 
median percentage of cash reserves than most of the developed countries analyzed by Dittmar 
                                                          
    
86
 The shares of listed firms in China can be either tradable or non-tradable. Following the literature (Chen et 
al. 2011; Huang et al. 2011), we calculate Tobin’s Q as the sum of the market value of tradable stocks, the book 
value of non-tradable stocks, and the market value of net debt, divided by the book value of total assets. The 
results were similar when tradable stock price is used to calculate as the market value of non-tradable stocks. 
For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
    
87
 Corresponding ratios for US firms are in fact 18.0% according to Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007), 14.8% 
according to Harford et al.  (2008), 8.1% according to Kim et al.  (1998), 14.5% according to Opler et al. (1999), 
and 19% according to Venkiteshwaran (2011). The corresponding ratio for UK firms is 9.9% (Ozkan & Ozkan, 
2004). 
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et al. (2003) and Riddick & Whited (2009), for which the median cash to assets ratio is 6.3% 
and 6.2%, respectively.
88
 It is interesting to point out that Japan has similar mean and median 
cash to assets ratios as China (16.4% and 13.9%, respectively). In addition, our descriptive 
statistics reveal that the average cash level (14.7%) is higher than the sum of average cash 
flow (4.7%) and capital expenditures (5.8%). Cash holdings constitute therefore a non-trivial 
percentage of total assets of Chinese firms. This may be due to the higher costs associated 
with raising external credit in China (Allen et al. 2005), which may lead Chinese firms to rely 
more on internal finance than firms in other countries.   
The lower part of Table 3.3 provides summary statistics for the cash-to-assets ratio by 
year. It reveals that average (median) cash holdings range from 9.8% (7.9%) in 1998 to 
17.2% (14.3%) in 2010. This suggests that during the sample period, the level of cash 
holdings in China almost doubled.
89
 Additionally, in line with Chen et al. (2012), we observe 
a trough of cash holdings in 2005 and 2006.
90
  Chen et al. (2012) attribute the reduction in 
cash holdings to an improvement in Chinese firms’ corporate governance and a relaxing in 
the financial constraints following the 2005 split structure reform.
91
 The noticeable increasing 
                                                          
    
88
 The cash-to-assets ratios for developed countries like the US, UK, Germany and France is more right-
skewed than the ratios for Chinese firms in our sample. 
    
89
 To better understand this trend, we regressed firms’ cash holdings on a constant and a firm-specific time 
trend using the fixed-effects estimator. The estimated coefficient on the time trend was found to be positive and 
significant (slope = 0.1% per year; t-statistic= 4.90). This suggests the existence of a 0.1 percentage point per 
year increase in the tendency of firms to accumulate cash. 
    
90
 It should be noted, however, that contrary to us, Chen et al. (2012) report value of cash and cash 
equivalents divided by non-cash assets.  
91
 The split structure reform was launched in May 2005 by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission’s 
(CSRC) in order to float the non-tradable shares through the open market. Prior to the reform, the majority of 
shares of listed firms in China was not tradable and typically held by the government itself or government 
entities. The reform substantially released market frictions and had a positive impact on firms’ governance 
(Allen et al. 2007; Jiang et al. 2010; Li et al. 2011; Hou et al. 2012). 
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trend in cash holdings from 2007 onwards may be due to the financial crisis, which made it 
more difficult for firms in China to access credit.  
To examine whether the increase in cash applies equally to different types of firms, 
we partition our sample into small and large firms, on the one hand; and firms with low and 
high Tobin’s Q, on the other. Specifically, we define as small/large (characterized by a 
low/high Tobin Q) in a given year those firms whose total real assets (market-to-book ratio) 
fall below/above the median value of the corresponding variable of all firms operating in the 
same industry. Fig. 3.1 illustrates the evolution over time of the median cash ratios across 
small and large firms, and across firm with low and high Tobin’s Q. We can see that the 
increases in cash have similar patterns across sub-samples, which suggests that the increase in 
cash holdings is driven by neither firm size nor Tobin’s Q. Additionally, we do not observe 
obvious differences in the cash ratios between large and small firms. However, cash to assets 
ratios are slightly higher for firms with higher Tobin’s Q, which may due to the fact firm with 
higher Q hold more cash in order to respond to better investment opportunities.
92
  
[Insert Fig 3.1] 
 
  
                                                          
    
92
 Unreported p-values associated with tests for equality of both sample means (t-test) and sample medians 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test) show significant differences in the cash ratios across firms with low and high Tobin’s 
Q. 
Chapter 3                               Adjustment behavior and value of corporate cash holdings: 
The China experience                                                      
153 
 
3.4. Evaluation of the results 
3.4.1. Determinants of cash holdings 
In this section, we examine whether the level of cash holdings (measured by the ratio of cash 
and cash equivalents to total assets) can be explained by firms’ characteristics. Following 
Opler et al. (1999), the explanatory variables that we use as determinants of cash holdings are 
motivated by the transaction and precautionary motives. We also add acquisitions and 
ownership dummies as acquisition expenditures may be seen as a substitute to capital 
expenditures, and the ownership structure is a unique feature in the Chinese context. Our 
model of optimal cash holdings (Cash
*
) is therefore given by the following equation: 
       
     ∑                                                         
                                                                                  
                    ∑      ∑          ∑                                                                           
where the subscript i indexes firms; j indexes industries; and t, years (t=1998-2010). Xk,it  is a 
vector of the explanatory variables that affect the costs and benefits of holding cash. These 
variables are the following: 
 Q (Tobin’s Q), i.e. the firm’s market-to-book ratio. Firms with more profitable 
investment opportunities are more likely to hold more cash, since the opportunity 
cost of cash shortfalls is larger for these firms. Therefore, liquid assets are expected 
to increase with Tobin’s Q. 
 Firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. This variable is 
expected to have a negative sign due to economies of scale in cash management 
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(Miller & Orr 1966). Small firms have incentives to maintain higher cash reserves to 
avoid substantial fixed costs of raising funds.  
 Cash flow, defined as the ratio of the sum of net profit and depreciation to total 
assets. We expect to observe a positive relation between cash flow and cash holdings 
since firms with more funds available have the means to accumulate more liquid 
assets. 
 NWC (non-cash NWC), defined as the ratio of net working capital (working capital 
minus cash holdings) to total assets. NWC can be seen as a substitute for cash, thus 
firms with more NWC should hold less cash. 
 CAPEX represents the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Capital 
expenditures could increase the firm’s net worth as well as debt capacity. Thus, firms 
with higher capital expenditures are less risky and likely to have easier access to 
capital markets. Additionally, firms can manage their cash balances through 
investment in response to unexpected shocks. Therefore, one would expect firms that 
invest more to accumulate less cash.  
 Leverage, defined as the ratio of its short-term and long-term debt to total assets.  We 
expect to observe a negative relation between cash holdings and leverage. When 
firms are facing surplus internal funds, they may in fact save cash and reduce 
leverage. Similarly, when internal funds drop, firms may cut their cash holdings and 
obtain more leverage. Additionally, high leverage may prove the firm was successful 
at obtaining loans from banks. Therefore, firms with high leverage may face a lower 
need to hold liquid assets. 
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 Div_Dum is a dividend payout dummy equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends, 
and 0 otherwise.
93
 We expect this dividend dummy (Div_Dum) to have a positive 
effect on cash holdings due to the fact that dividend-paying firms tend to hold more 
cash to manage dividend payments in a situation of shortage of liquid assets. A 
positive relation could also be due to the fact that cash-rich firms are more likely to 
pay dividends.
94
 
 Var_CF is a measure of the volatility of cash flow, measured at the industry level. 
For a given industry j in a given year t, it is measured as the mean of the standard 
deviations of the cash flow to assets ratios of all firms operating in that industry in 
year t. According to the precautionary motive, a firm’s individual cash holdings are 
expected to react positively to industry cash flow risk.  
 Ownership, is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if a firm is state-owned in 
a given year, and 0 otherwise.
95
 Given the soft budget constraints characterizing 
them, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are likely to face a lower degree of financial 
constraints, thus we expect them to hold less cash than their non-state owned 
counterparts. 
 AC1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in a given year if a firm attempts acquisitions in 
the next fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. According to Harford (1999), substantial cash 
                                                          
    
93
 Cash dividends are more likely to affect the level of cash holdings, compared to stock dividends. 
    
94
 However, the relationship between cash holdings and dividend payment could also be negative since 
paying dividends signals to the markets that the firm is less risky, which provides it with better access to 
external financing, and with a lower need to hold cash. 
    
95
 We differentiate firms into SOEs and non-SOE groups according to their ultimate controlling shareholder: 
The SOE sector is made up of state-controlled entities. The non-state sector, in which non-state entities are the 
controlling shareholders, comprises six types of ownership categories: domestic private, foreign, collective, 
employees’ union, non-profit organizations or institutes, and others. The majority of firm-years in our sample 
(70.2%) belong to the state sector. Moreover, 83% of the firm-years in the non-state sector of our sample are 
domestic private firms. 
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holdings increase the likelihood of  attempting acquisitions. Hence, we would expect 
to observe a positive relation between cash holdings and the chance of undertaking 
acquisitions. 
Eq. (3.1) also incorporates time dummies (∑Year), which account for the possible 
effects of business cycles, as well as the impact of change in interest rates. Industry dummies 
(∑Industry) are included to capture the industry fixed-effects associated with firms’ cash 
holdings.
96
Finally, provincial dummies (∑province) are added to account for uneven 
development across different provinces.
97
 
The error term in Eq. (3.1) consists of two components:   , a firm-specific component, 
embracing any time-invariant firm characteristic which might influence firms’ cash holdings, 
as well as any time-invariant component of the measurement error which may affect any 
variable in our regression; and     , which represents an idiosyncratic component. The fitted 
values of Eq. (3.1) can be interpreted as a proxy for optimal cash holdings. We estimate 
excess cash as the difference between real cash holdings and optimal levels. 
                                                          
    
96
 According to the industry classification taken from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
firms in China’s listed sector are assigned to one of the following twelve industrial sectors: Farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry & fishing; Mining; Manufacturing; Utilities; Construction; Transportation & warehouse; 
Information technology; Wholesale & retailing; Real estate; Social services; Communications & cultural;  
Conglomerates; Finance & insurance. Following previous literature, we exclude the Finance & insurance sector 
from our study.
 
 
    
96
 It should be noted that because of collinearity, industry dummies (∑Industries) cannot be included in the 
equations when the fixed- effects estimator is used. The same argument applies to the industry-level measure of 
cash flow volatility (VAR_CF). 
    
97
 There are 31 provinces in China: Coastal provinces (Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang); Central provinces (Chongqing, Anhui, Heilongjiang, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, and Shanxi); and Western provinces (Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, 
Neimenggu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Yunnan ).  
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Table 3.4 provides the pooled OLS, Fama-MacBeth, and fixed-effects estimates of 
Eq. (3.1). Column 1 reports the pooled OLS estimates of cash holdings with cluster-robust 
standard errors, which control for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and intra-cluster correlation. 
We observe that cash holdings rise significantly with cash flow and industry-level cash flow 
volatility, and are positively related to the dummy indicating whether a firm pays dividends. 
In addition, cash holdings decrease significantly with net working capital, capital 
expenditures, and leverage. According to the adjusted R-square, the model is able to explain 
around 24% of the variation in firms’ cash holdings. However, the OLS pooled estimator fails 
to account for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity in a panel data set. 
[Insert Table 3.4] 
Column 2 presents the estimates obtained using the two-step Fama-MacBeth 
estimator (Fama & MacBeth 1973). In the first step, a cross-sectional regression is estimated 
for each time period.  In the second step, the cross-sectional estimates are averaged across 
time to obtain final estimates. With this approach, a time series of cross-sectional estimates 
are effectively able to correct for general serial correlation in the residuals in the panel. The 
coefficient estimates are very similar in sign and magnitude to the ones obtained with OLS. 
Nonetheless, the Fama-MacBeth estimator also fails to properly account for the data’s panel 
characteristics.  
Columns 3 to 5 reports therefore fixed-effects estimates, which exploit more directly 
the panel features of the dataset, by eliminating the effect of time-invariant firm 
characteristics. Columns 4 and 5 differ from column 3 as they are based on slightly different 
dependent variables, namely the ratio of cash to net assets in column 4, and the log of this 
same ratio, in column 5. These additional estimates are presented for robustness. The ρ 
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coefficients reported in columns 3 to 5 suggest that between 59% and 63% of the total error 
variance can be captured by unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, focusing on column 3, we 
observe that the market to book ratio, size, cash flow, and the dummies indicating whether a 
firm pays dividends or attempts acquisitions all have positive and significant coefficients. Net 
working capital, capital expenditures, leverage, and the SOEs dummy, on the other hand, 
have negative and precisely determined coefficients. The estimates, obtained in columns 4 
and 5, all based on a fixed-effects estimator, are similar to those in column 3.  
Generally, the estimated coefficients reported in Table 3.4, which suggest that firms 
with better investment opportunities, more cash flow, and a higher volatility of cash flow are 
more likely to hold more cash, are consistent with the transaction cost and precautionary 
motives of the trade-off theory, as well as with the pecking order theory. In line with the 
trade-off theory, firms with a lager investment opportunity set or a more volatile cash flow 
(which indicates a higher industry-level risk) are in fact more likely to hold more cash for 
precautionary reasons. In addition, the pecking order theory predicts that firms with more 
cash flow hoard more cash. To give some economic interpretation to the cash flow 
coefficients, in column 3, a rise in cash flow from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile 
leads to an increase of 0.9% in cash holdings.
98
 In other words, the point estimate (0.162) 
suggests that the elasticity of cash holdings to a change in cash flow, evaluated at sample 
means is 0.052.
99
  
Our results also provide evidence that changes in net working capital, capital 
expenditures and leverage all have a negative impact on cash holdings. In the case of net 
                                                          
    
98
 This number (0.009) is calculated as (0.085-0.030)*0.162. 
    
99
 Considering that the mean of Cash is 0.147 and the mean of CF is 0.047, 0.052 is obtained from the 
following calculation: 0.162*0.047/0.147. 
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working capital, this can be explained considering that net working capital can be used as a 
substitute for cash, which is consistent with the trade-off theory. Additionally, according to 
the pecking order theory, firms prefer to use internal finance to fund their investment 
projects. Hence, firms with more capital expenditures will hoard less cash. Alternative 
reasons might be that investment projects can increase firms’ marketable collateral, as well as 
their net worth, enlarging debt capacity and inducing a decline in demand for cash. Coming 
to leverage, its negative and precisely determined sign is consistent with the trade-off theory, 
according to which, on the one hand, firms might use cash reserves to reduce debt overhang 
(Bates et al. 2009; Riddick & Whited 2009), whilst on the other, high leverage shows a firm’s 
ability to obtain loans, which may lead to holding less cash in hand.  
We also find a positive relationship between firm size and cash holdings in columns 3 
to 5, which contradicts the view that there exist economies of scale to hold cash. One way to 
interpret this result is that small Chinese firms hold lower cash balances may be that 
according to the financial hierarchy theory, these firms are less profitable.
100
 However, when 
we lag all our independent variables except for AC1 in the Eq. (1) (not reported here) to 
alleviate the simultaneity issue
101
 (Polk & Sapienza 2009; Duchin et al. 2010). We find that 
the coefficient on firm size become negative and significant and the coefficients on the other 
variables in the model are virtually identical. Finally, the coefficients on the dummy variables 
indicating whether a firm pays dividends, attempts acquisitions, or is state-owned are in line 
with the hypothesized signs. Cash-rich firms are in fact more likely to pay dividends. 
                                                          
    
100
 In unreported results, we find that the profitability of large firms is significantly greater than that of small 
firms, regardless of whether we focus on sample means (t-test) or sample medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test). 
Specifically, as in Fig. 3.1, we split our sample into small/large firms if a firm’s size (measured by total assets) 
falls below/above the median value of all firms operating in the same industry. We find that large firms have 
higher return-on assets (ROA, 0.036) and cash flow (CF, 0.061) than small firms (ROA, 0.009; CF, 0.033).  
    
101
 Some variables in the Eq. (1) may be endogenous and the model thus may suffer from reverse-causality 
problems. 
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Moreover, if a firm is going to take over other companies in the near future, it is much more 
likely to accumulate more cash for the payment. Furthermore, based on the results from Allen 
et al. (2007) and Guariglia et al. (2011), state-controlled enterprises face less financial 
constraints compared with non-state-controlled firms. For this reason, it is possibly easier for 
them to raise funds externally, which makes it unnecessary to hold costly cash balances.  
In summary, the coefficient associated with the variables Tobin’s Q, NWC, Leverage, 
and Var_CF are consistent with the trade-off theory, while those associated with Cash flow 
and CAPEX can better be explained by the pecking order theory.  
 
3.4.2. The adjustment behavior of cash holding levels 
3.4.2.1. The targeting behavior of cash holdings 
We begin our analysis by investigating whether firms tend to revert cash holdings to their 
target levels. To this end, following Opler et al. (1999), we first test the mean reversion 
properties of cash holdings by estimating a first-order autoregressive model of the changes in 
the cash ratio for each firm in our sample, as outlined in the following equation: 
                                                                                
where Δ indicates a first-difference from one period to the next, and      is the ratio of cash 
and cash equivalents to total assets.     , is assumed to be an independent and identically 
distributed disturbance with zero mean.  
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Fig. 3.2 illustrates the distribution of the autoregressive coefficient (β) obtained from 
Eq. (3.2).
102
 The figure shows that the distribution is bell-shaped with a negative centerline. 
The median and mean of the coefficients (β) are -0.179 and -0.165, respectively, suggesting 
that cash holdings are mean reverting. Instead of running separate regressions for each firm, 
we next run pooled OLS estimates of Eq. (3.2) with cluster-robust standard errors for the full 
sample of firms.
103
 The estimated coefficient (β) is found to be -0.166 (t-stat= -14.50, 
R
2
=0.03). Once again, the fact that the absolute value of the coefficients (β) is less than 1 
suggests that cash balances display mean reverting properties. This finding is consistent with 
Opler et al. (1999) and Venkiteshwaran (2011).
104
 
[Insert Fig 3.2] 
 
3.4.2.2. Adjustment to target cash holdings 
We next investigate whether firms in our sample adjust their cash balances towards the target 
level over time. To test whether this is the case, we first sort firms into quintiles in each year 
based on their previous year’s cash positions. In Panel A of Fig. 3.3, the horizontal axis goes 
                                                          
    
102
 To ensure we have a sufficient number of observations in each cross-sectional regression, following Opler 
et al. (1999), we drop all firms with less than five years of observations during the period 1998-2010. The chart 
is based on 1,363 firms, which corresponds to 14,711 firm-year observations. 
    
103
 The cluster-robust standard errors allow for valid inference under heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in 
linear panel-data models, especially in large data sets (Born & Breitung 2012). 
    
104
 Based on a test by Wooldridge (2002), we find serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of Eq.(2) model, 
which might bias the standard errors and cause inefficient estimates. To correct autocorrelation, we fit fixed-
effects model with AR(1) or AR(2) or AR(3) disturbances, given the estimated value of firms’ half-life of cash 
rebalancing in this study is between 1.2 and 2.1 years. We find the estimated coefficient (β) remain significant 
and negative (between -1 and 0), even we include more lags of the change in cash in the right-hand side of 
Eq.(2). 
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from cash-poor (3.15% cash/TA) to cash-rich (31.86% cash/TA) firms, from left to right. The 
vertical axis describes the subsequent year’s changes in cash holdings, which reflects the 
firm’s explicit effort to adjust its cash ratio toward a target level. It appears that cash-poor 
firms tend to increase the mean (median) cash levels by 2.7% (0.9%) in the following year, 
while cash-rich firms are inclined to reduce the mean (median) cash ratios by 4.8% (4.2%) in 
the subsequent year, which is consistent with convergence. This evidence confirms that firms 
exhibit mean reversion in their cash holdings.  
[Insert Fig 3.3] 
Panel B of Fig. 3.3 examines whether the subsequent year’s changes in cash holdings 
are affected by firms’ deviations from their cash target levels. To do so, we partition firms 
into quintiles in each year on the basis of the difference between their real cash holdings and 
their optimal cash levels obtained  from the estimation of  the OPSW model in Equation (1) 
(Cash-Cash*). The horizontal axis, from left to right, indicates that the firms in the first 
quintile have the highest cash deficit (-8.63%), while firms in the last quintile have the 
highest excess cash holdings (10.23%). Accordingly, the former raise their cash ratios by an 
average (median) of 4.7% (2.5%), and the latter reduce their balances by an average (median) 
of 6.2% (5.6%) in the following year. The evidence in Panel B reflects the firms’ 
unambiguous tendency to correct their deviations from the optimal levels. In other words, 
firms with excess cash or a deficit of cash have an inclination to actively rebalance their 
deviations towards the optimal level. Firms that are either cash-rich or cash-deficient adjust 
therefore their cash ratios to offset the gap.
105
 
                                                          
    
105
 The mean reversion of cash holdings is not in line with the financial hierarchy theory, according to which 
the time-series properties of changes in cash should be determined by the availability of firms’ internal resource. 
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It should also be noted that the adjustments illustrated in both Panels of Fig. 3.3 are 
asymmetric. Specifically, firms with higher deviations from their target levels, i.e. those in 
the first quintile (characterized by a lower level or a deficit of cash holdings) and in the last 
quintile (characterized by a higher level or an excess of cash holdings) tend to adjust their 
cash holdings more aggressively than firms in the median quintiles. Moreover, the average or 
median adjustment is more pronounced for cash-rich firms in comparison with cash-poor 
ones, which may be due to asymmetric adjustment costs. This can be explained considering 
that it is more costly for firms with lower cash balances to build their cash reserves or deviate 
from the targets, than it is for cash-rich firms to spend cash or deviate from the targets. Cash-
poor firms are in fact more likely to be financially constrained (Dittmar & Duchin 2010). A 
similar asymmetric adjustment is also reported for US manufacturing firms by 
Venkiteshwaran (2011), and for Chinese listed companies in Lian et al. (2010). 
 
3.4.3. Targeting behavior vs. financial hierarchy  
As discussed in last section, firms exhibit a tendency of cash convergence towards a target 
level, which can be explained by the trade-off theory. However, according to the financial 
hierarchy theory, adjustments of firms’ cash holdings are simply a consequence of changes in 
internal resources. According to this view, firms do not actively manage their cash balances, 
thus there is no optimal level of cash holdings. To directly distinguish between these two 
alternative views, following Opler et al. (1999) and Venkiteshwaran (2011), we construct a 
“financing deficit” variable to proxy the flow of funds, and we then examine whether the 
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financing deficit can be used to explain changes in cash holdings.
106
 If the financial hierarchy 
behavior prevails over the trade-off theory, we would expect the financing deficit to wipe out 
the effects of the deviation from optimal cash levels (         
         )  in a partial 
adjustment model of the following type:   
                     (         
         )           + 
                                      ∑     ∑          ∑                                              
where      is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, Cash* is the estimated 
target cash holdings, FINDEF is the firm’s financial deficit, and  is the speed of adjustment 
(SOA)
107
, which measures how fast firms adjust their cash holdings towards the optimal 
level. SOA is expected to be greater than zero if firms exhibit mean reversion, and smaller 
than 1 if their adjustment is imperfect.
108
  
Table 3.5 presents the fixed-effects estimates from the partial adjustment model in Eq. 
(3.3).
109
 In columns 1 to 4, a variant of Eq. (3.3) which excludes the financial deficit variable 
is estimated. In column 1, the firm’s target cash holdings (Cash*) are measured as the 
average cash holdings over the last three years. In column 2, Cash* is given by the fitted 
values from Eq. (3.1) estimated using the OLS pooled estimator. In column 3 and 4, they are 
obtained likewise, except for the fact that Eq. (3.1) is estimated using the Fama-MacBeth and 
                                                          
    
106
 The financing deficit variable is defined as follows: (dividend payments + investment + changes in net 
working capital – operating cash flow) / total assets. Note that it is computed before financing to measure the 
fund shortage in each year, which helps us avoid estimating an identity.  
    
107
 Literately, the SOA refers to the percentage change between the initial cash level and the target. 
    
108
 If    , there is no adjustment of the firm’s cash holdings towards its target during each time period. 
If   , the adjustment towards the target is perfect. 
    
109
 The results were similar using the pooled OLS estimator with cluster-robust standard errors, as in Opler et 
al. (1999). For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
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the fixed-effects estimators, respectively. In all four regressions, the adjustment coefficients 
are significant at the 1% level. The speeds of adjustment are respectively 0.483, 0.574, 0.578, 
and 0.581. To give some economic interpretation, we calculate firms’ half-lives of cash 
rebalancing, defined as the time necessary to cover half of the deviation from the initial cash 
level to the target level. The values are 1.435, 1.208, 1.198, and 1.194 years, respectively, 
which imply an imperfect adjustment of cash. Our finding are similar to those reported in 
Opler et al. (1999) and Venkiteshwaran (2011), who also find support for the target 
adjustment model. 
[Insert Table 3.5] 
In column 5 of Table 3.5, we examine whether the firm’s financial deficit (      ) 
is able to explain the variation in cash holdings. The results indicate that the coefficient 
associated with FINDEF is positive and precisely determined. However, the point estimate of 
FINDEF evaluated at sample means is only 0.042, indicating that the elasticity of a change of 
cash holdings reacting to a change in FINDEF is only around 3% of the elasticity of a change 
in the deviation (         
         ) observed in column 4.
110
 This suggests that the change 
in cash holdings that follows a percentage change in the deviation (         
         ) is 
around 30 times larger than the one that follows the same percentage change in FINDEF. In 
addition, the R
2
 of the financial hierarchy model (0.03) in column 5 is smaller than the ones 
in the trade-off model (which range from 0.13 to 0.30).   
                                                          
    
110
 Note that the mean of FINDEF is 0.000769 and the mean of  (         
         ) is -0.00179. Thus, the 
ratio between the elasticity of ΔCash to FINDEF and the elasticity of ΔCash to (         
         ) is given 
by (0.042*0.000769)/(0.581*0.00179)=0.031. 
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In columns 6 to 9, we include the deviation (         
         )and the financing 
deficit (FINDEF) in the same regression. The coefficients on the former are similar to what 
we obtained when we only included the deviation variable, while the coefficients on the latter 
are no longer significant. Moreover, we do not observe any increases in the R
2
 in column 6 to 
9, compared with columns 1 to 4. The reason is probably that the deviation (         
  
       )has more explanatory power in cash rebalancing than the flow of funds deficit 
(FINDEF), destroying therefore the significance of the latter.  
Lastly, in columns 10 to 13, we estimate an augmented version of Eq. (3.3), whereby 
Cash* is measured in four different ways, and which includes an interaction term between the 
financing deficit (FINDEF) and a dummy variable (Above target), which equals to one if the 
firm’s cash is above its target level (reflecting excess cash holdings), and 0 otherwise. The 
motivation for including this interaction term comes from agency considerations, according 
to which excess cash may lead to free cash flow problems due to the entrenchment of 
management. As suggested by the agency theory of cash holdings, managers tend to 
accumulate cash if the firm is making profit. However, even if the firm faces a cash flow 
deficit, entrenched managers might make efforts to keep a certain level of cash holdings in 
order to protect their own interests. Therefore, if the free cash flow theory holds, we should 
observe that the financing deficit (FINDEF) better explains cash rebalancing for firms with 
excess cash. The results in columns 10 to 13 show this interaction term is not statistically 
significant (with one exception in column 10).
 111
 This can be seen as evidence against the 
free cash flow theory. 
                                                          
    
111
 If the free cash flow theory were to hold, we would expect a positive coefficient on the interaction term 
(FINDEF *Above target). However, given the unexpected sign on the interaction term, the small values of R
2
 
and F, and the relatively small sample size due to the calculation of the target level of cash holdings as the 
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Overall, our results in Table 3.5 provide strong support for the fact that cash holdings 
in China can best be explained by a trade-off model rather than by the financial hierarchy 
theory or the free cash flow theory. This is in line with most of the findings from US and 
European firms (Kim et al. 1998; Opler et al. 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan 2004; Lee & Powell 
2011; Venkiteshwaran 2011). 
 
3.4.4. Dynamic adjustment models of cash holdings 
In a frictionless world, firms should never deviate from their optimal cash holdings. 
However, adjustment costs hinder the immediate rebalancing of cash towards the desired 
target level.  Adjustment costs can be seen as costs of building up cash reserves making use 
of internal or external finance, and costs of depleting cash reserves by investing or paying 
dividends to shareholders. In order to further study the properties of the SOA of cash, 
following Venkiteshwaran (2011), we estimate a dynamic model, which allows for 
systematic changes in the determinants of optimal cash levels, and considers a partial 
adjustment process for the firm’s cash holdings within each time period. Our model takes the 
following form: 
                     (         
         ) 
            ∑     ∑         ∑                                           
We rearrange Eq. (3.4) as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
average cash holdings over the last three years, it is likely that the model in column 10 is misspecified. It should 
also be noted that the estimated value of firms’ half-life of cash rebalancing (0.021 year) is unconvincing.  
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 ∑     ∑         ∑                                           
We then allow the target level of cash holdings to be determined by firm characteristics as 
follows: 
         
    ∑         
 
 ∑     ∑         ∑                        
where Xk,it  is a vector of firm characteristics. 
Substituting Eq. (3.6) into Eq. (3.5), leads to the following equation: 
                                           ∑         
 
  
 ∑     ∑         ∑                                        
This dynamic adjustment model in Eq. (3.7) implies that:  
1) Firms aim at closing the deviation between actual (       ) and desired cash-holding 
levels (      ). Eventually, they are able to make sure their actual cash levels 
converge to the target (      ). 
2) The speed of adjustment (SOA) is given by subtracting the estimated coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable         from 1.  
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3) The long-run effect of the firm characteristics on cash holdings can be obtained by 
dividing the estimated coefficient on       by  . 
As it is dynamic, we estimate Eq. (3.7) using the system Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond 
(1998).  The advantage of this approach is to not only enable us to account for the dynamic 
nature of cash rebalancing
112
, but also to control for the possible endogeneity of the 
regressors.
113
 Specifically, the system GMM estimates the equation in both first-differences 
and levels. It employs lagged values of the regressors as instruments in the first-differenced 
equation, and makes use of first-differences of the relevant regressors as additional 
instruments in the levels equation. This estimator has been shown to dramatically improve the 
precision and efficiency of the estimates compared with the simple first-difference GMM 
estimator (Blundell et al. 2001).  
In order to assess the validity of instruments and the correct specification of the 
model, we employ two criteria. The first is the Hansen (J) test for over-identifying 
restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as a Chi-square with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of instruments less number of parameters.  
The second criterion is the m(n) tests for the n
th
 order serial correlation of the 
differenced residuals. Under the null hypothesis of no n
th
-order serial correlation of the 
differenced residuals, the test asymptotically follows a standard normal distribution. If the 
                                                          
    
112
 In a dynamic setting, the lagged dependent variable may lead to serial correlation of the error term. 
Moreover, the fact that the lagged dependent variable is as stochastic as the dependent variable may also cause 
biased and inconsistent estimates (Maeshiro 1996; 1999). 
    
113
 As pointed by Acharya et al. (2007), variables like investment, leverage and dividends, may be jointly 
determined with cash. In addition, the variables that affect cash holdings are also likely to affect some of the 
regressors, such as leverage, growth opportunities and liquidity (Opler et al. 1999). 
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m(n) test shows the presence of autocorrelation of order n, the instruments need to be 
restricted to lags of at least n+1. In our case, because the m2 test rejects the null hypothesis of 
no second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals, we use levels of the 
endogenous variables lagged n+3 and deeper as instruments in the first-differenced equations, 
and first-differences of the endogenous variables lagged twice as additional instruments in the 
levels equations (Baum 2006; Roodman 2006). A rejection of the null hypothesis of either the 
Hansen (J) test or the m(n) test may be due to either poor specification of the model or 
instrument invalidity. 
We also estimate Eq. (3.7) using the pooled OLS (OLS) and the fixed-effects (Fe) 
estimators for comparison. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable obtained from 
the pooled OLS estimator will be upwards biased in a dynamic panel setting, while the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable obtained from the fixed-effects (Fe) estimator 
will be downwards biased in a dynamic panel model. If our GMM coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable is correctly estimated, the value should lie between the estimates obtained 
from the pooled OLS and the fixed-effects (Fe) estimators (Bond et al. 2001). Table 3.6 
reports the results of the different estimates of our dynamic model of cash holdings outlined 
in Eq. (3.7).
114
 
[Insert Table 3.6] 
Column 1 presents the results obtained using our preferred system GMM estimator 
(Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). We treat all regressors as endogenous and 
use their lags as instruments. The estimated coefficient on the lagged depended variable is 
significant and positive (0.609), suggesting that the speed of adjustment is 0.391 (=1-0.609) 
                                                          
114
 Var_CF is dropped in the fixed-effects regressions because of collinearity. 
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and the half-life, 1.773 years (=Ln2/ (1-0.609)). The estimated coefficient for the adjustment 
speed of Chinese firms (0.391) is slightly lower than that found for US firms (0.566)  
(Venkiteshwaran 2011) and for UK firms (0.605) (Ozkan & Ozkan 2004), which were both 
obtained using a similar estimation methodology.
115
 A possible explanation for the relatively 
low value of Chinese firms’ adjustment speed may be that the significant information 
asymmetries, high liquidity risk, and frictions that characterize the Chinese economy lead to 
higher adjustment costs, which prevent firms from quickly rebalancing their cash reserves 
towards the target level.
116
 The results also indicate imperfect adjustment, as firms only close 
39.1% of the gap between current and optimal cash level within one year. In addition, we find 
that investment opportunities (Tobin’Q) and cash flow have a positive impact on cash 
holdings, whereas leverage affects cash holdings negatively. The Hansen (J) test and the m(3) 
test do not reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity and/or model specification, 
suggesting that the instruments based on the system GMM regression are valid. 
We also estimate Eq. (3.7) using the pooled OLS estimator based on cluster-robust 
standard errors (column 2), and the fixed-effects estimator (column 3). We can see that the 
estimated coefficients on the lagged depended variable are 0.669 and 0.420, respectively. As 
predicted, the system GMM estimate (0.609) lies between the fixed-effects estimate (lower 
bound) and the pooled OLS estimate (upper bound). The speeds of adjustment obtained from 
the pooled OLS estimator and the fixed-effects estimator are 0.331 and 0.580, respectively. 
                                                          
    
115
 Our speeds of adjustment are slightly lower than those reported in Alles et al. (2012), also for Chinese 
listed companies. The differences could be due to the fact that our sample is larger and slightly more recent than 
theirs, and to the fact that our specifications are not identical. 
    
116
 The value of the half-life (1.77 years) is greater than that found for US firms (1.22 year) by 
Venkiteshwaran (2011). It is also greater than that observed for UK firms (1.15 year), as reported in Ozkan & 
Ozkan (2004). 
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They indicate that, on average, a Chinese firm completes half of its cash adjustment in a 
period ranging between 1.195 and 2.094 years.
 
 
In summary, the estimates in Table 3.6 suggest that whatever the estimator used, 
given an optimal level of cash holdings, firms tend to actively rebalance their cash holdings 
towards the target. This finding is in line with the trade-off theory. However, there are lags in 
the adjustment to the target, which may be due to adjustment costs.
117
 We next analyze how 
adjustment costs might affect SOAs. 
                                                          
    
117
 This imperfect adjustment might be explained by the pecking order theory, according to which the changes 
in cash holdings rise and fall with firm’s profitability. This theory suggests that firms do not have an optimal 
level of cash, and therefore do not actively manage their cash reserves. However, the evidence according to 
which firms rebalance their deviations from the optimal target levels, which we found in the previous section; 
and the evidence according to which firms intentionally actively manage their cash holdings, that we find in the 
next section contradict this explanation.   
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3.4.5. Adjustment costs, active management of cash and the speed of cash adjustment  
3.4.5.1. Adjustment costs and the speed of cash adjustment (SOA) 
The estimates of the partial adjustment model reported in the previous section suggest that, in 
line with the trade-off theory, Chinese listed firms have a target cash ratio towards which they 
actively manage their cash. Yet, we also find that the cash rebalancing is imperfect. In order 
to understand why this is the case, we investigate whether, as suggested by Dittmar & Duchin 
(2010), adjustment costs play a role. Trading off the adjustment costs against the costs of 
operating with suboptimal cash levels may lead firms to only rebalance their cash stocks 
partially. Furthermore, different firms may face different adjustment costs, and hence, exhibit 
different and imperfect SOAs. To shed more light on the role of adjustment costs, in this 
section, we first examine the cross-sectional variation in SOAs, focusing on firms with 
different levels of excess cash, which are likely to be associated with different levels of 
adjustment costs
118
. Next, we investigate whether firms exhibit different SOAs because they 
manage their cash reserves differently, namely through different cash management policies, 
dividend payout, investment, and debt, which are all associated with different levels of 
adjustment costs. According to the trade-off theory, active management of cash should be 
associated with lower adjustment costs and a higher adjustment speed.  
In column 1 of Table 3.7, we examine whether the SOAs vary with the extent to 
which firms’ cash holdings deviate from their target levels. We would expect SOAs to be 
lower for firms with a cash deficit, as these firms are likely to face high adjustment costs due 
to the presence of financial frictions. To test whether this is the case, we partition firms into 
                                                          
    
118
 Firms with high excess cash are likely to face lower adjustment costs than firms with low excess cash, as it 
is more costly for firms to build up cash reserves to close the cash deficit than to deplete their excess cash 
reserves. 
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groups with relatively low, medium, and high levels of excess cash (Cash-Cash*) as 
predicted by the OPSW model with fixed-effects described in section 3.4.1. Specifically, we 
define as firms with low excess cash in a given year (Dum_low=1) those firms whose excess 
cash falls in the bottom third of the distribution of the excess cash of all firms operating in the 
same industry in that given year. Similarly, we define as firm-years with medium excess cash 
(Dum_medium=1) those observations falling in the middle third of the distribution, and as 
firm-years with high excess cash (Dum_High=1), those with excess cash in the top third of 
the distribution. We find that the SOA of cash tends to increase monotonically with the levels 
of excess cash. In particular, we observe that firms with high excess cash display much 
higher speeds of adjustment (0.354=1-0.646) compared with firms that face low excess cash 
(0.172=1-0.828). The Wald tests reject the equality of the coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable between high-excess-cash and low-excess-cash firms at the 1% level. This 
finding can be explained considering that it may be more costly for firms to build up cash 
reserves to close the cash deficit than to deplete their excess cash reserves. It is consistent 
with the pattern observed in Fig. 3.3, according to which cash-rich firms have faster 
adjustment in the following year compared with cash-poor firms. It is also in line with Lian et 
al. (2010) who find that the downward SOA of Chinese firms with excess cash is 
significantly higher than the upward  SOA when firms face a cash deficit. This result is 
inconsistent with the agency view of cash holdings, according to which firms with less excess 
cash reserves are likely to be well-governed firms, and might be inclined to rebalance their 
cash levels towards the optimal levels faster, while firms with excess cash should display 
lower downward adjustment speeds due to entrenchment motives (Dittmar & Duchin 2010).  
In column 2 of Table 3.7, we use the industry median level of cash in a given year to 
measure firms’ target cash levels. We then define as firms with low excess cash in a given 
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year (Dum_low=1) and firms with high excess cash (Dum_High=1), respectively those firms 
whose levels of cash are below or above the median value of the distribution of the cash 
levels of all firms operating in the same industry in that given year. The results reveal that 
firms with excess cash above the industry median display much higher SOAs (0.469=1-
0.531) compared with firms below the industry median (0.271=1-0.729). The Wald tests 
reject the equality of the estimates in the two sub-groups of firms. We therefore conclude that 
the presence of adjustment costs might slow down the speed of cash adjustment for firms 
with a cash deficit compared with those with excess cash.   
[Insert Table 3.7] 
 
3.4.5.2. Active management of cash and the speed of cash adjustment (SOA) 
According to the trade-off theory, if firms face lower adjustment costs of cash, they are more 
likely to actively adjust their cash holdings through different activities, such as investment, 
dividend payments, and debt issuance. In this section, we further examine the extent to which 
Chinese firms actively adjust cash towards a target level and display different SOAs when 
facing different adjustment costs.
119
  Following Dittmar & Duchin (2010), we conjecture that 
firms that actively manage their cash holdings have higher speeds of adjustment due to lower 
adjustment costs, and estimate the change in unexpected (excess) cash as follows: 
                                     
                       
                      
                                                          
    
119
 It should be noted that the most significant difference between the trade-off view and other theories is that, 
according to the former, firms actively manage their cash holdings towards the optimal level. Therefore, the 
investigation of active cash management can be used to differentiate between underlying theories of cash 
holdings. 
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where Cash is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, Cash* is the target cash 
holding, and Xcash is the unexpected (excess) cash holding predicted by the OPSW model 
with fixed-effects discussed in section 3.4.1. Rearranging Eq. (3.8) yields: 
                                                 
           
                    
We next define the following variables: 
             ( 
                 
                   
 )                                                 
                ( 
       
           
 
                   
 )                                                  
       measures the percentage of the change in unexpected cash holdings attributable to the 
change in the real cash ratio, while          measures the percentage of the change in 
unexpected cash  holdings due to the change in the target cash ratio. 
Based on Eq. (3.9b) and Eq. (3.9c), we construct a dummy variable Dum_Activei,t 
,which is equal to one if                         and 0 otherwise. This indicates whether a 
firm actively manages its cash holdings. Around 72% of the firm-years in our sample belong 
to the Active group. This suggests that the majority of our Chinese firms tend to actively 
adjust their cash reserves. Column 3 of Table 3.7 reports the difference in SOAs of cash for 
sub-groups of firms sorted on the basis of Dum_Active. As expected, firms that actively 
manage their cash holdings have higher speeds of cash adjustment (0.423=1-0.577) compared 
with passive firms (0.266=1-0.734). The p-value associated with the Wald tests show the 
difference in the SOAs between the two sub-groups is statistically significant. In short, this 
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finding suggests that changes in real cash ratios contribute more to firms’ cash rebalancing 
than changes in implied target ratios. This is in line with  Dittmar & Duchin (2010), who 
argue that firms that actively manage their cash levels have higher speeds of adjustments due 
to the lower levels of  adjustment costs. 
Next, we consider three additional ways through which firm might actively adjust 
their cash holdings, namely by paying cash dividends, investing, and using debt finance. 
Specifically, in column 4 of Table 3.7, we initially partition firms according to their dividend 
payout status. To this end, we construct a dummy (Div_Dum), which equals 1 if the firm is 
paying cash dividends in a given year, and 0 otherwise. In columns 5 and 6, we split firms 
respectively on the basis of their investment, defined as capital expenditures scaled by total 
assets and their debt ratios, measured by the ratio of their total (short- and long-term) debt to 
total assets. We classify a firm as having relatively low (Dum_low=1), medium 
(Dum_medium=1), or high (Dum_high=1) level of investment or debt ratio in a given year if 
its investment or debt ratio in that year falls respectively in the bottom, the medium, or the 
top third of the corresponding ratios of all firms operating in the same industry it belongs to. 
The results reported in columns 4 to 6 show that the SOA of firms that pay cash dividends, 
make substantial investments, and issue significant debt finance are 0.419, 0.464 and 0.462 
respectively, much higher than the ones of those who do not pay dividends (0.314), make 
small investment (0.376), and issue little debt finance (0.304). The p-values associated with 
the test for the equality of the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable between firms 
that pay or do not pay dividends (column 4), and display high and low of investment (column 
5) and debt (column 6), show that, with one exception (column 6, where the significance 
level is 20%), these differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. These 
findings suggest that if firms actively manage their cash ratios towards the target level 
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through dividend payments, investment, or debt finance, they display higher SOAs of cash, 
which are probably associated with lower adjustment costs. Our findings are consistent with 
the evidence in Dittmar & Duchin (2010).  
In summary, the results in Table 3.7 are in line with the trade-off theory: there exists 
an optimal cash level towards which firms actively adjust their cash holdings. However, due 
to adjustment costs, this adjustment is not perfect. This explains the asymmetric SOAs we 
observe across different types of firms.  
 
3.4.6. The marginal value of cash holdings 
3.4.6.1. Measure of the marginal value of cash holdings 
The evidence we found thus far is supportive of a trade-off behavior in cash holdings. In 
particular, we observe that Chinese firms have target cash levels and actively correct any 
deviation from their targets in the presence of adjustment costs.  
We next examine the extent to which firm performance (value) is affected by 
adjustments of cash holdings. To this end, following Faulkender & Wang (2006), we initially 
estimate the following regression:
 120
 
                                                          
    
120
 Given an less-developed stock market, stock prices in China provide little information on firms’ future 
operating performance (Wang et al. 2009). Thus, contrary to Faulkender & Wang (2006), we use the return on 
assets (ROA) instead of stock returns models to measure Chinese firms’ value. It should also be noted that 
because we estimate Eq. (3.10) using a fixed-effects estimator, industry dummies are not included. 
Chapter 3                               Adjustment behavior and value of corporate cash holdings: 
The China experience                                                      
179 
 
             
 
                                                  
                                                   
                                                           
          ∑     ∑                                                      
where the term Δ indicates a first-difference from one period to the next; the subscript i 
indexes firms; and t, years (t=1998-2010). 
The left hand side in the regression is the excess operating performance       
     , where  ROA is the return on assets, and ROAB is the benchmark return on assets 
constructed as 25 Fama & French (1993) size and book-to-market portfolios. Specifically, in 
each year, we partition firms into 25 portfolios on the basis of size (total assets) interacted 
with the book-to-market ratio to control for risk-related factors that may affect firm 
performance (value).
121
  Firm i’s benchmark ROA in year t is a value-weighted ROA based on 
total assets within the portfolio to which firm i belongs in that year.
122
  
The right hand side in the regression comprises a vector of explanatory variables that 
affect firms’ performance (value). Among these, Cash is the sum of cash and cash 
equivalents; E is earnings before extraordinary items; NA is net total assets (total assets minus 
cash holdings); INT is interest expense; DIV is cash dividends; Leverage is the ratio of the 
sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets. Ownership is a dummy variable, which is 
                                                          
    
121
 Firms in different size and book-to-market portfolios may have different ROAs. 
    
122
 We find similar results using the industry median level of ROA in a given year to measure the benchmark 
return on assets (ROA
B
). In order words, our results were robust to defining the excess operating 
performance             in a given year as the difference between the firm’s ROA and its industry median 
level. These results are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request. 
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equal to 1 in a given year if a firm is state-owned, and 0 otherwise. AC1 is a dummy variable, 
which is equal to 1 in a given year if the firm attempts acquisitions in the next fiscal year, and 
0 otherwise. Additionally, as discussed in Section 3.2.2, in order to capture differential effects 
on the marginal value of cash holdings, we interact the change in the value of cash (     ) 
with: (1) the level of the firm’s cash holdings (    ), (2) the firm’s ownership structure 
(Ownership), (3) whether or not the firm engages in Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) in the 
next year (AC1). We estimate the regression by controlling for year, province and firm fixed-
effects. Apart from dummy variables, all independent variables are scaled by total assets.  
 
3.4.6.2. Value regression specification of changes in cash 
Table 3.8 presents the key results from the estimation of Eq. (3.10) obtained using the fixed-
effects estimator. In column 1, we present the estimates of a simplified version of the 
equation, with no interactions. Consistent with Faulkender & Wang (2006), we find that firm 
value is significantly higher for firms with higher changes in cash, earnings, net total assets, 
and dividend payments, as well as for firms with a higher cash level in the past year, a lower 
change in interest expenses, lower leverage, and firms who are non-state-owned and who 
attempt acquisitions in the next period. All the coefficients are statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  
The fact that firms’ changes in cash reserves are positively related to excess operating 
performance suggests that adjustments in cash holdings do not hinder firm performance. The 
point estimate (0.092) indicates that the elasticity of           with respect to a change 
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in cash holdings, evaluated at sample means is 1.19.
123
 This suggests that a 10 % increase in 
ΔCash leads to a 11.9% rise in          . The significant and positive marginal value of 
cash also provides support for the precautionary motive of the trade-off theory, according to 
which liquidity enhances firm value by offering a buffer to avoid potential underinvestment 
and by enabling the firm to hedge against risk.
124
 The adjusted R
2
 suggests that 44% of the 
total variance of           can be explained by our model.  
[Insert Table 3.8] 
In column 2, we introduce the change in cash interacted with the level of cash (Cashi,t-
1*ΔCashi,t).The coefficient estimate for the interaction term is -0.073 and is significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level. To give some economic intuition, the coefficient 
suggests that a 0.130 change in the level of cash (i.e. a shift from the first to the third quartile 
of the cash distribution) leads to a drop of 1% (-0.01=0.130 *-0.073) in             
     . In other words, keeping other factors constant, a firm with cash level at the first 
quartile of the distribution of our sample (0.068) has a 10% higher marginal value of cash, 
than a firm with cash level at the third quartile of the distribution (0.198).
125
 This finding is 
consistent with  Faulkender & Wang (2006) and suggests that the marginal value of cash is 
decreasing in the level of cash reserves. A possible reason why firms with lower cash 
reserves benefit more from an increase in cash holdings is that these firms either face higher 
                                                          
    
123
 This elasticity is defined as the ratio of the change in excess operating performance (          for a 
relative change in ΔCash. Considering that the mean of          is 0.00039 and the mean of ΔCash is 
0.00505, it is given by 1.19=0.092* (0.00505/0.00039). 
    
124
 It is noteworthy that if the agency theory prevailed, we would observe the opposite, i.e. an insignificant 
coefficient for the marginal value of cash, as excess cash may lead to the free cash flow problems due to empire-
building or entrenchment of management. 
    
125
 This number (10%) is calculated as ((0.107-0.073*0.068)/(0.107-0.073*0.198)). 
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transaction and liquidity costs, or are more likely to have to forgo positive net present value 
(NPV) projects when their liquid assets are not sufficient. Thus, cash-poor firms value more 
their internal finance including their cash reserves, and for this reason, every additional RMB 
of cash they hold has a higher value. In contrast, for firms holding higher levels of cash, the 
costs of a further increase in liquid assets may outweigh the benefits, due for instance to 
factors such as higher rates of corporate tax and free cash flow problems. 
Our next specification, reported in column 3, includes the change in cash interacted 
with the dummy variables Ownership and AC1 as additional regressors. The aim of this 
specification is to investigate the extent to which the marginal value of cash differs between 
SOEs and non-SOEs, and between firms involved in acquisitions and other firms. The 
coefficients on both interaction terms are negative and significant at the 5% level. Given the 
mean level of cash of 0.147 in our sample, the marginal value of cash for non-SOEs, not 
involved in M&As (0.130=0.142-0.083*0.147) is around 1.4 (0.130/0.055-1) times higher 
than that of SOEs which attempt acquisitions in the next fiscal year (0.055=0.142-
0.083*0.147-0.043-0.032). The finding regarding the ownership structure is consistent with 
the presence of financial constraints. The value of additional cash is more likely to be higher 
for non-state owned firms, who face more financial constraints, since cash reserves can be 
used as internal finance and can prevent these firms from forgoing positive NPV projects 
(Faulkender & Wang 2006).
126
 In China, non-state-controlled firms are more likely to face 
more financial constraints compared with SOEs since state-ownership is favored in terms of 
access to credit from state-owned banks (Bai et al. 2006; Allen et al. 2007; Poncet et al. 
                                                          
    
126
According to the financial constraints hypothesis proposed by Fazzari et al.(1988), cash flow and 
investment are positively related due to financing constraints. In other words, internal finance including cash 
reserves is more valuable for financially constrained firms, who cannot access external finance to fund their 
investment. 
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2010; Guariglia et al. 2011). SOEs typically experience soft budget constraints (SBC) as they 
need to maintain social stability and achieve not only economic, but also political objectives. 
Our finding is consistent with Megginson & Wei (2012) who find that both the level and the 
marginal values of cash reserves for Chinese firms are negatively associated with state 
ownership. They attribute this negative relationship to the soft budget constraints intrinsically 
associated with state ownership.
127
 
Firms, who attempt acquisitions in the next period, may have lower marginal 
operating value of cash, as a result of their holding excess cash to fund the acquisition. 
128
 
Jensen (1986) suggests that in the presence of large free cash flows, acquisitions are a crucial 
way by which managers reduce their personal undiversified risk and build their empires, 
which may induce them to make bad investment decisions or undertake unprofitable or value-
damaging mergers, especially in the absence of good investment opportunities. From this 
point of view, acquisitions are likely to destroy the value of excessive cash flow. Our finding 
is in line with Harford (1999), who observe a decrease in value for acquirer firm with excess 
cash, as reflected in the subsequent poor operating performance, and with Oler (2008), 
according to which the levels of internal finance held by acquirer firms are significantly 
negatively related with their performance measured in terms of post-acquisition returns on net 
operating assets (RNOA).
129
 
                                                          
    
127
 In unreported results, we find that SOEs actually hold less cash than non-SOEs, suggesting that the level 
of cash holdings is not the reason why SOEs have a lower marginal value of cash.  
    
128
 Acquiring firms may raise additional debt or they may implement a stock swap transaction in acquisitions. 
However, the majority of acquisitions deals in China are financed only by cash (61.4%) whereas only 5.7% of 
bidders consider pure stock offers. 
    
129
 Acquiring firms may raise additional debt or implement a stock swap transaction to finance their 
acquisitions instead of using their available cash reserves. However, according to our data, the majority of 
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3.4.6.3. Value regression specification of excess cash 
In the previous section, we have examined the value of the realized change in firms’ cash 
holdings. However, the realized change in cash may include both expected and unexpected 
changes. The portion that explains the excess operating performance           is more 
likely to be the unexpected change rather than the expected one. In this section, we use three 
alternative measures of the excess (unexpected) cash to conduct a further check for the 
marginal value of cash. In particular, we provide estimates of Eq. (3.10) whereby the realized 
changes in cash holdings are replaced by changes in excess cash holdings. 
Following Faulkender & Wang (2006), we initially construct excess cash as the 
difference between the realized change and the benchmark (expected) change in cash, 
whereby the latter is measured as a value-weighted change in cash in each year, based on 
total assets, within each of the 25 Fama & French (1993) size and book-to-market portfolios. 
Specifically, the benchmark change in cash at year t is the change in cash of the portfolio to 
which firm i belongs to in that year. Estimates of Eq. (3.10) based on this measure of excess 
cash are reported in column 4 of Table 3.8.  
Next, we use two models taken from Almeida et al. (2004) to predict the benchmark 
(expected) change in cash, controlling for industry and province fixed-effects in each year. 
The most general of these two models can be written as:  
        
                                                   
                 ∑         ∑                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                    
acquisition deals in China are financed only by cash (61.4%) whereas only 5.7% of bidders consider pure stock 
offers. 
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where the term Δ indicates a first difference from one period to the next. Cash is the sum of 
cash and cash equivalents; Size is the natural logarithm of real total assets; CF is real cash 
flow; NWC is net working capital (working capital minus cash holdings); CAPEX is capital 
expenditures; ShortDebt is short-term debt to total assets. All variables except for Q and Size 
are scaled by total assets. The subscript i indexes firms; and t, years (t=1998-2010).  
Using the OLS estimator, we estimate Eq. (3.11) in each year. The fitted values of Eq. 
(3.11) can be interpreted as a proxy for the expected change in cash in that year
 
. The 
difference between the realized change and the expected change in cash is then computed and 
interpreted as the unexpected change in cash.  
In column 5 of Table 3.8, following Almeida et al. (2004), we use a relatively 
parsimonious version of Eq. (3.11) to predict the expected change in cash in which ΔCash is 
a function of Q, size and cash flow only. In column 6, we add ΔNWC, CAPEX and 
ΔShortDebt as additional variables to predict the expected change in cash. 
The results based on excess cash from columns 4 to 6 of Table 3.8 are nearly identical 
to those obtained using the realized change in firms’ cash. In short, our finding according to 
which the marginal operating value of cash is lower for firms who have a higher level of cash 
reserves, are controlled by the state, or attempt acquisitions are robust to focusing on excess 
(unexpected) cash holdings.   
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3.4.7. Financing constraints (FC) and marginal value of cash holdings 
We next provide a direct test for whether the marginal value of cash is higher for firms that 
face higher financial constraints. The intuition for this difference between financially 
constrained and financially unconstrained firms is that given the higher cost to raise external 
funds that they face, the former have to rely more on internal finance including cash reserves 
in order to invest. As a consequence, additional cash reserves should be more valuable for 
firms that face higher financial constraints, and the sensitivity of           to a change 
in cash should be higher for these firms. 
To check our conjecture, we use different criteria to proxy for the degree of financial 
constraints faced by firms. Initially, we split firms on the basis of their a priori likelihood of 
being financially constrained, based on size (measured by total real assets and number of 
employees) and dividend payout. The rationale for these classifications is that small firms are 
more subject to short track records and typically have lower net worth and collateral values. 
Thus, they may face more severe asymmetric information in credit markets. Under these 
circumstances, it may be more difficult or expensive for small firms to obtain external 
financing (Gertler & Gilchrist 1994; Beck et al. 2005; Clementi & Hopenhayn 2006; 
Guariglia 2008). Similarly, financially constrained firms are likely to cut or reduce dividend 
payout (Fazzari et al. 1988; Kaplan & Zingales 1997; Cleary 1999; Almeida et al. 2004; 
Almeida & Campello 2007). This may be explained considering that these firms’ desired 
investment is likely to exceed the internal finance they generate and the external funds they 
can obtain. Hence, financially constrained firms are unlikely to have sufficient funds to 
distribute as dividends. In each year, we classify as financially constrained (unconstrained) 
firm-years that fall in the bottom (top) one third of the distribution of total assets and number 
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of employees of all firms operating in the same industry. The remaining firm-years will be 
the ones with medium financial constraints. Similarly, a firm is considered as financially 
constrained (unconstrained) if it does not pay (pays) cash dividends in a given year.
130
 
Second, we construct two additional indexes of firm-specific levels of financial 
constraints (the KZ index and WW index)  initially proposed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
and Whited and Wu (2006). Following Lamont et al. (2001), we first construct the KZ index, 
which is a function of five observable firm characteristics: cash flow (CFt: net income + 
depreciation),  dividends (DIVt);  cash and cash equivalents (Casht) deflated by beginning of 
year capital (Kt-1); Tobin’s Q [Qt: (market value of equity +market value of net debt)/(total 
assets-net intangible assets)]; and the ratio of debt (Debtt: sum of short-term and long-term 
debt) to total capital (TKt: sum of debt and equity), and can be expressed as follows:  
 
 
Following Whited and Wu (2006), we next construct the WW index which is a linear 
function of six variables: cash flow [CFt/BAt-1: (net income + depreciation)/beginning-of-year 
book assets]; a dividend indicator (DIVPOSt, indicating positive dividends); the long-term 
debt to current assets ratio (TLTDt/CAt-1: long-term debt to total current assets); Tobin’s Q 
(Qt); size (LNBAt: natural log of the book value of assets); firm real sales growth (SGRt); and 
industry sales growth (ISGt):  
                                                          
    
130
 The reason why we only consider cash dividends is that paying stock dividends in China may reflect firms’ 
financial constraints. 
 
  3 12
1 002 0 283 3 139
39 368 1 315
t t t tt 1
t tt 1 t 1                                                 ( . ) 
KZ . * CF / K . * Q . * Debt / TK
. * DIV / K . * Cash / K

 
   
 
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We then separate firms into financially constrained (unconstrained) categories based 
on the KZ and WW indices, whereby a firm with a higher level of the KZ or WW index is 
considered to be more financially constrained. As in Almeida et al. (2004), we assign firms 
into groups of low, medium and high financial constraints in a given year if their KZ or WW 
index falls respectively in the bottom, middle and top one third of the distribution of the 
index of all firms operating in the same industry they belong to in that year.  
Lastly, given the unique Chinese context, we categorize firms based on a Chinese-
specific indicator called “Special Treatment (ST)”. In order to improve market transparency 
and offer a risk warning to investors, since 1998, China’s Stock exchanges launched a “ST” 
(special statement) procedure. Under the regulation, once a firm has suffered two consecutive 
annual losses, it will be labeled as a “ST” firm: it will need an internal audit report and its 
daily share movements will be limited to 5%. After being issued a delisting risk warning 
(ST), firms are given the pressure of being de-listed from the stock exchanges. Thus firms 
with “ST” status can be seen as facing financial constraints. We therefore categorize firms as 
being financially constrained (unconstrained) if they have (have not) been issued a special 
treatment or a de-listing risk warning. 
Table 3.9 shows the difference in the marginal operating performance of cash across 
firms with different degree of financial constraints. Based on the different criteria we 
mentioned before, High_FC, Medium_FC and Low_FC, are dummy variables, equal to 1 
respectively if a firm is more likely to face high, medium and low financial constraints, 
3 13
0 091 0 062 0 021
0 044 0 035
t t tt 1 t 1
t t t                                                ( . )
WW . * CF / BA . * DIVPOS . *TLTD / CA
. * LNTA . * SG  0.102*  ISG        
   
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relatively to all firms operating in the same industry they belong to in a given year, and 0 
otherwise. In all cases, we interact the change in cash with these dummies and examine the 
coefficients associated with the interaction terms.
131
As expected, whatever the criterion used, 
we can see that the coefficient associated with a change in cash is significantly larger for 
firms that face higher financial constraints.
132
 In addition, the p-values associated with the 
Wald tests show the differences of the changes in cash coefficients under all criteria between 
constrained and unconstrained firms are significant at the 1% level.  
[Insert Table 3.9] 
  
                                                          
    
131
 We find similar results using the change in excess cash interacted with dummies related to financing 
constraints. These results are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request.  
    
132
 We can also see that the coefficients associated with a change in cash tend to increase monotonically with 
the degree of external financial constraints faced by firms under the criteria of firm size (total real assets and 
number of employees) and the KZ and WW indices. 
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3.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we investigate corporate cash holdings for a panel of Chinese listed firms 
during the period 1998-2010. We find evidence of mean reversion of cash holdings. 
Following Opler et al. (1999), we then test different theories of corporate cash holdings and 
find that, in line with most of the findings from US and European firms (Kim et al. 1998; 
Opler et al. 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan 2004; Lee & Powell 2011; Venkiteshwaran 2011), firms 
in China behave consistently with the trade-off view. We also find evidence of imperfect and 
continuous rebalancing of cash holdings, with average annual adjustment speed ranging from 
0.331 to 0.580, suggesting that Chinese firms rebalance their cash holdings more slowly than 
firms from the West, probably due to relatively higher adjustment costs. The values of the 
adjustment speeds also indicate that the typical Chinese listed firm completes half of its 
required cash adjustment in a period between 1.2 and 2.1 years, which is longer than the 
corresponding period found for US and European firms. In addition, we find cross-sectional 
variation in the speed of adjustment. Particularly, firms with a higher level of excess cash 
have higher adjustment speeds. This is because these firms are likely to face lower 
adjustment costs than their cash-poor counterparts. Our results also show that firms display 
higher speeds of cash adjustment, when they tend to actively manage their cash balances 
through investment, dividend payments, and debt issuance, which are all associated with 
lower adjustment costs.  
To explore the consequence of active management of cash holdings, we then test how 
excess operating performance is affected by a change in cash holdings. We find that Chinese 
firms benefit from retaining additional cash. However, greater (excess) cash levels 
significantly reduce the performance of additional cash holdings. Additionally, firms that 
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attempt acquisitions or are state-owned display a lower marginal value of cash. Finally, our 
results are consistent with the view according to which additional cash is more valuable for 
those firms that face a higher degree of financing constraints.  
Our findings suggest that Chinese firms actively manage their cash levels based on 
the costs and benefits of holding cash. However, relatively high adjustment costs affect the 
overall adjustment process, and could cause an inefficient use of cash and hence a reduction 
in firms’ investment and growth. Policies aimed at reducing these costs would benefit the 
economy. 
In addition, for constrained non-state-owned firms, cash accumulation relieves the 
stress of the restricted access to credit and prevents these firms from forgoing positive net 
present value projects. Given the relatively higher degree of financial constraints that non-
SOEs face and the greater marginal value of cash that they have, it may be sensible for these 
firms to keep sufficiently high levels of liquidity. 
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Table 3.1 
Structure of the unbalanced panel 
No. of obs. per firm No. of obs. Percent Cumulative 
3 354 2.31% 2.31% 
4 284 1.85% 4.16% 
5 105 0.68% 4.84% 
6 714 4.65% 9.49% 
7 574 3.74% 13.23% 
8 568 3.7% 16.93% 
9 774 5.04% 21.98% 
10 1,450 9.45% 31.42% 
11 1,243 8.1% 39.52% 
12 1,860 12.12% 51.64% 
13 7,423 48.36% 100% 
Total 15,349 100% 
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Table 3.2 
Distribution of the number of firm-year observations by year 
Year No. of obs. Percent Cumulative 
1998 708 4.61% 4.61% 
1999 812 5.29% 9.9% 
2000 912 5.94% 15.84% 
2001 1,042 6.79% 22.63% 
2002 1,115 7.26% 29.9% 
2003 1,177 7.67% 37.57% 
2004 1,233 8.03% 45.6% 
2005 1,320 8.6% 54.2% 
2006 1,325 8.63% 62.83% 
2007 1,370 8.93% 71.76% 
2008 1,478 9.63% 81.39% 
2009 1,471 9.58% 90.97% 
2010 1,386 9.03% 100% 
Total 15,349 100% 
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Table 3.3 
Description of variables 
variable mean p25 p50 p75 N 
Cash 0.147 0.068 0.121 0.198 15,349 
ΔCash 0.005 -0.033 0.003 0.044 15,349 
Tobin 1.750 1.120 1.394 1.932 15,348 
Size 20.46 19.75 20.36 21.08 15,349 
CF 0.047 0.030 0.054 0.085 15,248 
ROA 0.023 0.010 0.032 0.059 15,348 
CAPEX 0.058 0.013 0.038 0.082 15,277 
Leverage 0.232 0.108 0.220 0.333 15,309 
NWC -0.062 -0.174 -0.041 0.088 15,349 
ΔE 0.006 -0.015 0.004 0.024 13,764 
ΔNA 0.028 -0.051 0.043 0.139 13,765 
Var_CF 0.087 0.078 0.078 0.095 15,349 
ΔINT 0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.010 13,764 
Cash-to-assets ratios (Cash) by year 
1998 0.098 0.04 0.079 0.134 708 
1999 0.115 0.048 0.096 0.161 812 
2000 0.136 0.064 0.111 0.187 912 
2001 0.164 0.081 0.138 0.224 1,042 
2002 0.154 0.076 0.131 0.213 1,115 
2003 0.151 0.075 0.127 0.203 1,177 
2004 0.143 0.069 0.118 0.194 1,233 
2005 0.138 0.06 0.112 0.186 1,320 
2006 0.135 0.062 0.112 0.183 1,325 
2007 0.144 0.065 0.119 0.193 1,370 
2008 0.150 0.071 0.125 0.2 1,478 
2009 0.169 0.083 0.142 0.226 1,471 
2010 0.172 0.087 0.143 0.234 1,386 
Notes: P25 (50/75) is the 25
th 
(50
th
/75
th
) percentile of the respective distribution. Cash (Cash-to-assets ratio) is 
the ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. ΔCash is the ratio of the change in cash and cash 
equivalents from year t-1 to t to total assets. Tobin (Q) is the market-to-book ratio. Size is the natural logarithm 
of total assets. CF is the ratio of the sum of net profit and depreciation to total assets. ROA is the return on 
assets. CAPEX is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of 
short- and long-term debt to total assets. NWC (non-cash NWC) is the ratio of net working capital (working 
capital minus cash holdings) to total assets. ΔNA is the ratio of the change in net total assets (total assets minus 
cash holdings) from year t-1 to t to total assets. ΔE is the ratio of the change in earnings before extraordinary 
items from year t-1 to t to total assets. Var_CF is the mean of the standard deviation of the cash flow to total 
assets ratios of firms in a given industry. ΔINT is the ratio of the change in the interest expenses from year t-1 to 
t to total assets. All variables are deflated using a GDP deflator.  
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Table 3.4 
Cash holdings regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable OLS Fama-MacBeth FE FE FE 
 
Cash/ 
Total Assetst 
Cash/ 
Total Assetst 
Cash/ 
Total Assetst 
Cash/ 
 Net Assetst 
Ln (Cash/  
Net Assets) t 
Tobint 0.002 0.005 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.021** 
 
(1.00) (1.49) (2.60) (2.84) (2.29) 
Sizet -0.003 -0.003 0.018*** 0.029*** 0.198*** 
 
(-1.57) (-1.32) (10.84) (9.34) (12.07) 
CFt 0.171*** 0.186*** 0.162*** 0.257*** 2.190*** 
 
(11.45) (11.53) (17.04) (14.71) (23.42) 
NWCt -0.059*** -0.067*** -0.097*** -0.188*** -0.490*** 
 
(-7.54) (-11.11) (-22.19) (-23.40) (-11.41) 
CAPEXt -0.113*** -0.122*** -0.055*** -0.137*** 0.172 
 
(-5.72) (-6.67) (-4.10) (-5.58) (1.31) 
Leveraget -0.209*** -0.200*** -0.183*** -0.322*** -1.431*** 
 
(-17.14) (-21.99) (-26.72) (-25.68) (-21.36) 
Div_Dumt 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.129*** 
 
(11.55) (8.81) (7.72) (6.45) (7.69) 
Var_CFt 1.135** 1.143***    
 
(2.16) (3.61)    
SOEst -0.007** -0.004 -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.056** 
 
(-2.00) (-1.24) (-3.30) (-3.21) (-2.17) 
AC1t+1 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.008** 0.058*** 
 
(0.99) (0.27) (2.94) (2.41) (3.17) 
Observations 15132 15132 15132 15132 15131 
R
2
 0.24 0.25 0.14 0.12 0.15 
Adjusted R
2
 0.24 
 
0.04 0.02 0.05 
ρ 
  
0.62 0.63 0.59 
F-value 25.77 535.69 45.60 38.65 50.49 
Notes: The specifications were estimated using the pooled OLS (column 1), the Fama-MacBeth (column 2), and 
the fixed-effects (column 3, 4 and 5) estimators. Time, industry, and province dummies were included in 
columns 1 and 2.  For the fixed-effects (column 3, 4 and 5) estimates, we only include time and province 
dummies. The dependent variable is: Cash/Total Assets (column 1, 2 and 3), Cash/ Net Assets, (column 4), and 
Ln (Cash/Net Assets) (column 5). Tobin (Q) is the market-to-book ratio. Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. CF is the ratio of the sum of net profit and depreciation to total assets. NWC (non-cash NWC) is the ratio 
of net working capital (working capital minus cash holdings) to total assets. CAPEX is defined as the ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets. 
Div_Dum is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm has made any cash dividend payment in the year, and 
0 otherwise. Var_CF is the mean of the standard deviations of the cash flow to total assets ratios of all firms in a 
given industry. SOEs, is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if a firm is state-owned in a given year, and 
0 otherwise. AC1 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a firm attempts acquisitions in the 
next fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. For the pooled regression, t-statistics (in parentheses) are asymptotically 
cluster-robust to heteroscedasticity, and intra-cluster correlation is accounted for at the firm level. For the Fama-
MacBeth specifications, the estimated coefficients are given by the average of the ones obtained from annual 
cross-sectional regressions. For the fixed-effects regression, ρ represents the proportion of the total error 
variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 3.5 
Testing various cash holding theories 
Dependent variable 
Casht+1 -Casht (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Mean target adjustment 0.483*** 
    
0.484*** 
   
32.843*** 
   
 
(32.71) 
    
(31.20) 
   
(13.68) 
   Predicted target adjustment 
 
0.574*** 
    
0.578*** 
   
0.579*** 
  
  
(65.19) 
    
(59.43) 
   
(59.36) 
  Fama-MacBeth target 
adjustment 
  
0.578*** 
    
0.589*** 
   
0.589*** 
 
   
(68.17) 
    
(62.44) 
   
(62.37) 
 Fixed-effects target 
adjustment 
   
0.581*** 
    
0.591*** 
   
0.592*** 
 
   
(67.02) 
    
(61.44) 
   
(61.41) 
Pecking order 
    
0.042*** -0.002 0.005 -0.000 0.005 5.363*** 0.007 0.001 0.010* 
     
(9.04) (-0.39) (1.17) (-0.10) (1.30) (5.05) (1.20) (0.10) (1.71) 
Pecking order*Above target 
         
-6.109*** -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 
          
(-4.15) (-0.50) (-0.26) (-1.12) 
Observations 10,632 13,594 13,594 13,594 12,144 10,593 12,052 12,052 12,052 10,593 12,052 12,052 12,052 
Half_Life 1.435 1.208 1.198 1.194 
 
1.431 1.199 1.177 1.173 0.021 1.198 1.177 1.172 
R2 0.13 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.03 0.13 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.03 0.28 0.29 0.29 
Adjusted R2 -0.02 0.19 0.21 0.20 -0.11 -0.02 0.17 0.19 0.18 -0.12 0.17 0.19 0.18 
ρ 0.29 0.38 0.38 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.42 0.44 0.33 0.09 0.42 0.44 0.33 
F-value 37.49 120.03 130.49 126.37 9.20 36.18 104.81 114.77 111.41 8.33 102.12 111.82 108.58 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using the fixed-effects estimator. Time and province dummies were included in all specifications. ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance 
accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is given by the difference between the cash/total assets ratio at time t+1 and the corresponding ratio at time t. The target 
adjustment is the difference between the estimated target cash holdings at t+1 and the realized level of cash holdings at t. Following Opler et al. (1999), we use three different approaches to 
estimate the levels of target cash holdings. Mean target represents the average cash holdings over the last three years. Predicted target is given in each year by the fitted values from the OPSW 
model estimated using a pooled OLS estimator. Fama-MacBeth target is given in each year by the fitted values from the OPSW model estimated using the two-step Fama-MacBeth estimator. 
Fixed-effects target adjustment is given by the predicted values from the OPSW model estimated using the fixed-effects estimator. Pecking order is the firm’s financial deficit (FINDEF), which 
is measured as follows: (dividend payments + investment + changes in net working capital – operating cash flow) / total assets. Pecking order*Above target is an interaction term between the 
financing deficit (FINDEF) and a dummy variable (Above target), which is equal to one if the deviation from optimal cash levels (         
         ) is negative and 0 otherwise. Half-life is 
the time necessary to cover half of the deviation from the initial cash level to the target level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively 
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Table 3.6 
Dynamic models of cash holdings 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Casht+1 GMM OLS FE 
Casht 0.609*** 0.669*** 0.420*** 
 
(20.94) (63.94) (49.41) 
Tobint 0.007** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 
(2.37) (5.89) (5.73) 
Sizet 0.002 -0.001 -0.013*** 
 
(0.50) (-0.63) (-7.54) 
CFt 0.079** 0.038*** 0.055*** 
 
(2.09) (3.48) (5.79) 
NWCt 0.001 0.002 0.007* 
 
(0.10) (0.41) (1.66) 
CAPEXt 0.003 -0.071*** -0.056*** 
 
(0.05) (-6.33) (-4.35) 
Leveraget -0.071*** -0.049*** -0.041*** 
 
(-2.98) (-8.48) (-5.91) 
Div_Dumt -0.009 0.002 0.002 
 
(-1.29) (1.04) (1.22) 
Var_CFt 0.755* 0.542**  
 (1.66) (2.09)  
SOEst 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.16) (1.02) (-0.45) 
AC1t+1 0.006 -0.005*** -0.004** 
 
(0.65) (-2.69) (-2.39) 
N 13594 13594 13594 
Adjustment Speed 0.391 0.331 0.580 
Half_Life 1.773 2.097 1.195 
R
2
  0.56 0.24 
Adjusted R
2
  0.56 0.14 
ρ  
 
0.44 
F-value 64.91 157.80 78.00 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.15 
  m3 test (p-value) 0.57 
  Notes: The specifications were estimated using the system GMM (column 1), the fixed-effects (column 2), and 
the pooled OLS (column 3) estimators. Time, industry, and province dummies were included in all 
specifications apart from the fixed-effects estimates in column 2 (which include time and province dummies 
only). The dependent variable in all regressions is the level of cash holdings (the ratio of the sum of cash and 
cash equivalents to total assets) at t+1. Tobin (Q) is the market-to-book ratio. Size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets. CF is the ratio of the sum of net profit and depreciation to total assets. NWC (non-cash NWC) is the 
ratio of net working capital (working capital minus cash holdings) to total assets. CAPEX is defined as the ratio 
of capital expenditures to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total 
assets. Div_Dum is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm has made any cash dividend payment in the 
year, and 0 otherwise. Var_CF is the mean of the standard deviations of the cash flow over total assets ratios of 
all firms in a given industry. SOEs, is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if a firm is state-owned in a 
given year, and 0 otherwise. AC1 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if the firm attempted 
acquisitions in the next fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. For the system GMM regression, m3 is a test for third-order 
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serial correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. We treat Casht, Tobin t, Sizet , CFt, NWCt, CAPEXt,  Leveraget, Div_Dumt, SOEst and AC1t+1 
as potentially endogenous variables. Levels of these variables dated t-3 and further are used as instruments in 
the first-differenced equations, and the first-differences of these same variables lagged twice are used as 
additional instruments in the levels equations. For the pooled regression, t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
asymptotically cluster-robust to heteroscedasticity and intra-cluster correlation is accounted for at the firm level. 
For the fixed-effects regression, ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by 
unobserved heterogeneity.  Half-life is the time necessary to cover half of the deviation from the initial cash 
level to the target level. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3.7 
Dynamic models of cash holdings 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Casht+1 Xcash Xcash’ Active DIV Investment Debt 
Dum_lowt*Casht 0.828*** 0.729*** 0.734*** 0.686*** 0.624*** 0.696*** 
 
(10.99) (7.49) (13.82) (19.62) (14.97) (19.31) 
Dum_mediumt*Casht 0.787***    0.636*** 0.622*** 
 
(12.03)    (14.19) (13.04) 
Dum_hight*Casht 0.646*** 0.531*** 0.577*** 0.581*** 0.534*** 0.538*** 
 
(12.78) (12.39) (17.49) (17.13) (10.10) (10.90) 
Tobint 0.005** 0.005** 0.004 0.004* 0.005** 0.004** 
 
(2.13) (2.20) (1.63) (1.69) (2.33) (2.07) 
Sizet 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.70) (-0.41) (-0.32) (-0.27) (-0.32) (0.04) 
CFt 0.065** 0.073** 0.081** 0.077** 0.073** 0.070** 
 (2.05) (2.25) (2.42) (2.29) (2.40) (2.23) 
NWCt -0.006 -0.006 -0.014 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 
 (-0.57) (-0.49) (-1.13) (-0.42) (-0.34) (0.19) 
CAPEXt 0.033 0.009 0.020 -0.025 -0.091 -0.042 
 (0.64) (0.17) (0.38) (-0.46) (-1.11) (-0.87) 
Leveraget -0.065*** -0.072*** -0.087*** -0.078*** -0.081*** -0.078** 
 (-3.29) (-3.73) (-4.29) (-3.74) (-4.27) (-2.51) 
Div_Dumt -0.017*** -0.008 -0.005 0.012 -0.002 -0.004 
 (-3.14) (-1.44) (-0.90) (1.29) (-0.32) (-0.74) 
Var_CFt 1.878** 2.566** 1.453 2.507** 2.341** 1.480 
 (2.02) (2.45) (1.47) (2.22) (2.35) (1.61) 
SOEt 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 (0.29) (0.07) (-0.33) (0.11) (0.06) (0.14) 
AC1t 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.002 0.003 
 (0.74) (1.02) (0.93) (0.93) (0.30) (0.45) 
Dum1t 0.002 0.042*** 0.022** 
 
0.005 0.015 
 (0.16) (3.46) (2.12) 
 
(0.44) (1.17) 
Dum2t 0.007    0.026* 0.027* 
 (0.62)    (1.71) (1.76) 
N 13,594 13,594 11,947 13,594 13,594 13,594 
F-value 76.34 64.51 62.67 63.63 58.27 65.80 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.36 0.46 0.23 
m3 test (p-value) 0.42 0.44 0.27 0.58 0.54 0.54 
Diff (Low vs High) 0.01*** 0.04** 0.02** 0.04** 0.20 0.01*** 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using the system GMM estimator. Time, industry and province dummies were included in all specifications. The dependent variable 
in all regressions is the level of cash holdings (the ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets). Tobin (Q) is the market-to-book ratio. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. CF is the ratio of the sum of net profit and depreciation to total assets. NWC (non-cash NWC) is the ratio of net working capital (working capital 
minus cash holdings) to total assets. CAPEX is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total 
assets. Div_Dum is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm has made any cash dividend payment in the year, and 0 otherwise. Var_CF is the mean of the standard 
deviations of the cash flow over total assets ratios of all firms in a given industry. SOEs is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if a firm is state-owned in a given year, 
and 0 otherwise. AC1 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a firm attempted acquisitions in the next fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. In the columns labelled 
Xcash, Investment, and Debt, Dum_low (Dum_high) is a dummy variable in turn equal to 1 in a given year if the firm’s excess cash, capital expenditures, and leverage ratio 
respectively lie in the bottom (top) one third of the distribution of the corresponding variables of all firms operating in the same industry in that year, and 0 otherwise. For the 
remaining firm-years, the dummy Dum_medium will be equal to 1. In the columns labelled Xcash’, Active, and Div, Dum_high (Dum_low) is a dummy variable, which is in 
turn equal to 1 in a given year if the firm has a levels of cash ratio below (above) the median value of the distribution of the cash ratios of all firms operating in the same 
industry in that given year, is (not) actively managing its cash holdings, and is paying (no) dividends, respectively, and 0 otherwise. We treat Tobint, Sizet, CFt, NWCt, 
CAPEXt, Leveraget, Div_Dumt, OEst, AC1t+1 as well as all the interaction terms with Casht as potentially endogenous variables. Levels of these variables dated t-3 and further 
are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, and first-differences of these same variables lagged twice are used as additional instruments in the levels equations. 
Diff is a test for equality of the coefficients across various categories of firms distributed as Chi-square. Specifically, we report p-values of the Wald statistics for the equality 
of the cash coefficients between firm-years in group (Dum_high) and group (Dum_low). t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3.8 
 Regressions of ROA-ROA
B
 on changes in firm cash holdings 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROAt - ROA
B
t Cash(1) Cash(2) Cash(3) xCash ACW(1) ACW(2) 
ΔCasht 0.092*** 0.107*** 0.142*** 0.145*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 
 
(14.53) (9.95) (10.43) (10.50) (9.82) (9.82) 
ΔEt 0.342*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 0.343*** 0.343*** 
 
(73.83) (73.75) (73.63) (73.62) (73.85) (73.85) 
ΔNAt 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
 
(38.29) (37.92) (37.98) (38.38) (38.13) (38.13) 
ΔINTt -0.315*** -0.314*** -0.314*** -0.315*** -0.313*** -0.313*** 
 
(-11.76) (-11.72) (-11.73) (-11.77) (-11.70) (-11.70) 
ΔDIVt 0.168** 0.168** 0.164** 0.166** 0.175** 0.175** 
 
(2.19) (2.19) (2.14) (2.16) (2.28) (2.28) 
Casht-1 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 
 
(9.44) (9.33) (9.37) (9.85) (8.93) (8.93) 
Leveraget -0.174*** -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.172*** -0.174*** -0.174*** 
 
(-39.31) (-39.14) (-39.02) (-38.93) (-39.36) (-39.36) 
SOEt -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
(-2.62) (-2.61) (-2.48) (-2.45) (-2.68) (-2.68) 
AC1t 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (2.23) (2.23) (2.51) (2.35) (2.39) (2.39) 
Casht-1* ΔCasht  -0.073* -0.083* -0.072* -0.083* -0.083* 
  (-1.70) (-1.92) (-1.61) (-1.86) (-1.86) 
SOEt * ΔCasht 
  
-0.043*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
   
(-3.77) (-3.17) (-3.17) (-3.17) 
AC1t+1* ΔCasht 
  
-0.032** -0.027* -0.033** -0.033** 
   
(-2.19) (-1.78) (-2.14) (-2.14) 
Observations 13,716 13,716 13,716 13,716 13,716 13,716 
R
2
 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
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Adjusted R
2
 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
ρ 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.46 
F-value 269.99 264.35 254.08 255.51 253.39 253.39 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using the fixed-effects estimator. ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. 
Time and province dummies were included in all specifications. The dependent variable is the excess operating performance           , where  ROA is the return on 
assets and ROA
B
 is the benchmark return on assets constructed as 25 Fama & French (1993) size and book-to market portfolios. In columns 1 to 3, ΔCash is the ratio of the 
change in cash and cash equivalents (Cash) from year t-1 to t to total assets. In columns 4 to 6, ΔCash is the ratio of the change in excess cash from year t-1 to t to total 
assets (see Section 3.4.6.3 for more details). ΔE is the ratio of the change in earnings before extraordinary items from year t-1 to t to total assets. ΔNA is the ratio of the 
change in net total assets (total assets minus cash holdings) from year t-1 to t to total assets. ΔINT is the ratio of the change in interest expense from year t-1 to t to total 
assets. ΔDIV is the ratio of the change in cash dividends from year t-1 to t to total assets. Cash is the ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. Leverage is 
the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets. SOE is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if a firm is state-owned in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
AC1 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a firm attempted acquisitions in the next fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.9 
Regressions of ROA-ROA
B
 on changes in firm cash holdings differentiating firms into financially constrained and unconstrained 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROAt - ROA
B
t Total Assets 
No. of 
Employees DIV KZ WW ST 
ΔCasht*High_FCt 0.143*** 0.104*** 0.133*** 0.217*** 0.173*** 0.157*** 
 
(15.04) (11.11) (16.33) (17.40) (18.02) (17.09) 
ΔCasht*Medium_FCt 0.086*** 0.097***  0.070*** 0.059***  
 
(8.62) (9.29)  (6.46) (5.76)  
ΔCasht*Low_FCt 0.031*** 0.065*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.023** 0.047*** 
 
(2.88) (5.71) (4.89) (5.64) (2.23) (5.98) 
ΔEt 0.341*** 0.345*** 0.340*** 0.337*** 0.339*** 0.338*** 
 
(73.38) (72.13) (73.22) (72.17) (72.48) (72.77) 
ΔNAt 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 0.095*** 
 
(38.63) (37.80) (37.94) (37.17) (38.63) (37.57) 
ΔINTt -0.313*** -0.317*** -0.312*** -0.307*** -0.293*** -0.312*** 
 
(-11.70) (-11.52) (-11.69) (-11.50) (-10.96) (-11.71) 
ΔDIVt 0.175** 0.165** 0.171** 0.161** 0.165** 0.174** 
 
(2.29) (2.12) (2.24) (2.10) (2.18) (2.28) 
Casht-1 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 
 
(9.77) (8.79) (9.38) (9.88) (9.22) (9.41) 
Leveraget -0.172*** -0.176*** -0.172*** -0.174*** -0.173*** -0.171*** 
 
(-39.02) (-38.61) (-38.98) (-39.27) (-39.21) (-38.66) 
SOEt -0.005*** -0.005** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 
(-2.61) (-2.46) (-2.68) (-2.78) (-3.22) (-2.79) 
AC1t+1 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 
(2.27) (2.27) (2.22) (2.11) (2.08) (2.28) 
Observations 13,716 13,181 13,716 13,635 13,602 13,716 
R
2
 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
Adjusted R
2
 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 
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ρ 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.45 
F-value 261.29 250.81 266.78 261.26 269.26 268.11 
Diff (Low VS High) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using the fixed-effects estimator. ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. 
Time and province dummies were included in all specifications. The dependent variable is the excess operating performance ROA-ROA
B
, where ROA is the return on assets 
and ROA
B
 is the benchmark return on assets constructed as 25 Fama & French (1993) size and book-to market portfolios. ΔCash is the ratio of the change in cash and cash 
equivalents from year t-1 to t to total assets. ΔE is the ratio of the change in earnings before extraordinary items from year t-1 to t to total assets. ΔNA is the ratio of the 
change in net total assets (total assets minus cash holdings) from year t-1 to t to total assets. ΔINT is the ratio of the change in interest expense from year t-1 to t to total assets. 
ΔDIV is the ratio of the change in cash dividends from year t-1 to t to total assets. Cash is the ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. Leverage is the ratio 
of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets. SOEs is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if a firm is state-owned in a given year, and 0 otherwise. AC1 is a 
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a firm attempted acquisitions in the next fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. Based on the following different criteria: Firm 
Size (total assets or number or employees), Dividend Payout Status, the KZ index, the WW index, and a Chinese-specific indicator (ST), we split firm-years into the following 
three groups: High_FC, Medium_FC, and Low_FC, which are dummy variables equal to 1 respectively if a firm is more likely to face high, medium, and low financial 
constraints, relatively to all firms operating in the same industry they belong to in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Specifically, in columns 1 and 2, we consider a firm to be 
financially constrained (unconstrained) if its size (measured by total assets or  number or employees) lies in the bottom (top) one third of the distribution of the corresponding 
values of all firms belonging to the same industry each year. The remaining firm-years will be the ones, who face a medium level of financial constraints. In columns 3, we 
categorize firm-years according to their dividend payout status. In particular, we consider a firm as financially constrained (unconstrained) if it is not paying (paying) 
dividends in a given year. In columns 4 and 5, we consider a firm to be financially constrained (unconstrained) if its KZ or WW index lies in the top (bottom) one third of the 
distribution of the corresponding variables for all firms belonging to the same industry in a given year. The remaining firm-years will be the ones, who face a medium level of 
financial constraints. In column 6, we partition firm-years into financially constrained (unconstrained) if they have (have not) been issued a special treatment or a de-listing 
risk warning (ST). Diff is a test for equality of the coefficients across various categories of firms distributed as Chi-square. Specifically, we report p-values of the Wald 
statistics for the equality of the coefficients on changes in cash between firm-years, who are more and less likely to face financial constraints. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Fig. 3.1 Median cash-to-assets across firm size and Tobin’s Q 
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Fig. 3.2 Distribution of coefficients on lagged change in cash-to-assets 
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Fig. 3.3 Subsequent year’s change in cash holdings 
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Chapter 4 
Corporate liquidity and acquisitions: The China experience 
 
Using a panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 1998-2011, we examine the extent to 
which corporate liquidity impacts firms’ acquisition decisions, method of payment choices, 
and consequent performance following mergers. Our findings support the free-cash-flow 
motive of acquisitions: cash-rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions. Furthermore, it 
is found that tunneling contributes to the agency costs of free cash flow. Finally, given the 
higher opportunity cost of cash they face, financially constrained firms with higher growth 
prospects tend not to use cash payments in acquisitions. This finding is consistent with the 
under-performance of cash acquisitions in both the short-and long-terms. 
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4.1. Introduction 
The gradual establishment and development of China’s capital markets and the impact of 
globalization have fuelled a phenomenally roaring pace of merger and acquisitions 
(M&As).
133 
Given high growth rates and large amounts of cash generated by Chinese firms, 
strategic mergers including inward and outward M&A investments offer Chinese firms 
opportunities for seeking further economies of scale or other synergies, enhancing their 
competition advantage, and entering global markets. Additionally, M&As have become 
easier in the light of the relaxation of obstacles to their approval process, and of the 
constantly evolving regulatory and taxation framework surrounding them.  
It is also worth mentioning that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been 
restructuring their state-owned assets through M&As. On the one hand, SOEs in strategically 
relevant sectors such as basic materials, energy, utilities, telecommunications, aerospace and 
defense have been encouraged to form global conglomerates. On the other hand, some SOEs 
have been required to reduce their equity to generate efficiency improvements and increase 
competitiveness, which offers opportunities of market entry for other potential investors 
(Devonshire-Ellis et al. 2011). As a result, China’s M&A transactions including domestic 
consolidation, as well as outward and inward takeovers have significantly increased over the 
years (see Table 4.1). According to the 2012 M&A outlook of Bloomberg, China has 
engaged in 158 billion US dollars’ worth of takeover deals in 2011. This represents a 
moderate 9% increase from the 145 billion US dollars announced in 2010 (Bloomberg 2012).  
                                                          
    
133
 China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 encouraged Chinese enterprises to 
restructure and consolidate through M&As, in order to defend themselves from the influx of strong foreign 
competitors or to expand their business territories overseas. 
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In this study, we investigate the effect of corporate liquidity on acquisitions. Our 
results suggest that the agency costs of free cash flow play an important role in determining 
firms’ M&A strategy in China. Additionally, liquidity risk and frictions based on 
informational asymmetries can explain both payment choices and performance following 
acquisitions.  
Theories that focus on corporate liquidity and the costs of cash holdings can help to 
answer the question of what drives acquisitions. From a micro perspective, the existence of 
capital market imperfections (CMI) contributes to financial frictions, and firms face a cost 
premium on external finance. Under these circumstances, it is suggested that firms prefer 
using internal finance like cash or retained earnings to external financing such as bank loans, 
debt, and equity (Myers 1984). In particular, compared to their financially healthy 
counterparts, financially constrained firms value their cash holdings more, since liquidity 
allows them to invest without having to access new costly debt or equity (Faulkender & 
Wang 2006). Thus, corporate liquidity should play a crucial role on investment decisions, 
including acquisitions. Particularly, liquidity allows firms to make acquisitions, as it can be 
used directly as a measure of payment or can be used to meet interest payments on debt 
finance. It follows that an increase in corporate liquidity should enhance firms’ acquisition 
activities. In line with this argument, Shleifer & Vishny (1992) note that high corporate 
liquidity has driven merger waves in the last century. The authors argue that when cash flows 
are high, sellers should be more willing to sell their assets since higher cash flows bring the 
prices offered close to the firms’ fundamental values. Using a large panel of European 
acquisitions, Erel et al. (2014) point out that a reduction in the level of cash holdings, 
sensitivity of cash to cash flow, and sensitivity of investment to cash flow can be observed on 
target firms subsequent to being acquired. Based on these findings, the authors suggest 
financing improvement could potentially be a key factor leading to M&As. 
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According to the neoclassical hypothesis, industry assets can be restructured via 
mergers, in response to technological, regulatory or supply shocks, provided that sufficient 
capital liquidity is available. Harford (2005) argues that economic motivation and high 
macro-level capital liquidity generate a large number of merger deals in time. Similarly, 
Eisfeldt & Rampini (2006) observation that procyclical capital liquidity goes hand in hand 
with capital reallocation among firms, suggesting that liquidity is a critical key for industry 
shocks to generate merger waves. 
In addition, consistent with the agency costs theory, the free cash flow hypothesis 
(Jensen 1986) may also explain why firms with high liquidity are more likely to engage in 
takeovers. A high liquidity offers managers the incentive to make self-interested and 
entrenched decisions on low-benefit projects or acquisitions. Hanson (1992) finds evidence 
that acquiring firms with large free cash flow undertake low-benefit acquisitions. Harford 
(1999) finds a positive relation between cash-richness and the likelihood of a bid. His results 
also suggest that the cash-richness effect is being driven by the greater likelihood of agency 
conflicts between management and shareholders, indicated by low managerial ownership. In 
line with the agency costs of free cash flow explanation for acquisitions, there is a negative 
market reaction for acquiring firms with excess cash, due to the expectation of poor future 
performance. Oler (2008) also finds that the level of cash flow of the acquirer firms is 
significantly negatively related with their performance in terms of post-acquisition returns on 
net operating assets (RNOA).   
Yet, M&As represent a quick way to spend excess cash, which may limit the 
discretion of management and relieve the agency problems of free cash flow. According to 
Myers & Majluf (1984) and Smith & Kim (1994), mergers can create value by reducing 
resource misallocations, e.g. combining the resources of cash-surplus firms with firms 
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without sufficient financial slack. Considering that high free cash flow can be seen as 
evidence of mismatching between growth prospects and resources, Hanson (1992) states that 
higher target returns can be observed when firms have excess cash flow, which can be 
attributed to  takeovers reducing agency costs.  
Despite the extensive studies that rationalize the liquidity reason of the occurrence of 
mergers and acquisitions, only a small amount of research has paid attention to the motives 
behind China’s takeovers. Given the substantial increase in M&As characterizing the 
country, the Chinese case represents an ideal laboratory to further our understanding of the 
motives behind acquisitions and other aspects of merger policies. Our work contributes to 
existing literature in the following ways. First, it analyzes the interactions between corporate 
liquidity and M&As in the Chinese context. To the best of our knowledge, these interactions 
have not been investigated in previous literature. It is, however, important to analyze them, as 
they can help to assess the extent to which acquiring firms can benefit from acquisitions. 
Second, we investigate whether takeovers in China are driven by free-cash-flow. This will 
enable us to assess whether the agency-costs explanation of mergers proposed in the West 
(Jensen 1986; Hanson 1992; Smith & Kim 1994; Harford 1999; Oler 2008) is also valid in 
the Chinese case. Third, we analyze method-of-payment choices in acquisitions to assess the 
role played by the opportunity costs of cash holdings and capital constraints.  
Overall, our study provides a portrait of the nature and implications of M&As in 
China, and sheds light on how liquidity affects firms’ acquisition decisions, method of 
payment choices, and post-merger performance. We provide support for the free cash flow 
hypothesis according to which cash-rich Chinese firms tend to make use of their excess cash 
to take over other firms. The agency costs of free cash flow explanation is further tested by 
separating firms based on whether they are subject to tunneling. We find that the role of cash 
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manifests itself more for firms with greater likelihood of tunneling. Next, given the impact of 
the opportunity cost of cash, we find that greater growth prospects, reflected by a higher 
Tobin’s Q, reduce a bidder’s willingness to use cash payments in acquisitions. We also find 
that this effect depends on the level of financial constraints that the firm faces. Specifically, 
only constrained acquirers display a significantly negative sensitivity of using cash as a 
payment method to growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio), while no significant relation 
is found for financially healthy acquirers.  
Further tests indicate that cash acquisitions underperform stock ones. We find that the 
abnormal announcement returns are worse for cash bidders, which is consistent with the 
explanation that given the lower opportunity costs of cash holdings, financially healthy firms 
with few growth prospects are more likely to use excess cash as payment to undertake value-
losing M&A deals. Taking a longer term perspective, we also observe a decrease in average 
performance after acquisitions financed in cash, which once again supports the opportunity 
cost of cash hypothesis for acquisitions by firms with excess cash.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review of 
related research and develops our four hypotheses. In section 4.3, we describe the main 
features of our data and present summary statistics. Section 4.4 presents our main empirical 
analysis. Section 4.5 concludes. 
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4.2. Theoretical background and hypotheses development  
4.2.1. Agency costs of free cash flow 
Due to information asymmetries, liquid assets can protect firms from the costs associated 
with capital market imperfections. According to Keynes (2006) , holding a sufficient amount 
of liquid assets allows firms to undertake valuable projects once they occur. However, 
liquidity may also give management flexibility to pursue its own objectives. The free cash 
flow hypothesis advanced by Jensen (1986) suggests that managers endowed with free cash 
flow are likely to expand their firms even beyond the optimal size or undertake unprofitable 
projects. Given the fact that excessive cash can be seen as hoarded free cash flow, excess 
cash reserves can lead to agency conflicts over the disposal of cash. In the light of these 
considerations, it should be noted that M&As are a quick way to spend cash rather than 
paying it out to their shareholders. Thus, when a firm accumulates more than its normal level 
of cash, the firm is more likely to engage in takeovers (Harford 1999). Based on the above 
logic, we propose our first hypothesis:  
HΙ: cash-rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions.   
Tunneling refers to the appropriation of firm assets and the expropriation of minority 
investors by controlling shareholders or mangers for personal gain. According to Liu & Lu 
(2007) and Jiang et al. (2010), tunneling is rather widespread among Chinese listed firms due 
to the their unique concentrated ownership structure and the share segmentation system
134
, 
and to weak corporate governance mechanisms and public enforcement. As a result, the 
controlling shareholders/management of tunneling firms may make self-interested and 
                                                          
    
134
 Before the 2005 split share structure reform, the shares of listed firms in China could be either tradable or 
non-tradable. 
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entrenched decisions, and even conduct unprofitable projects. M&As or related party 
transactions between Chinese listed firms may provide direct opportunities for controlling 
shareholders, management and/or local governments to direct assets or profits out of firms, 
helping them achieve their personal or political benefits.
135
 
We suggest that an acquisition decision in China is unlikely to be motivated by purely 
economic considerations. First, in China, most publicly-listed companies are carve-outs or 
spin-offs from large stated-owned enterprises, formed through the divestment of less 
profitable or unrelated subsidiary businesses. These listed firms are strongly dependent on 
their parent firms, as they typically share personnel, capital, and assets (Liu & Lu 2007). As a 
result, the former often need to provide resources for their inefficient parents. In some cases, 
the listed firms may be asked to take over the poor-performing assets or shares of their parent 
firms or purchase the assets or shares at higher price (than the real value), particularly when 
these listed firms experience high profitability or hold excess cash in hand.  
Second, the management of the listed SOEs is often appointed by the government. In 
order to support loss-making small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), achieve political 
objectives, avoid unemployment, and maintain social stability, the management of these 
listed firms with high profitability or excess liquidity may be required by the government to 
absorb the SMEs, and engage in administrative restructuring plans to turn around their 
performances. Especially, when local governments face large fiscal deficits, or when 
unemployment is high, they may have higher incentives to interfere in the M&A deals of 
firms affiliated with them.  
                                                          
    
135
 A related party transaction is defined as any transaction such as asset acquisitions, asset sales, equity 
transfers, loan guarantees, accounts receivable, etc. between listed subsidiaries and their affiliated parent 
companies (controlling shareholders). These transactions may give direct opportunities for controlling 
shareholders to extract cash from their related listed firms through tunneling (Djankov et al. 2008) . 
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Third, controlling shareholders or local governors have a high level of motivation to 
quickly build empires and/or to stimulate regional economic growth through M&As, which 
may not maximize shareholders’ wealth, but increase the resources and power in their hands 
and give them the chance to stand out in the political competition for their career promotion. 
In summary, tunneling may be a motivation behind acquisition activities in China, as 
controlling shareholders and management may use M&As as opportunities to spend excess 
cash for their private benefits instead of paying it out to their shareholders. We therefore 
propose our second hypothesis:  
HΙΙ: Cash-rich firms subject to tunneling are more likely to make acquisitions.   
 
4.2.2. Opportunity cost of cash 
Substantial empirical evidence has documented the precautionary motive for cash holdings 
(Opler et al. 1999; Han & Qiu 2007; Bates et al. 2009). Ex ante cash reserves prevent firms’ 
underinvestment ex post in the event of unexpected earnings shortfalls or costly external 
finance. Especially, when high-Q “glamour” firms have difficulties in accessing external 
capital due to asymmetric information, liquidity management can play an important role. In 
line with these arguments, Almeida et al. (2004) argue that financially constrained firms have 
a greater propensity to save cash out of cash flow. Furthermore, Faulkender & Wang (2006) 
find that firms with higher financial constraints benefit more from holding cash than their 
financially healthier counterparts. In addition, the level of financial frictions is found to have 
a large bearing on firms’ investment decisions and financial management (Fazzari et al. 1988; 
Harford 1999). 
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As a particular type of investment, M&A activities should also be strongly influenced by 
financial frictions. Acquiring firms face a choice of payment between cash and stock. 
According to the opportunity cost of cash hypothesis (Alshwer et al. 2011), when external 
finance is either too expensive or not available, financially constrained bidders with high 
growth opportunities face higher opportunity costs of cash holdings, and prefer therefore to 
save more cash to avoid the costs of forgoing positive net present value (NPV) projects in the 
future. Therefore, constrained bidders with higher investment opportunities are more likely to 
use stock to finance their M&A deals. On the contrary, unconstrained bidders do not have 
strong preference for the method of takeover payment, because they can easily raise external 
finance for their future projects and meet unexpected shocks. 
Our third hypothesis examines the effect of financing constraints on the sensitivity of the 
method of payment in acquisitions to firms’ investment opportunities. Based on the argument 
above, it takes the following form:  
HΙΙΙ: The sensitivity of cash payment decisions to growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q) is 
significantly negative for financially constrained bidders, but is insignificant for 
unconstrained bidders. 
Based on the opportunity cost of cash hypothesis (Alshwer et al. 2011) that we 
mentioned earlier, acquiring firms prefer to use cash in acquisitions when they face a lower 
opportunity cost of cash. Therefore, we should expect that cash-acquiring firms are more 
likely to waste cash on acquisitions, which may result in underperformance. Our fourth 
hypothesis is therefore aimed at testing whether cash payments have a negative effect on 
market reaction and post-merger operating performance in China. This hypothesis can be 
stated as follows:  
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HΙV: Cash-financed acquirers perform significantly worse than stock-financed acquirers. 
Specifically, compared to the latter, the former exhibits lower short-run abnormal returns. 
Additionally, cash acquisitions experience decreasing operating performance from the pre- 
to the post-merger period. 
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4.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.3.1. The dataset 
To test our hypotheses, we construct a sample of firms that issue A-shares on either the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) during the period 
1998-2011. The data is taken from the China Stock Market Trading Database (CSMAR) and 
the China Economic Research Service Centre (CCER)
136
. Following the literature, we 
exclude firms in the financial sector, due to their different measurements of liquidity, and 
their dissimilar operating, investing, and financing activities. We further winsorize 
observations in the one percent tails for the regression variables to minimize the potential 
influence of outliers. Finally, we drop all firms with less than three years of consecutive 
observations. All variables are deflated using the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China). 
In addition, our sample includes all Chinese acquisitions announced between January 
1, 1998 and December 31, 2011, taken from the Thomson Financial (SDC) Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database. Acquiring firms are Chinese public firms listed on either the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Both successful and unsuccessful deals are 
taken into consideration.  
Table 4.1 provides a breakdown of non-bidders and bidders by year, differentiated by 
methods of payment. Our final unbalanced panel consists of 16,288 firm-year observations 
representing 1,601 listed firms. The number of firm-year observations of each firm varies 
between three and thirteen, with number of observations varying from a minimum of 705 in 
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 The cash flow statement in the databases is not available until 1998. 
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1998 to a maximum of 1,407 in 2009. This sample includes 971 unique acquirers making 
2,033 deals.
137
 As shown in Table 4.1, there is a clear increasing trend of the number of 
M&As in our sample period. In addition, the majority of our acquiring firms (61.4%) use 
cash as payment in acquisitions, whereas only 5.7% of bidders consider stock offers.
138
  
[Insert Table 4.1] 
 
4.3.2. Summary statistics 
Table 4.2 presents means and median of key variables for the overall sample and provides a 
comparison of these descriptive statistics based on whether or not a firm is engaged in 
acquisitions
139
. We also conduct statistical tests for equality of the means (t-test) and sample 
medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) of each variable across bidders and non-bidders. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 4.1. As one would expect, we observe that acquiring firms 
are larger than their non-acquiring counterparts, regardless of whether size is measured in 
terms of assets or number of employees. P-values associated with tests for equality of both 
sample means (t-test) and sample medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) show that the 
differences are significant at the 1% level.  
                                                          
    
137
 See Table 4.1 for more details about the structure of our sample. Given the unbalanced nature of our panel, 
which allows for both entry and exit, potential selection and survivor bias can be eased.  
    
138
 The split share structure of China’s stock markets led to difficulties in valuing firms’ stocks, particularly 
for non-tradable shares. For this reason, pure stock-for-stock was not a popular payment method before the mid-
2000s. As seen from Table 4.1, over 98% of stock acquisitions took place after the 2005 split share reform. 
Moreover, the category of Mixed PYMT in our study refers to all methods of payment different from all-cash or 
all-stock. They include acquisitions made with mixed payments (e.g. of cash and stock), debt-arrangement and 
asset swaps.       
    
139
 To this end, the statistics are differentiated across bidders and non-bidders. 
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[Insert Table 4.2] 
Furthermore, we focus on a series of variables that measure firms’ operating and 
market performance, namely, return on assets (ROA), sales growth, stock return (Return), 
investment expenditure (CAPEX), price-earnings ratio (PE), and cash flow (CF). We can see 
that acquiring firms typically have significantly better performance than non-bidders. In 
addition, the table shows that bidders generally appear to have slightly lower Tobin’s Q than 
non-bidders. These findings suggests that M&As may allow acquiring firms with better 
performance but low investment opportunities to expand. In terms of riskiness measured in 
terms of cash flow volatility (Var_CF), we observe that acquiring firms display higher 
volatility than non-bidders, indicating that bidders are more risky.
 
 
We do not see a significant mean difference in collateral (the ratio of tangible assets 
to total assets) between bidder and non-bidders. However, on average bidders exhibit slightly 
higher leverage (0.244) than non-bidders (0.231). With regard to liquidity variables [Cash, 
ΔCash, net working capital (NWC)], bidders do not always display higher liquidity ratios 
compared to non-bidders. In fact, bidders display a much lower NWC (-0.083) compared to 
non-bidder (-0.058). The higher leverage and lower liquidity shown by bidders might be due 
to the fact that they need to increase leverage and spend liquidity to engage in acquisitions.
140
 
In terms of financial constraints, we find that acquiring firms typically face less financially 
                                                          
    
140
 In unreported results, we find that the liquidity of bidding firms is significantly greater than that of non-
bidders in the year prior to acquisitions. This confirms our explanation that bidders spend a large amount of cash 
in acquisitions. 
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constraints compared to non-bidders, regardless of whether we use the KZ or the WW index to 
measure financial constraints.
141
 
Regarding our measures of incentive for tunneling, following Jiang et al. (2010), we 
use the ratio of other receivables to total assets (OREC)
142
, and the separation of the 
blockholder’s controlling right (C) and her/his ownership right (O) (DIF_Blockholders)143 to 
proxy how likely Chinese firms are subject to tunneling or expropriation from controlling 
shareholders.
144
 We observe that 51.4% of the bidders in our sample exhibit a divergence 
between the blockhead’s controlling ownership and cash-flow ownership (DIF_Blockhoders), 
which is significantly larger than the corresponding value observed for non-bidders (46.8%).  
However, bidders do not display a higher ratio of other receivables to total assets (OREC) 
compared to non-bidders (the corresponding ratios are 0.045 and 0.066, respectively). This 
suggests that acquisitions are not solely fuelled by tunneling.   
The table also shows that bidders are more likely to pay dividends (Payout). This 
suggests that bidders might also distribute cash via dividends to reduce the agency costs of 
                                                          
    
141
 With only one exception for the t-test of the KZ index, all other statistical tests indicate that the differences 
in the means and medians between bidders and non-bidders are significant at the 1% level. See Appendix 4.1 for 
details on how the KZ or WW indices are constructed. 
    
142
 As evidence, a survey of 130 listed Chinese firms conducted by the Shanghai-based Shenying and Wanguo 
Securities Co., Ltd. finds that on average the controlling shareholders owe their listed companies 40 millions of 
US dollars in the form of accounts receivable or parent borrowing (Liu & Lu 2007). In addition, Jiang et al. 
(2010) claim that “during 1996-2006, tens of billions in RMB were siphoned [through inter-corporate loans] 
from hundreds of Chinese listed firms by controlling shareholders” (p.2). The authors explain that these inter-
corporate loans can be found in the balance sheets of the majority of listed firms in China and are typically 
reported as “Other Receivables”.  
    
143
According to Claessens et al. (2002), Lemmon & Lins (2003), and Jiang et al. (2010), the separation of 
cash flow and control tend to give blockhoders effective control on the firms by only holding a relatively low 
proportion of shares, via pyramid structures and cross-holding among firms. The probability and danger of the 
exploitation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder (called “tunneling”) is high if these two 
agents do not have the same interest.  
    
144
 See Appendix 4.1 for the details on how OREC and DIF_Blockholders are constructed. 
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the free cash flow. Finally, CEOs in bidder companies are less likely to hold shares in their 
own company compared to non-bidders.
145
 Given that managerial ownership 
(Shareholding_CEO) aligns the managers’ interests with the firm’s shareholders, managers in 
bidder firms with less managerial ownership are more likely than managers in non-bidder 
companies to make entrenched decisions on value-decreasing acquisitions.   
  
                                                          
    
145
 P-values associated with both the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test reject the equality of the mean and 
median of the variables Payout and Shareholding_CEO across bidders and non-bidders. 
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4.4. Empirical analysis 
4.4.1. Predicting the probability of being a bidder 
Following Harford  (1999), we study whether there is a link between firms characteristics and 
acquisition decisions. In particular, we investigate whether high cash reserves are associated 
with a higher chance to attempt acquisitions. To this end, we estimate the following model 
whereby the dependent variable is coded as one if the firm announces a bid in year t+1, and 
zero otherwise: 
                     ∑                                                   
                                                                                      
                                                                                         
                                                                                 ∑     
                                     ∑          ∑                                                                              
The subscript i indexes firms; and t, years (t=1998-2011). Xk,it  is a vector of  explanatory 
variables that affect firms’ acquisition decisions. It includes firm financial characteristics and 
corporate control variables, based on prior work by Harford (1999). Our primary variable of 
interest is unexpected (excess) cash (Xcash), defined as the difference between real cash 
holdings and optimal levels predicted by the Opler et al. (1999, hereafter OPSW) model.
146
 
Return is the annual stock returns; Tobin (Q), the market-to-book ratio; ROA, the return on 
assets; Sales growth, the annual rate of growth of real sales; NWC, the ratio of net working 
capital (working capital minus cash holdings) to total assets; Leverage, the ratio of the sum of 
short- and long-term debt to total assets; PE, the price-to-earnings ratio; Size, the natural 
                                                          
    
146
 We control for the widely different optimal levels of cash holdings across companies by introducing 
excess cash. See Appendix 4.2 for details on how excess cash is calculated. 
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logarithm of total assets. Shareholding_CEO is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm CEO is holding shares in his/her own company, and 0 otherwise. Blockholders is the 
percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder. SOEs is a dummy variable, that 
takes the value of 1 if the firm is state-owned in a given year, and 0 otherwise.  
Eq. (4.1) also incorporates time dummies (∑Year), which account for the possible 
effects of business cycles, as well as the impact of change in interest and exchange rates.
147
 
Industry dummies (∑Industry) are included to capture industry fixed effects. 148  Finally, 
provincial dummies (∑province) are added to account for uneven development across 
regions.
149
 
The error term in Eq. (4.1) consists of two components:   , a firm-specific component, 
embracing any time-invariant firm characteristics which might influence firms’ acquisitions 
strategies, as well as any time-invariant component of the measurement error which may 
affect any variable in our regression; and εi,t, which represents an idiosyncratic component. 
                                                          
    
147
Year dummies can be also used to account for exogenous shocks potentially associated with firms’ 
acquisitions decisions, e.g. the 2005 split share reform, the 2005 Chinese exchange rate system reform, The 
financial crisis of 2007–2008. 
    
148
 According to the industry classification taken from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
firms in China’s listed sector are assigned to one of the following twelve industrial sectors: Farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry & fishing; Mining; Manufacturing; Utilities; Construction; Transportation & warehouse; 
Information technology; Wholesale & retailing; Real estate; Social services; Communications & cultural;  
Conglomerates; Finance & insurance. Following previous literature, we exclude the Finance & insurance sector 
from our study. 
    
149
 There are 31 provinces in China: Coastal provinces (Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang); Central provinces (Chongqing, Anhui, Heilongjiang, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, and Shanxi); and Western provinces (Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, 
Neimenggu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Yunnan). 
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Given the discrete and limited nature of the dependent variable, Eq. (4.1) is estimated 
using the random-effects panel Probit estimator
150
. The results of the Probit estimation are 
given in columns 1 to 5 of Table 4.3. In columns 1 and 2, we use Return to proxy for firms’ 
real performance, while firms’ real performance is measured by the ROA in columns 3 and 4. 
In column 5, we include both Return and ROA. The ρ coefficient reported in all specifications 
shows the relative importance of the unobserved effect: it suggests that around 13% of the 
total error variance can be captured by unobserved heterogeneity. As predicted by our 
Hypothesis Ι, cash-rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions: all specifications in 
Table 4.3 show in fact that the probability of being a bidder increases with the level of excess 
cash held (Xcash). This finding is consistent with what Harford (1999) and Opler et al. 
(1999) found for US firms.  
The positive relation between cash position and M&A decisions can be alternatively 
explained by the financial constraints hypothesis, according to which capital market 
imperfections may force firms to save to fund large capital expenditures, such as M&As. 
According to Harford (1999), the distinguishing between the free cash flow and financial 
constraints hypotheses require identification of firms with excess cash holdings. Once firms 
have accumulated a large amount of excess cash than they need for their good investment 
opportunities, the positive relation is more likely to reflect the agency conflicts over the 
disposition of the cash reserves. A baseline model of cash holdings used in this study is 
allowed us to identify whether a firm is cash-rich or not. In addition, under the financial 
constraints hypothesis, firms who are engaging in M&As are no more likely to experience 
                                                          
    
150
 To check robustness, we also estimate Eq. (4.1) using a conditional fixed-effects Logit model, which does 
not require the crucial assumption that firm-specific unobserved effects must be independent of the regressors. 
However, a drawback of the fixed-effects Logit estimator is that all the firms for whom the dependent variable is 
constant over the sample period are dropped in estimation. In our case, around 4,000 observations out of 14,500 
were dropped. The estimates based on the conditional Logit estimator were similar to those obtained with the 
random-effects Probit model.  For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
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lower value of cash holdings. However, in related work, Guariglia & Junhong (2014) find 
that a decrease in operating value of cash for acquirer firm with excess cash. 
[Insert Table 4.3] 
In columns 2 and 4, we separately introduce firms’ stock returns (Return) and 
operating performance (ROA), respectively, interacted with the level of Tobin’ Q 
(Return*Tobin and ROA*Tobin). In particular, in column 4, we find that the coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term (ROA*Tobin) is -0.375 and is significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level. This suggests that the probability of being a bidder decreases when 
firms have higher operating performance (ROA) as well as valuable investment opportunities 
(Tobin’s Q). In other words, the relation between the likelihood to make acquisitions and 
Tobin’s Q (ROA) is weaker for firms with higher ROA (Tobin’s Q). The reason might be that 
when a firm has both high growth opportunities and a high operating capacity, it does not 
need to rely on external investments like M&As to grow and expand, as expanding via 
acquisitions is more likely to face a higher cost in price paid for the acquired assets as well as 
integration expenses (Margsiri et al. 2008). In addition, there is a relatively high uncertainty 
about the synergies created by the acquisitions. Margsiri et al. (2008) find that no internal 
growh opportunies can push acquisitions occuring sooner, which creates inefficiency. 
Therefore, investing internally in positive net present value (NPV) projects can be seen as a 
better choice than making acquisitions. It is noteworthy that the coefficient associated with 
the interaction term (Return*Tobin) is poorly determined in column 2. This can be explained 
considering that stock returns might not be as good as ROA to proxy for firms’ real 
performance in the Chinese context.  
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The results from column 1 to 5 also show that the coefficients on Return, ROA and 
Size, have positive and significant signs, which suggests that lager firms with higher stock 
market returns and operating performance (ROA) are more likely to make acquisitions. These 
findings are in line with Roll (1986) and Harford (1999), and support the hubris theory that 
takeover deals can be promoted by firms’ better performances and returns. Due to acquirer 
managers’ hubris, excessive arrogance, and myopia, a higher firm profitability may lead 
managers with discretion to make self-interested and entrenched decisions on acquisitions, 
and to diversity their personal portfolios and increase the scale and scope of operating assets 
in their hands (Moeller et al. 2004).  
As for the corporate control variables, our results provide evidence that 
Shareholding_CEO and Blockholders have a negative impact on the probability of being a 
bidder. This can be explained as follows. First, when the firm CEO holds shares in his/her 
own company (Shareholding_CEO), this may reduce the agency costs faced by the firm since 
managerial ownership may help to align managers’ interests with those of the firm’s 
shareholders.
151
 Thus, managers who hold shares in their own company may be less likely to 
make acquisitions due to personal interests. Second, the variable Blockholders is measured as 
the percentage share holdings of the primary owner. A large ownership stake held by the 
blockholders tends to lower the separation of voting rights and cash-flow rights, which may 
lower the tendency of managers to engage in takeovers for tunneling reasons (Jiang et al. 
2010). Moreover, a relatively large stake may give the primary owners more incentive to 
oversee or monitor the managers, alleviating therefore agency costs stemming from a  
conflict of interest between firm managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Ang 
et al. 2000). Alternatively, controlling owners with a relatively large stake might be reluctant 
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Alternatively, it may be the case that managers decide to forgo M&As, as financing them by means of a 
stock swap would dilute their stake in the company by a too large extent. 
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to lose the control of their firms by engaging in acquisitions. Therefore, firms characterized 
by a high ownership stake of controlling shareholders may be more cautious in making 
investment through M&As.  
Last, our result shows that non-SOEs are more active in takeovers than SOEs
152
. This 
can be explained considering that even though they are more financially constrained (Allen et 
al. 2005; Bai et al. 2006; Allen et al. 2007; Guariglia et al. 2011), firms from the non-state 
sector have achieved much faster growth than their state-owned enterprises counterparts 
(Allen et al. 2007), which gives the former more motivation to expand and increase their 
market share through M&As.
153
   
 
4.4.2. Are cash-rich firms subject to tunneling more likely to make acquisitions?  
We next provide tests of our hypothesis II. In particular, in columns 6 and 7 of Table 4.3, we 
investigate a particular scenario of takeover motivation, in which controlling shareholders 
tunnel excess cash through M&A transactions.  
Following Jiang et al. (2010), we use the ratio of other receivables to total assets 
(OREC) to proxy how likely primary shareholders are of expropriating resources from 
minority investors. The “Other Receivables” account is commonly used by Chinese listed 
firms to record transactions with related parties rather than the sales and purchases of goods 
and services. The vague definition of “Other Receivables” as well as the low level of 
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 We split the firms into two ownership categories according to their ultimate controlling shareholder: the 
SOE sector and the non-SOE sector. Non-SOEs have non-state entities as the controlling shareholder. These can 
be domestic private, foreign, collective, employees’ unions, non-profit organizations or institutes, and others. 
    
153
 In recent years, many non-SOEs have been encouraged to participate in the SOE reform through M&As. 
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disclosure requirements make manipulation possible. This account is therefore frequently 
used to cover up tunneling (Li 2010). According to Jiang et al. (2010), tens of thousands of 
inter-corporate loans borrowed by controlling shareholders are classified as “Other 
Receivables” on the balance sheets of Chinese listed firms, and represent a larger portion of 
total assets of the company. In our sample, other receivables constitute about 5% on average, 
and up to around 60% of total assets, confirming that the tunneling problem in China is 
significant. We expect that the larger the size of “Other Receivables” in the balance sheet, the 
more likely the firm is to resort to tunneling. Specifically, we classify a firm as subject to 
tunneling in a given year if its OREC in that year falls in the top three deciles of the 
distribution of the OREC of all firms operating in the same industry it belongs to. The 
remaining firm-years will be considered less subject to tunneling.
154
   
As an additional check, we also use the separation of the blockholder’s controlling 
right (C) and her/his ownership right (O) as another proxy for the firm’s tunneling incentives. 
In particular, we construct the dummy variable DIF_Blockholders, which takes value one if 
the firm’s blockholder’s controlling right exceeds its cash-flow ownership in a given year, 
suggesting the presence of tunneling, and zero otherwise.  According to Claessens et al. 
(2002), Lemmon & Lins (2003), and Jiang et al. (2010), the incentives of tunneling are 
greater when a firm has implemented mechanisms of separating cash flow and control. This 
can be explained considering that blockhoders tend to have exceedingly effective control on 
the firms, and are able to derive more benefits from tunneling activities by only holding a 
relatively low stake of shares, through pyramid structures and cross-holding among firms. We 
therefore classify a firm as (not) subject to tunneling in a given year if the blockhoder’s 
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 Similar results were obtained when using a 50% threshold. For brevity, these results are not reported, but 
are available upon request. 
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controlling right (C) is (not) greater than his/her ownership right (O), i.e. if 
DIF_Blockholders is equal to one.   
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 4.3 present an analysis of the impact of tunneling on 
making acquisition decisions by including an interaction term between excess cash (Xcash) 
and the dummy variable (Tunneling), which partition firms into groups with relatively high 
and low likelihood of tunneling based on OREC and DIF_Blockholders, respectively. We 
find that the excess cash coefficients are only significantly positive for the firms with greater 
likelihood of tunneling, regardless of whether we use OREC or the DIF_Blockholders to 
proxy for the degree of expropriation. The results support our Hypothesis II, according to 
which Chinese firms tend to take advantage of acquisitions to tunnel cash to their controlling 
shareholders.  
In Table 4.4, we compare the average percentage of firms conducting acquisition 
activities across groups of firms that are more or less likely to tunnel. We observe that for the 
firms with higher likelihood of tunneling (e.g. those firms with a high ratio of other 
receivables to total assets, or with blockholder’s cash-flow ownership lower than the 
controlling ownership), the average proportion of becoming bidders is higher for the High-
Xcash group than one for the Low-Xcash group.
155
 Both the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test indicate that the differences in the means and medians between the two groups are 
significant. Conversely, for the firms with low OREC or with blockholder’s cash-flow 
ownership approximately equal to the controlling ownership, the average proportion of 
becoming bidders for High-Xcash group is only slightly larger than that for Low- Xcash 
group. All statistical tests cannot reject the equality in the means and medians between the 
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 We classify firms into high (low) Xcash group in a given year if their Xcash (excess cash) is above (below) 
zero.  
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two groups. Hence, the findings here once again confirm our Hypothesis II, according to 
which high excess cash may lead firms subject to tunneling to engage in takeover activities. 
[Insert Table 4.4] 
 
4.4.3. The choice of payment method  
4.4.3.1. The determinants of method of payment 
In order to test our Hypothesis IV, in this section, we initially provide an analysis of the 
method of payment. Following Martin (1996) and Faccio & Masulis (2005), our model of the 
determinants of the method of payment is given by the following equation: 
                               
    ∑      
 
                                                                             
                                                                   
                                                                          
                                                                                   
                                                     ∑     ∑        
 ∑                                                                                                                                    
 
Chapter 4                               Corporate liquidity and acquisitions: The China experience                            
233 
 
where the subscript i indexes firms; and t, years (t=1998-2011). The dependent variable is the 
bidder’s payment choice. Explanatory variables comprises bidder and deal-specific attributes. 
Specifically, we measure the bidder’s financial, operational and corporate conditions with 
Tobin (Q), the market-to-book ratio; Cash (the ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents 
to total assets)
156
; CF (the ratio of the sum of net profit and depreciation to total assets); 
Leverage (the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets); Size (the natural 
logarithm of total assets); Collateral (the ratio of tangible assets to total assets); Blockholders 
(the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder); Runup_stock (the cumulative 
daily stock price returns of the bidder over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days 
prior to the announcement date); Sigma_stock (the standard deviation of the bidding firms’ 
daily returns over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the 
announcement date); Runup_market (the cumulative daily Shanghai and Shenzhen value-
weighted stock returns over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the deal 
announcement); Shareholding_CEO (a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
CEO is holding shares in his/her own company, and 0 otherwise); SOEs (a dummy variable, 
that takes the value of 1 if the firm is state-owned in a given year, and 0 otherwise); and 
Experienced (a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the bidder has announced at 
least 3 takeover bids over the five years period prior to the deal announcement, and 0 
otherwise). 
We measure a deal’s attributes with Public_deals (a dummy variable, that takes the 
value of 1 for acquisitions of public firms, and 0 otherwise); Size_ratio (the ratio of the 
transaction value divided by the bidder’s market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement); 
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 We obtain similar results using excess cash (Xcash) instead of the realized level of cash (Cash) to control 
for bidders’ liquidity conditions, neither of which is significant. The results based on Xcash are not reported for 
brevity, but are available upon request. 
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Unfriendly (a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the deal is not defined as friendly 
by Thomson Financial SDC, and 0 otherwise); Diversifying (a dummy variable which takes 
the value of 1 if the bidder was not in the same industry as the target as measured using the 
bidder’s and the target’s first 2-digits of the primary SIC code, and 0 otherwise); and 
Completed (a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the transactions were completed, 
and 0 otherwise). We also include time dummies (∑Year), Industry dummies (∑Industry), 
and provincial dummies (∑province). 
Our estimates of Eq. (4.2) are reported in Table 4.5. Specifically, in column 1 and 3, 
the dependent variable is one if the deal is financed only by cash in year t+1, and zero 
otherwise.  The model is therefore estimated using a Probit estimator. The remaining of 
specifications are estimated using an ordered Probit estimator, as  the dependent variable 
takes value of 1 if the acquisition is stock-financed, 2 if it is mixed-financed, and 3 if it is 
cash-financed in year t+1.
157
 We also estimate all regressions by accounting for clustering, 
which takes into account the intraclass correlation within the same firm. 
It is noteworthy that if poor financial or corporate conditions, which play a crucial 
role on payment considerations actually also prevent some potential bidders from taking part 
in acquisition activity, then we may understate the importance of the determinants of the 
choice of payment method. To control for this self-selection bias, we implement the 
Heckman’s (1976, 1979) two-step procedure and report the results in columns 3 to 9. In the 
first stage, based on Eq. (4.1), we estimate a selection (Probit) model for the possibility of 
making a bid for each firm-year. We then calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio for each 
observation. In the second stage, we include the inverse Mill’s ratio in the second-step 
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 Because our data does not always provide full information of the actual percentage of payment in 
acquisitions, we estimate Probit and ordered Probit models, which allows us to focus on the qualitative decision 
of payment choice. 
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equations to correct for a potential selection problem in our sample. As suggested by 
Heckman (1976, 1979), if the inverse Mill’s ratio does not have a significant sign, then we 
can confirm that the self-selection bias does not have a significant impact on the second-stage 
equations of payment consideration. We find insignificant inverse Mill’s ratios in Table 4.5. 
Hence, we do not reject the null hypothesis of independence of the second-stage equations 
from the selection equations, suggesting that self-selection bias is not a serious issue for our 
estimates.   
We observe that the bidder’s stock valuation (Tobin’s Q) has a significant and 
negative coefficient in all specifications (columns 1 to 4), suggesting that better investment 
prospects are associated with a lower likelihood of cash payments. The finding is in line with 
Jung et al. (1996) and Martin (1996), who explain that firms with better investment 
opportunities tend to use stock payments to avoid under-investment costs associated with 
financing cash acquisitions by debt. Debt financing requires management to pay it back with 
future cash flows, which might in turn increase the difficulty for bidders with valuable 
growth opportunities to finance their future investment projects. In addition, this finding is 
also consistent with the opportunity cost of cash hypothesis, according to which acquiring 
firms with higher investment opportunities would rather not spend cash in acquisitions since 
they face higher opportunity costs.
158
 
[Insert Table 4.5] 
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 The underlying alternative explanation can be that a higher Tobin’s Q might pick up stock over-valuation 
(or a high stock varluation), which may cause stock to be used to in the deal transactions. However, if this is the 
case, given that Runup_stock is more likely to reflect stock over-valuation, we should find that acquiring firms 
with Runup_stock are also more likely to use stock as payment in acquisitions. In contrast, we find that the 
insignificant relation between Runup_stock and methods of payment. 
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In addition, the coefficient associated with cash flow (CF) is positive and significant 
in column 1 and 4, which is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen 1986), 
according to which higher amounts of cash flow may increase the likelihood of cash 
payments in acquisitions. We also find that the probability of choosing cash payments is 
positively related to the dummy variable (Experienced), which implies that those bidders who 
have conducted multiple takeover deals prefer to use cash, probably due to the higher 
liquidity at their disposal.
159
 Next, we find a significant and negative sign for the variable 
(SOEs), suggesting that state-owned firms are more likely to use non-cash payments 
compared with non-SOEs. A possible explanation may be that SOE mergers via 
administrative transfers or connected transactions between one government agency and 
another can take place under the command of the government with non-cash payments, even 
no payment (Kam et al. 2008).
 160
 On the contrary, non-SOEs are more likely to engage in 
acquisitions in relatively more competitive sectors for the synergy reason. Due to the serious 
asymmetric information in China and the relatively high valuation signaled by them, cash 
payments increase the probability of acceptance by the targets with decent prospects. Hence, 
non-SOEs are generally more likely to use cash payments in acquisitions than SOEs. 
Turning to the deal’s characteristics, consistent with Faccio & Lang (2002), Harford 
et al. (2009) and Karampatsas et al. (2014), we find that the variables regarding target’s 
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 Due to hubris or entrenchment, multiple acquisitions may be used by management to spend excess 
liquidity, which destroy firms’ value (Billett & Qian 2008; Black et al. 2013). The negative announcement 
effect for bidders who have conducted multiple takeover deals shown in section 4.4.4.1.2 confirms the hubris 
conjecture.  
    
160
Under the administrative decisions of state or local governments, some listed SOEs may undertake 
restructuring plans and take over other firms, in order to achieve greater economies of scale and improve 
productivity (Bai et al. 2008). Moreover, if listed SOEs themselves are making losses or face financial distress, 
their controlling shareholders (the government) may conduct connected transactions and absorb other high-
quality assets from their connected parties, such as the affiliated firms, to prop up their listed firms to avoid a 
delisting or default (Peng et al. 2011) 
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listing status (Public_deals) have negative and significant coefficients in all specifications, 
suggesting that in deals where unlisted targets are involved, a greater use of cash is made, 
while stock payments are more attractive for bidders of listed targets. This can be explained 
considering that private sellers should be more likely to accept cash as a method of payment 
due to their consumption and liquidity needs. In addition, stock acquisitions of unlisted 
targets with a concentrated ownership structure potentially create a large rival blockholder for 
bidder dominant shareholders, which can be a corporate control threat for the bidders.  
The relative size of the deal (Size_ratio) has a significantly negative effect on cash 
payments, which is in line with Hansen (1987), Faccio & Masulis (2005), Alshwer et al. 
(2011) and Karampatsas et al. (2014). The fact that the probability of a stock offer increase 
with the size of the target relative to that of the bidder supports the asymmetric information 
prediction that large deals may lead to information asymmetry with regard to the target’s 
market value.
 Given stock’s contingent-pricing mechanism, the rise of the information 
asymmetry therefor increases the incentives of acquiring firms to use stock payments. 
Furthermore, the reason why there is a significantly negative effect of Size_ratio on cash 
payments can be the lack of sufficient cash resources to finance an acquisition with a 
relatively large deal size.  
The attitude indicator for the deals defined as unfriendly (Unfriendly) has a positive 
and significant coefficient in the cash payment regression. This result is consistent with 
unfriendly bidder preference for cash financing to quickly close the deal, thus deterring other 
competing bidders and aggressive defenses against hostile takeovers (Linn & Switzer 2001; 
Faccio & Masulis 2005; Alshwer et al. 2011). Fishman (1989) documents that unlike the 
value of stock payments, which is contingent upon the profitablity of the acquistion, a cash 
offer facilitates a more rapid deal completion, since the seller does not make the accept/reject 
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decision based on the future cash flows of the acquired target. In contrast, stock payments 
will lower the speed of takeover process due to security registration and the requirements of 
approval by the bidder’s shareholders. Furthermore, using stock lowers the likelihood of 
acceptance since a stock offer is presumed to have a low value (Gilson & Black 1986; 
Fishman 1989).  
 
4.4.3.2. Financial constraints and method of payment 
In order to test our hypothesis III, we investigate whether the opportunity costs of cash 
holdings, as measured by the sensitivity of cash payment decisions to growth opportunities 
(Tobin’s Q), is higher for firms that face higher financial constraints. Specifically, we include 
an interaction term between Tobin’s Q and the dummy variable, which partition firms into 
groups with relatively high and low levels of financial constraints. The results of this test are 
presented in columns 5 to 9 of Table 4.5.  
Based on existing literature, we use five different criteria to proxy the level of 
financial constraints that bidders face. The first criterion is size, whereby it is assumed that 
small firms usually do not have sufficient net worth and collateral values, as well as a 
sufficiently long track record compared with large firms. Thus, the former will be more 
vulnerable to asymmetric information in credit markets and should face more difficulty in 
obtaining external financing (Gertler & Gilchrist 1994; Beck et al. 2005; Clementi & 
Hopenhayn 2006; Guariglia 2008).  
Second, we construct the KZ index and WW indexes to proxy for firm-specific levels 
of financial constraints, following  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Whited and Wu 
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(2006).
161
 Basically, a firm is more likely to be financially constrained if it has a higher level 
of the KZ or WW index.  
Third, prior literature documents that financially constrained firms tend to cut or 
reduce dividend payout to finance their desired investment and projects or cover their debt 
obligations (Fazzari et al. 1988; Kaplan & Zingales 1997; Cleary 1999; Almeida et al. 2004; 
Almeida & Campello 2007). We therefore expect firms that pay no dividends to face higher 
capital market imperfections. 
Following this literature, we classify firms as facing a relatively high (low) level of 
financial constraints in a given year, first, if their size (measured by total real assets or 
number of employees) falls in the bottom three deciles (the top seven deciles) of the 
distribution of the assets and number of employees of all firms operating in the same industry 
as that firms in that given year (column 5 and 6);  if their KZ or WW indices in that year fall 
respectively in the top three deciles (the bottom seven deciles) of the distribution of the 
indexes of all firms operating in the same industry they belong to in that given year (column 
7 and 8); if the firm has not (has) made any cash dividend payment in the year (column 
9).
162,163
 
As shown in columns 5 to 9 of Table 4.5, we find that in the regressions for cash 
payment decisions, the coefficient associated with Tobin’s Q is only significantly negative for 
the firms who face higher levels of financial constraints, irrespective of the financial 
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 See Appendix 4.1 for details on how the KZ and WW indices are constructed. 
    
162
 The reason why we use a relatively small (30%) threshold to classify firms as facing relatively low and 
high financial constraints is that a large portion of acquiring firms is characterized by large size, and may 
consequently be less affected by capital market imperfections. 
    
163
 The reason why we only consider cash dividends is that paying stock dividends in China may reflect 
firms’ financial constraints. 
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constraints criterion used. This suggests that financially constrained bidders with higher stock 
valuation (Tobin’s Q) are more likely to save cash and use stock to pay for the acquisitions. 
This finding is in line with the opportunity cost of cash hypothesis (Alshwer et al. 2011): 
financially constrained acquirers with better investment opportunities value cash more than 
their financially healthier counterparts. Therefore, since holding more cash gives more 
financial flexibility and avoids the high opportunity cost of forgoing positive net present 
value (NPV) projects, these firms are more reluctant to distribute cash and prefer to use stock 
as payment to finance the deals. In contrast, firms with greater access to financial markets 
may not have strong preference for payment methods in acquisitions, since it is not difficult 
for them to fund their current or future investments using debt or equity. 
In Table 4.6, as a further test of our Hypothesis III, we provide descriptive statistics of 
the means of payment used by the bidding firms. Based on firms’ financial conditions and 
Tobin’s Q, we partition firm-years into 4 sub-groups: Group1 (financially constrained firms 
with low Q), Group 2 (financially constrained firms with high Q), Group 3 (financially 
unconstrained firms with low Q), and Group 4 (financially unconstrained firms with high 
Q).
164
  We then calculate the average proportion of 100% cash payment across the four sub-
samples.
165
 We observe that on the one hand, for the financially constrained group, the 
average percentage of cash transactions for the low Q group is much higher than the one for 
high Q group, for all five criteria used to define financial constraints. The statistical tests 
from three of the criteria indicate that the differences in the means and medians between the 
two groups are significant at the 5% level.  
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 We classify a firm into high (low) Q group in a given year if its Tobin’s Q is above (below) the median 
value of the Q of all firms operating in the same industry in a given year. 
    
165
 Similar results were obtained when cash payments are defined as payments such that over 50% of the 
overall value of the payment is cash. For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
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On the other hand, we cannot find significant differences of the average proportion of 
cash payment between high and low Q groups for financially unconstrained firms. These 
statistics suggest that relatively financially constrained bidders with high investment 
opportunities are reluctant to use cash to finance their acquisitions. This finding is also in line 
with the opportunity cost of cash hypothesis (Alshwer et al. 2011), in which financial 
constraints increase the opportunity cost of holding cash. 
 [Insert Table 4.6] 
 
4.4.4. The valuation effects of takeovers 
4.4.4.1. Short-run analysis  
4.4.4.1.1. Abnormal returns for different methods of payment 
In this section, we use traditional short-window event studies to investigate stock market 
reactions across different methods of payment. Table 4.7 displays bidders’ cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) within the three-day (t=-1, +1) and five-day (t=-2, +2) windows of a 
merger announcement between 1998 and 2011.
166
 In line with Chi et al. (2011), Zhou et al. 
(2012) and Black et al. (2013), for all bids, the cumulative abnormal returns over a three-day 
and five-day event window are statistically significant and positive, taking values of  1.21 and 
1.40 percent, respectively. Significant and positive abnormal returns suggest that Chinese 
stock markets react positively to the announcements of bidding. This could be due to the fact 
that although acquisitions are more likely to destroy value, they may be less wasteful than 
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 See Appendix 4.1 for the details on how bidders’ (cumulative) abnormal returns are constructed. 
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investing internally in loss-making projects, especially when the acquirers have substantial 
cash flows and few growth opportunities. Alternatively, Chi et al. (2011) attribute the 
positive announcement returns to the low M&A competition in China.  
 [Insert Table 4.7] 
When we partition the bidders (n=2033) on the basis of their methods of payment, we 
see that stock bidders generate the most significant and largest abnormal returns, regardless 
of the event windows used (CAR3=8.87%, CAR5=10.76%, n=115). Bidders with mixed 
payments follow (CAR3=0.94%, CAR5=1.25%, n=669), and cash bidders are last 
(CAR3=0.65%, CAR5=0.62%, n=1249).
167
 
In short, the results show that the market has different perceptions of acquisitions 
depending on the methods of payment used.
168
The lowest announcement returns are 
associated with cash payments, which is in line with the findings from Black et al. (2013) in 
the Chinese economy, as well as with our Hypothesis IV. We attribute this to the fact that, 
due to the lower opportunity costs of cash, cash-acquiring firms are more likely to waste cash 
on unprofitable acquisitions. Other factors may also contribute to this finding. First, bidders 
have a greater probability to offer high acquisition premiums for cash transactions. Given the 
high degree of information asymmetry prevalent in the Chinese stock market, cash payments 
are more likely to be accepted by target firms only if cash offers are attractive or exceed their 
true value. Second, when stock payments are used in takeover transactions, taxes are deferred 
                                                          
    
167
 Both the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test indicate that the differences in the means and medians 
between cash and stock acquisitions are significant. 
    
168
 The finding that the market reacts more positively to mergers paid in stock is in contrast to most of the 
evidence found in the West (Travlos 1987; Andrade et al. 2001). According to the market-timing theory, stock 
payments are in fact preferred by overvalued acquiring firms, which conveys negative information and thus 
leads to negative abnormal announcement returns. 
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until the stock is sold. However, cash payments may face immediate capital gains tax 
implications. Thus, the tax-deferred option in stock may be valued more by the market. Third, 
given that the finance literature (Fishman 1989; Faccio & Masulis 2005) has argued that safer 
deals (lower risk and hence lower expected returns) are better suited to finance by means of 
cash; risky deals should be financed by means of stock, as stock financing allows to share the 
benefits/risks of a deal with target shareholders Thus, the market is likely to react favorably 
more to the announcements of stock transactions.  
In addition, Fig.4.1 presents the plot of the average acquirer cumulative abnormal 
return (CAAR) for the bidding firms in the event window (t=−30, +30).  We find that during 
the event window, the CAAR starts to decline, and hit the trough in around day -12.  This is 
then followed by a picking up until day +5, and a decline between day +5 and +30. It is 
astounding that the most sizeable CAAR increase occurs around the announcement day 
between day -5 and +5. 
[Insert Fig. 4.1] 
For comparison, Fig. 4.2 reveals the CAAR for the bidding firms in the event window 
(t=−30, +30) by different methods of payment. Specifically, Panel A, B and C report the 
average acquirer cumulative abnormal returns for all stock deals, mixed deals and all cash 
deals, respectively. Panel A of Fig. 4.2 show postive price reactions for the stock acquisiton 
annoncement. There is a significant increase between days -5 and +5. The CAAR is relatively 
flat prior to and following this period. Panle B also show postive price reactions for the 
acquisiton annoncements with the mixed payments. However, we find that the CAAR starts 
falling after day +2 in Panel B. Furthermore, these postive reations for the annoncement with 
the mixed payments are much smaller (0 - 1.25%), compred with those of the stock deals (0 -
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23%). For the cash acquisitons in Panel C, the CAAR is alomost negative and less than those 
of acquisiton annoncement with stock and mixed payments. Over the event window, the 
CAAR starts to drift down to around -0.75% in day -12, and then reserve the direction until 
day +2. Thereafter, during the post announcement period between days +2 and +30 , the 
CAAR decreases considerably . 
[Insert Fig. 4.2] 
Combined, the results in Fig. 4.1 and 4.2 suggest that infoarmtion about M&As starts 
to leak to the market before the offictial annoucment (in around day -10). In addition, the 
lowest CAAR is associated with cash payments, while the market reaction is the most positive 
for stock announcements. Interestingly, although we observe an increase in stock prices 
(t=−12, +2), when cash acquisitions are announced, the CAAR for cash payments is almost 
negative over the event window (t=−30, +30), except for the period around the announcement 
(t=-2, +2), which is entirely consistent with our Hypothesis IV, according to which cash-
acquiring firms are more like to suffer from lower opportunity costs of cash.
169
   
 
4.4.4.1.2. Cross-sectional regression analysis of bidders’ CARs  
We next re-investigate the relationship between methods of payment and bidder abnormal 
returns using a multivariate OLS regression analysis with robust standard errors (the 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance). Following Faccio & Masulis (2005), Golubov 
et al. (2012) and Black et al. (2013), our baseline regression model is: 
                                                          
    
169
 The fact that the positive price reaction around the M&A announcement day even for cash acquisitions is 
also consistent with the finding that we find positive CAR3 and CAR5 for cash bidders. 
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where the independent variables are bidder, target and deal specific factors, which include the 
payment dummy (Payment_cash), changes in cash holdings (ΔCash), cash holdings (Cash), 
Tobin’s Q (Q), cash flow (CF), market leverage (Leverage), firm size (Size), collateral 
(Collateral), the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder (Blockholders), 
stock performance prior the announcement (Runup_stock), risk prior the announcement 
(Sigma_stock), market performance (Runup_marke), an indicator of CEO sharehoding 
(Shareholding_CEO), a state ownership dummy (SOEs), an indicator of experienced bidder 
(Experienced), indicators of targets’ listing status (Public_deals), the  relative size of the deal 
(Size_ratio), an indicator of acquisition attitude (Unfriendly), an indicator of whether the 
bidder’s and target’s industries coincide (Diversifying), and an indicator of deal completion 
(Completed).
170
 In all specifications, we also incorporate year (∑Year) and industry fixed 
effects (∑Industry).171  
                                                          
    
170
 See Appendix 4.1 for the details on the variable definition. 
    
171
 We do not include province dummies in Eq. (4.3) because some of the dummies take on the value 1 for all 
observations in a cluster, and 0 otherwise (a singleton indicator). This causes singular outer-product-of-gradients 
(OPG) variance matrices in computing the robust standard errors, which therefore makes it impossible to 
compute an overall model F-statistic. When we use a standard OLS setting instead of the robust setting to 
estimate Eq. (4.3), this problem does not arise, and province dummies can be included. These results, which 
were very similar to those reported in Table 4.8 are not reported, but are available upon request.  
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Table 4.8 presents the results of this analysis, which is based on the Heckman two-
stage procedure to control for the self-selection bias. Specifically, as in section 4.4.3.1, we 
calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio for each observation based on a selection (Probit) model 
(Eq. (4.1)) for the probability of making a bid. We then include the inverse Mill’s ratios in the 
OLS regressions of the bidders’ CARs (Eq. (4.3)) to correct for a potential self-selection 
problem in our sample. The dependent variable in the regression is CAR5 in columns 1 and 3 
and CAR3 in column 2 and 4, respectively. As shown in column 1 and 2, after controlling for 
various bidder and deal characteristics, we find that the coefficient on Payment_cash is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, which is in line with our Hypothesis IV 
and with the opportunity cost of cash hypothesis. Keeping other factors constant, the 
magnitude of the coefficient in column 1 suggests that the use of cash payments in 
acquisition is associated with a 1.0% decrease in CAR5.  
[Insert Table 4.8] 
Focusing on the other control variables, we first find a significantly negative 
coefficient on cash flow (CF), which is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen 
1986), according to which firms with large free cash flow are more likely to conduct value-
destroying acquisitions. Second, the stock price run-up (Runup_stock) also has a negative 
effect on abnormal returns. Rosen (2006) and Golubov et al.  (2012) obtain a similar result. 
The negative coefficient on Runup_stock may be due to hubris: recent success may lead to 
incorrect business decision making, as managers affected by hubris may think they have 
better information about the target value than the market, and believe that the deal can create 
value in the long run. Therefore, these managers may tend to offer excessively high 
premiums for the targets. The market may perceive this situation, which may cause a reverse 
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reaction to the premerger performance.
172
 Third, the coefficients on the dummy variables 
(SOEs and Experienced) are significantly negative, which suggests that state-owned firms 
and firms that make many acquisitions are more likely to undertake low-benefit M&A deals. 
The former can be explained considering that even though acquiring firms from the state 
sector might enjoy favorable financial and political support due to government intervention 
(Zhou et al. 2012), the non-economic motivation (e.g. tunneling) may lead to the 
misallocation of firms’ resources. In other words, non-market mechanisms of the acquisitions 
conducted by SOEs may have limited influence on the synergy achievement.  The latter can 
be explained by the fact that hubris and over-confidence developed from past acquisitions 
may lead to value-losing deals, which is consistent with Billett & Qian (2008) and Black et 
al. (2013).  Fourth, the announcement returns increase in the relative size of the deal, which is 
consistent with findings reported for Chinese listed firms by Zhou et al. (2012) and Black et 
al. (2013), and for US firms by Asquith et al. (1983) and Moeller (2004). This may be 
explained considering that a larger relative size of the deal can have a greater effect on the 
bidder as the larger the relative deal size, the more significant the addition to the bidder will 
be (Asquith et al. 1983).
173
 Fifth, the indicator of deal completion (Completed) has a positive 
and significant effect on the bidder’s returns. This can be explained considering that the 
completion of the deal may intensify the positive market reactions to the merger 
announcement. Moreover, successful bidders may have more capable management or may 
operate in a less regulatory and competitive environment compared with unsuccessful ones. 
                                                          
    
172
 Alternatively the negative coefficient on Runup_stock can be explained by the market-timing theory, 
according to which acquiring firms may take advantage of the temporary overvalued stocks to make acquisitions, 
which induces stock payments (Shleifer & Vishny 2003; Rhodes‐Kropf & Viswanathan 2004). However, we 
can circumvent this explanation considering that, in Section 4.4.3.1, we did not find that acquiring firms with 
Runup_stock are more likely to use stock as payment in acquisitions. 
    
173
 For example, assume that there are two potential takeover targets for which the rates of net present values 
accruing to the bidding firm are the same (e.g. 15% of the target firm’s equity value). If the size of one target is 
twenty times that of the other, one should observe that the abnormal return, which is produced by acquiring the 
larger deal is 20 times that produced by acquiring the smaller deal. 
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Hence, the market may predict successful deals by giving higher positive returns upon 
announcement.
174
 
In addition, we find that the announcement returns (CAR3 and CAR5) are significantly 
positively associated with changes in cash holdings (ΔCash). For instance, the point estimate 
(0.051) in column 1 indicates that the elasticity of CAR5 with respect to a change in cash 
holdings, evaluated at sample means is 0.028.
175
 One way to interpret this result is that a 10 
% increase in ΔCash leads to a 0.28% rise in CAR5.  
In columns 3 and 4, we introduce the change in cash interacted with the level of cash 
(ΔCash*Cash). The motivation for including this interaction term is to estimate the effect of 
changes in the value of cash for different levels of cash. If the opportunity cost of cash theory 
holds, we should observe that the interaction term (ΔCash*Cash) has a negative effect on 
bidder returns: as firms’ cash levels improve, their marginal value of cash should decrease 
significantly. The coefficient estimates on the interaction term are -0.401 and -0.360 for 
CAR5 and CAR3, respectively, and are generally statistically significant at least at the 10% 
level. To give some economic intuition to these coefficients, a change in the level of cash of 
0.120 (i.e. a shift from the first to the third quartile of the cash distribution) corresponds to a 
drop of 4.8% (0.120 *-0.401) in CAR5/ΔCash, and a drop of 4.3% (0.120 *-0.360) in 
                                                          
    
174
 By using a natural experiment of comparing abnormal returns between unsuccessful and successful stock 
bidders, Savor and Lu (2014) find that successful stock bidders significantly outperform unsuccessful ones. This 
finding supports the market-timing theory. The authors find that successful stock-financed mergers benefit long-
term shareholders. In contrast, unsuccessful stock-financed mergers continue performing poorly even after the 
announcements of bid termination, particularly for richly priced stock bidders. The difference of abnormal 
returns between unsuccessful and successful stock bidders captures the market-timing benefits between the 
market and fundamental value of their equity. However, most of our evidence in this chapter does not support 
the market-timing theory.  
    
175
 The elasticity of the change of cash holdings is defined as the ratio of the cumulative abnormal returns 
CAR5 for a relative change in ΔCash. Considering that the mean of CAR5 is 0.0146 and the mean of ΔCash is 0. 
008, this elasticity is given by 0.028=0.051* 0.008/(0.0146). 
Chapter 4                               Corporate liquidity and acquisitions: The China experience                            
249 
 
CAR3/ΔCash. In other words, the magnitude of the coefficient suggests that, ceteris paribus, 
a bidder with cash level at the first quartile of the distribution of our sample (0.073) is around 
1.6 times (0.193/0.073-1) better in terms of marginal announcement returns of cash, than a 
firm with cash level at the third quartile of the distribution (0.193). This finding is consistent 
with the opportunity cost of cash hypothesis, according to which bidders with more cash 
reserves on hand are more likely to face lower opportunity costs of cash. They may invest 
their large cash reserves on negative net present value (NPV) projects or acquisitions due to 
other interests, and for this reason, every additional RMB of cash they hold on hand has a 
lower value. Therefore, for acquirers who are holding higher levels of cash, the market tends 
to react less positively to a further increase in their liquid assets, compared to those with less 
cash reserves. 
It is noteworthy that the coefficients associated with our control variables are 
consistently signed across specifications. The inverse Mills ratios are insignificant in all 
regressions, suggesting that basically unobservable characteristics in the choice of engaging 
in acquisition activities are unrelated to bidders’ announcement returns. Hence, we can 
conclude that there is no effect of self-selection bias. Additionally, the regressions’ Adjusted 
R
2
 indicates that around 10% of the variance in measured data can be explained by the model. 
In summary, we can conclude that, the results regarding abnormal announcement 
returns support our Hypothesis IV, according to which stock bidders experience more 
positive reactions than cash bidders. 
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4.4.4.2. Long-run analysis  
4.4.4.2.1. The time record of annual operating performance 
In last section, we found that cash-financed mergers have lower abnormal announcement 
returns than stock-financed mergers, suggesting that the market anticipates weaker future 
performance for the former. In order to provide greater insights into the relationship between 
a firm’s participation in acquisitions and long-run performance, Table 4.9 presents the change 
in operating performance for bidders characterized by different methods of payment. First, 
following Healy et al. (1992), Harford (1999) and Linn & Switzer (2001), we use the return-
on-assets (ROA) and cash flow performance (CF) to measure firms’ operating 
performance
176
. According to Barber & Lyon (1996), in order to assess operating 
performance of corporations following major events or decisions, it is important to design a 
test which controls for firms with similar pre-merger performance.
177
 To this end, first, in 
Panels A and B of Table 4.9, following Heron & Lie (2002), we analyze firms’ operating 
performance relative to the median performance of firms in the same industry. Specifically, 
industry-adjusted operating performance (industry-adjusted ROA, and industry-adjusted CF) 
are constructed as the difference between a firm’s operating performance (CF or ROA) and 
that of the median firm in the same industry in a given year. Second, in the spirit of  Rau & 
Vermaelen (1998) and Harford (1999), in Panels C and D, we match sample firms to control 
                                                          
    
176
 Cash flow performance (CF) is defined as the ratio of the sum of net profit and depreciation to total assets. 
    
177
 Barber & Lyon (1996) find that in an event study of operating performance, a test statistics is consistent 
and well specified only when sample firms are matched to appropriate benchmarks to control for abnormal firm 
performance prior to the event. The inferences based on the levels of performance over time are more likely to 
be misspecified. For instance, if an industry has experienced abnormal growth in CF during a certain time 
period, it is highly likely that the sample firms in this industry experience a similar growth in CF. Assume that a 
firm in this industry engages in an acquisition during the period, if we calculate the change of the firm’s real 
performance due to the merger event without an appropriate benchmark (e.g. an industry benchmark), this firm 
would appear to have an inflated change of operating performance.  
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for size and cash levels. Specifically, performance-adjusted operating performance 
(performance-adjusted ROA, and performance-adjusted CF) is constructed by subtracting the 
median performance of the firms in the same portfolio from the firm’s operating 
performance.
178
 These performance-matched methods allow us to make a direct comparison 
between the operating performance of firms with similar pre-event performance that engage 
in acquisitions and those that do not. It therefore helps us to provide better inference about 
how merger deals impact bidders’ operating performance. 
In Panels A to D of Table 4.9, we report mean and median values of adjusted-ROA 
and adjusted-CF from year -2 to year +2 relative to the year of the acquisition announcement. 
The results show that for the total sample, after taking into account both industry effects or 
after controlling for firms’ size and cash levels, Chinese bidders generally experience a 
positive improvement before they tend to take over other firms (i.e. from year -2 to year -1). 
Regardless of whether we use adjusted-CF or adjusted-ROA, this is then followed by 
underperformance in the post-acquisition period from year +1 to year +2. Furthermore, we 
find that the mean and median changes from year -1 to year +2 in adjusted operating 
performance are negative (-0.004 to -0.005 for adjusted-ROA and -0.001 to -0.003 for 
adjusted-CF). P-values associated with tests for both the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test show that these mean and median changes from year -1 to year +2 are statistically 
significant, with the exception of the mean changes in adjusted-ROA (t-statistics, 0.12 and 
0.17). 
 [Insert Table 4.9] 
                                                          
    
178
 Following Fama & French (1993), in each year, we partition firms into 25 portfolios on the basis of size 
(total assets) interacted with the cash ratio to control for abnormal firm characteristics prior to the event.  
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To check whether operating performance can be affected by methods of payment, we 
break the bidders down into three subsamples: Stock only, Mixed Payment, and Cash only. 
We find that the pre-acquisition operating performance is higher for bidders in cash-financed 
deals compared with those in stock-financed deals, regardless of whether we use adjusted-
ROA or adjusted-CF. However, cash acquisitions underperform stock ones in the post-
acquisition periods. It is interesting to note that only cash-financed deals show an increasing 
pre-acquisition performance, followed by a decreasing post-acquisition performance. This 
might be due the fact that cash deals constitute the majority of the whole sample. Both the t-
test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test significantly reject the null hypothesis that the mean and 
median differences in adjusted performance before and after acquisitions (from year -1 to 
year +2) equal zero at the 1% level. These findings can be interpreted in the light of the 
opportunity cost of cash hypothesis, according to which, due to a lack of investment 
opportunities, cash bidders with better operating performance prior to the takeover face lower 
opportunity costs of cash holdings and tend to use M&As as one way of spending excess 
cash. 
On the contrary, we find that there is an increasing adjusted performance from year -1 
to year +2 for stock-financed deals. This suggests that stock acquisition may improve 
bidders’ operating performance, which is consistent with the previous finding that stock offer 
generates higher announcement returns. These findings are consistent with the conclusion 
drawn from (Boateng & Bi 2010), who focusing on Chinese listed firms, find that cash-
financed acquirers perform better prior to the acquisitions, but experience worse post-
acquisition performance, while stock-financed acquirers have negative pre-acquisition 
performance, followed by significant positive post-acquisition abnormal returns.   
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Put together, acquisitions in China generally tend to underperform in the long run.
179
 
Particularly, for cash-acquiring firms, good performance prior to the bid allows them to 
accumulate substantial cash, which may benefit firm liquidity conditions and management 
discretion. Given the lower costs of cash holdings, the managers may then execute low-return 
mergers for their private interests. From this point of view, cash-financed acquiring firms are 
more likely to experience good performance before the mergers. However, their performance 
decreases on average after mergers. This finding confirms the underperformance of cash 
deals compared with stock deals in terms of abnormal announcement returns.  
4.4.4.2.2. Regression of industry-adjusted operating performance before and after the merger 
To confirm our previous finding of a performance drop after cash acquisition, we follow 
Harford (1999) and use OLS regressions to see if there is a change in operating performance 
of acquiring firms after mergers for deals financed in different ways.  Our baseline regression 
model is as follows: 
                                                                           
The dependent variable is the post-merger-operating performance of the bidder in 
year +1 (or from year +1 to year +2). Independent variables are the pre-merger-operating 
performance of the bidder in year -1 (or from year -2 to year -1). As in the previous section, 
we measure operating performance using industry-adjusted return-on-assets (industry-
                                                          
    
179
 The long-term under-performance of cash acquisitions is in contrast to the asymmetric information 
explanations proposed by most US and UK studies, according to which stock payments are preferred by 
overvalued bidders when purchasing target firms characterized by relative undervaluation. Stock payments are 
widely interpreted as a negative signal and tend to shift part of the (possible negative) future returns to the new 
shareholders. In contrast, when bidders have favorable private information about high value for the target 
(potential synergies), they would use cash to preempt potential competing bidders. Cash payments signal 
positive information. Hence, on average, stock-financed mergers will underperform cash-financed ones in the 
long-run. (Fishman 1989; Loughran & Anand 1997; Linn & Switzer 2001; Abhyankar et al. 2005).  
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adjusted ROA) and industry-adjusted cash flow (industry-adjusted CF). The results are 
reported respectively in panels A and B of Table 4.10. We then use performance-adjusted 
return-on-assets (performance-adjusted ROA) and performance-adjusted cash flow 
(performance-adjusted CF), and report the results respectively in panels C and D. The 
coefficient b1 captures the continuation of pre-merger operating performance for bidding 
firms. The coefficient b0 captures any improvement of abnormal operating performance from 
the pre- to post- merger period. The results in Table 4.10 show that for all of bidders, the b0 
coefficients in the regressions of both adjusted-ROA and adjusted-CF are significantly 
negative at the 1% level. Furthermore, when the regression is performed separately based on 
the methods of payment, we observe that the coefficients b0 are no longer significantly 
negative for stock-financed deals, but still negative and significant for the cash-financed 
deals.  
[Insert Table 4.10] 
These findings suggest that cash financed M&A deals tend to underperform in terms 
of operating performance from the pre- to the post-merger period. This is consistent with the 
opportunity cost of cash hypothesis, according to which bidders using cash as a method of 
payment face lower opportunity costs of cash. Therefore, they are likely to spend their cash 
on value-decreasing deals.  
Overall, the tests in this section support our Hypothesis VI, according to which cash-
financed acquires perform significantly worse than stock-financed acquirers. They also tell a 
consistent story that firms with more financial flexibility and lower investment opportunities 
are more likely to consider cash payments in acquisition and subsequently have worse 
performance in terms of announcement returns and long-run operating performance.   
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4.5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the nature of M&As in China during the period 1998-2011, 
focusing on the role of corporate liquidity. We develop a set of hypotheses to empirically test 
the links between firms’ financial conditions and their acquisition behavior, as well as the 
performance following mergers. First, consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen 
1986), we find that cash-rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions than their cash-
poor counterparts. Acquisitions can therefore be seen as one way by which firms spend 
excess cash instead of paying it out to shareholders. Further, we find  evidence that high Q 
firms with greater operating performance (ROA) are less likely to attempt acquisitions, 
implying that good-operating firms with higher growth opportunities do not rely on external 
investment like M&As to spend their excess cash. 
Second, we find that greater excess cash reserves may lead firms that are subject to 
tunneling to engage in takeover activities, suggesting that Chinese firms are likely to use 
M&As as a channel to expropriate cash through tunneling. In other words, tunneling is likely 
to amplify free-cash-flow-driven takeovers. 
Third, after controlling for all other determinants of the method of payment, we find 
that firms with greater growth opportunities, reflected by higher stock valuation (Tobin’s Q), 
are less likely to use cash as a method of payment. This effect manifests itself mainly for 
constrained firms and depends on the level of financial constraints that the firm faces. This 
finding is in line the opportunity cost of cash hypothesis (Alshwer et al. 2011), according to 
which cash comes at a cost for constrained bidders, especially those with valuable growth 
opportunities. Hence, these bidders are reluctant to use cash to finance acquisitions.   
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Finally, we find that cash acquisitions underperform stock acquisitions, since the 
former are more likely to be value-destroying, due to lower opportunity costs of cash 
holdings. Specifically, we find that cash acquisitions generate worse announcement abnormal 
returns compared with stock acquisitions. Under-performance of cash acquisition also comes 
along with a significant post-merger drop in operating performance. 
Our study is in line with the free-cash-flow motive of acquisitions, especially for 
those firms subject to tunneling. Given the relatively high financial capacity which 
characterizes some Chinese firms due to their high growth rates and ability to generate large 
amounts of internal funds (Guariglia et al. 2011), it is essential for these cash-rich firms to 
find more efficient and sensible ways to use their liquid assets to pursue expansion 
opportunities. To maximize shareholders’ value, synergy should play a more important role 
in M&A decision-making. The ongoing reform should reduce the agency costs associated 
with acquisitions, improve corporate transparency in M&A transactions, and protect the 
interests of minority shareholders by increasing the intensity of monitoring by other 
blockholders or independent institutions, aligning the interests between managers and 
investors, and disclosing connected transactions (e.g. tunneling). 
We also find that the lower opportunity costs of cash can drive Chinese acquiring 
firms to make cash-financed acquisitions, which leads to under-performance. Given that cash 
is an important resource for firms operating in imperfect capital markets, a cautious approach 
on how to use cash more efficiently should be promoted. A thorough evaluation of 
investment projects, as well as a sophisticated regulation and supervision of corporate profit 
distribution, and a more market-oriented allocation of resources would therefore benefit the 
economy. 
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Appendix 4.1. Definitions of the variables used  
 
Blockholders 
 
 CAR3, CAR5:  
cumulative abnormal 
returns: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cash 
 
Cash flow 
 
Collateral 
Completed 
 
DIF_Blockholders 
 
 
Diversifying 
 
 
 
Employee 
KZ index 
 
 
 
 
Percentage of shares controlled by the largest 
shareholder. 
CAR3 and CAR5 are the cumulative abnormal returns in 
the 3-day (-1,+1) and 5-day (-2,+2) event windows, 
respectively, where 0 is the announcement. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the 
market model with the market model parameters 
estimated over the period beginning 240 days and 
ending 41 days prior to the deal announcement for 
different day event windows around the 
announcement (day 0).  
Ratio of the sum cash and cash equivalents to total 
assets. 
Ratio of the sum of net profit and depreciation to total 
assets 
Ratio of tangible assets to total assets.  
Dummy variable equal to one if the transactions were 
completed, and zero otherwise.  
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s blockholder’s 
controlling ownership exceeds its cash-flow 
ownership in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable equal to one if the bidder is not in the 
same industry as the target as measured using the 
bidder’s and the target’s first 2-digits of primary SIC 
code, and zero otherwise.   
Number of employees. 
Following Lamont et al. (2001), the Kaplan and 
Zingales (KZ) index of constraints is a linear function 
of five variables. Specifically:        
    KZt=-1.002*CFt/Kt-1+0.283*Qt+3.139*Debtt/TKt-
39.368*(DIVt/Kt-1) -1.315*Casht/Kt-1  
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Leverage 
 
Market value of assets 
 
Method of payment: 
Cash Only,  
Mixed PYMT, 
Payment_cash,  
Stock Only 
 
 
 
NWC 
 
OREC 
Payout 
 
Public_deals 
 
PE  
(price-to-earnings ratio) 
Runup_stock 
 
 
Runup_market 
 
 
 
    where CFt is cash flow (net income + depreciation); 
Qt is Tobin’s Q; Debtt is the sum of short-term and 
long-term debt; DIVt is dividends; Casht is cash and 
cash equivalents; Kt is capital; TKt is total capital (sum 
of debt and equity). 
Ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debt to 
total assets. 
Sum of market value of tradable stocks, book value of 
non-tradable stocks, and market value of net debt. 
Cash Only: dummy variable equal to one if the payment 
is pure cash, and zero otherwise. Mixed PYMT: 
dummy variable equal to one if the payment is neither 
all-cash nor all stock, and zero otherwise. 
Payment_cash: dummy variable equal to one if the 
payment is mainly cash (>50%), and zero otherwise. 
Stock Only: dummy variable equal to one if the 
payment is pure stock, and zero otherwise. 
Ratio of net working capital (working capital minus 
cash holdings) to total assets. 
Ratio of other receivables to total assets. 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm the firm pays 
dividends in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable equal to one if the target is a listed 
firm, and zero otherwise. 
Ratio of market value per share to earnings per share. 
 
Cumulative daily stock price returns of the bidder over 
the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior 
to the announcement date. 
Cumulative daily Shanghai and Shenzhen value-
weighted stock returns over the period beginning 205 
days and ending 6 days prior to the deal 
announcement 
Chapter 4                               Corporate liquidity and acquisitions: The China experience                            
259 
 
Return on assets (ROA) 
Sigma_stock 
 
 
Sales growth 
Size 
Size_ratio 
 
Shareholding_CEO 
 
 
SOEs 
 
Unfriendly 
 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Var_CF 
 
WW index 
Ratio of net income to total assets. 
Standard deviation of the bidding firm’s daily returns 
over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days 
prior to the announcement date. 
Rate of growth of real sales. 
Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Ratio of transaction value divided by the bidder’s 
market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s top 
executives (including the CEO) are holding shares in 
their own company, and zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is state-owned 
in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable equal to one if the deal is not defined 
as friendly by Thomson Financial SDC, and zero 
otherwise.  
Ratio of market value of assets to book value of total 
assets.
180
 
Mean of the standard deviations of cash flow over total 
assets for firms in the same industry. 
Derived from Whited and Wu (2006), the WW index is a 
linear function based on six financial variables. 
Specifically:  
WWt=-0.091*CFt/BAt-1-
0.062*Payoutt+0.021*TLTDt/CAt-1-0.044*LNBAt-
0.035*SGRt+0.102*ISGt where CFt is cash flow (net 
income + depreciation) BAt is book assets]; Payoutt is a 
dummy indicating positive dividends); TLTDt is long-
term debt; CAt is total current assets; Qt is Tobin’s Q; 
                                                          
180
 The shares of listed firms in China can be either tradable or non-tradable. Following the literature (Chen et al. 
2011; Huang et al. 2011), we calculate Tobin’s Q as the sum of the market value of tradable stocks, the book 
value of non-tradable stocks, and the market value of net debt, divided by the book value of total assets. The 
results were similar when tradable stock price is used to calculate as the market value of non-tradable stocks. 
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LNBAt is the natural log of the book value of assets; 
SGRt is firm real sales growth; ISGt is industry sales 
growth.  
All variables (with the exception of dummy variables) are deflated using a GDP deflator, 
which is obtained from National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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Appendix 4.2. Measure of excess cash 
 
Excess cash is used to assess whether there is a relationship between cash-richness and 
acquisition decisions. Following Opler et al. (1999), excess cash is computed by subtracting 
the optimal level of cash holdings from cash and cash equivalents (Cash). Specifically, in the 
OPSW model, cash holdings are assumed to be a function of Tobin’s Q (defined as the firm’s 
market-to-book ratio); Firm size (defined as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets); 
Cash flow (defined as the ratio of the sum of net profit and depreciation to total assets); NWC 
(defined as the ratio of net working capital to total assets); CAPEX (defined as the ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets); Leverage (defined as the ratio of its short-term and long-
term debt to total assets); Div_Dum (a dividend payout dummy set to one if the firm pays 
dividends, and 0 otherwise); Var_CF (the mean of the standard deviations of cash flow over 
total assets for firms in the same industry). As ownership is likely to be important in the 
Chinese context, we also include a dummy variable for state ownership, namely SOEs, which 
is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the firm is state owned in a given year, and 0 
otherwise.
181
 
For firm i in year t, the model of cash holdings is therefore given by the following equation: 
       
     ∑                                                         
                                                                      ∑     
                     ∑                                                                                                                     
Xk,it  is the vector of the explanatory variables that affect the costs and benefits of cash 
holdings. Eq. (4.5) also incorporates time dummies (∑Year), and provincial dummies 
(∑province), which account for year and regional fixed effects associated with firms’ cash 
holdings.
182
  
The regression is estimated using the fixed effects estimator, which accounts for 
unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.
183
 The fitted values of Eq. (4.1) can be interpreted as 
                                                          
    
181
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less likely to face financial constraints. Therefore, according to the 
precautionary motive, one should expect SOEs to hold less cash than their non-state-owned counterparts. 
    
182
 It should be noted that because of collinearity, industry dummies (∑Industries) cannot be included in the 
equations when the fixed-effects estimator is used. 
    
183
 We also estimate Eq. (4.5) cross-sectionally in each year during the sample period. This allows the 
determinants of cash holdings to vary from year to year. The results remain substantially the same.  
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a proxy for the optimal level of cash holdings. We measure excess cash (Xcash) as the 
difference between the actual values of cash holdings and the fitted values derived from Eq. 
(4.5). 
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Table 4.1 
Distribution of the number of M&A deals in China by year 
Year Non-Bidders Bidders 
Stock 
Only 
Mixed 
PYMT 
Cash 
Only Completed 
Total 
No. 
Bidder 
Perc. 
1998 697 8 0 5 3 6 705 1.13% 
1999 793 20 0 13 7 6 813 2.46% 
2000 894 17 0 9 8 11 911 1.87% 
2001 1,021 17 0 9 8 7 1,038 1.64% 
2002 1,030 76 2 48 26 36 1,106 6.87% 
2003 1,000 146 0 66 80 66 1,146 12.74% 
2004 991 198 0 71 127 57 1,189 16.65% 
2005 1,154 138 0 50 88 41 1,292 10.68% 
2006 1,135 135 4 48 83 39 1,270 10.63% 
2007 1,085 221 11 51 159 63 1,306 16.92% 
2008 1,108 264 21 72 171 78 1,372 19.24% 
2009 1,160 247 31 59 157 89 1,407 17.56% 
2010 1,071 277 26 92 159 59 1,348 20.55% 
2011 1,116 269 20 76 173 57 1,385 19.42% 
Total 14,255 2,033 115 669 1,249 615 16,288 12.48% 
Notes: This table reports the time-series distribution of the number of observations. Bidders represents the firms 
who were announcing a bid in a given year. Non-Bidders represents the firms who were not announcing a bid in 
a given year. Stock Only includes deals that were financed only by stock. Cash Only includes deals that were 
financed only by cash. Mixed PYMT consists of those deals whose payments were not solely completely through 
stock or cash. Completed represents the deals whose transactions were completed. Total No. represents the total 
number of observations in a given year. 
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Table 4.2 
Summary statistics 
 
Non-Bidders Bidders All 
Diff. 
Mean 
Diff. 
Medium 
 
mean median mean median mean median 
Size 20.391 20.301 20.864 20.808 20.459 20.365 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Employee 3496 1709 6226 1996 3904 1732 0.00*** 0.00*** 
ROA 0.021 0.032 0.029 0.031 0.022 0.032 0.00*** 0.00*** 
sales growth 0.178 0.092 0.244 0.135 0.187 0.098 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Return 0.329 0.014 0.522 0.069 0.356 0.021 0.00*** 0.00*** 
CAPEX 0.057 0.037 0.061 0.045 0.058 0.038 0.00*** 0.00*** 
PE 92.43 40.07 80.02 36.39 90.64 39.56 0.00*** 0.00*** 
CF 0.046 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.047 0.054 0.00*** 0.52 
Var_CF 0.538 0.084 0.608 0.084 0.548 0.084 0.05** 0.32 
Tobin 1.751 1.404 1.746 1.328 1.75 1.394 0.86 0.00*** 
Collateral 0.304 0.279 0.300 0.267 0.303 0.277 0.30 0.10* 
leverage 0.231 0.217 0.244 0.239 0.233 0.220 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Cash 0.147 0.121 0.146 0.125 0.146 0.121 0.77 0.05** 
ΔCash 0.004 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.07* 0.02** 
NWC -0.058 -0.034 -0.083 -0.078 -0.062 -0.041 0.00*** 0.00*** 
KZ -1.984 -0.099 -2.73 -0.082 -2.096 -0.096 0.00*** 0.57 
WW -0.927 -0.927 -0.953 -0.955 -0.931 -0.931 0.00*** 0.00*** 
OREC 0.066 0.026 0.045 0.019 0.063 0.025 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Blockholders 0.400 0.382 0.376 0.361 0.397 0.378 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Payout 48.80% 
 
54.50% 
 
49.60% 
 
0.00*** 
 Shareholding_CEO 33.90% 
 
26.00% 
 
32.80% 
 
0.00*** 
 DIF_Blockholders 46.80% 
 
51.40% 
 
47.70% 
 
0.00*** 
 SOEs 71.10% 
 
64.70% 
 
70.20% 
 
0.00*** 
 Notes: Firms that are flagged as bidders (non-bidders) are those who were (not) announcing a bid in a given year. 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Employee is the number of employees. ROA is return on assets. Sales 
growth is the annual rate of growth of real sales. Return is the annual stock returns. CAPEX is defined as the ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets. PE is the price-to-earnings ratio. CF is the ratio of the sum of net profit and 
depreciation to total assets. Var_CF is the mean of the standard deviations of the cash flow over total assets for firms 
in a given industry. Tobin (Q) is the market-to-book ratio. Collateral is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets. Cash (Cash-to-assets ratios) is the ratio 
of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. ΔCash is the ratio of the annual change in Cash to total 
assets. NWC is the ratio of net working capital (working capital minus cash holdings) to total assets. KZ and WW 
represent  firm-specific levels of financial constraints: the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index of constraints (Lamont et 
al. 2001) and the Whited and Wu (WW) index of constraints (Whited & Wu 2006). OREC is the ratio of other 
receivables scaled by total assets. Blockholders is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder. 
Payout is a dummy variable that take the value of one if the firm is paying dividends in a given year, and 0 
otherwise. Shareholding_CEO is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s CEO is holding shares in 
his/her own company, and 0 otherwise. DIF_Blockholders is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
firm’s blockholder’s cash-flow ownership is lower than the controlling ownership in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
SOEs is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the firm is state-owned in a given year, and 0 otherwise. For 
the last four dummy variables (Payout, Shareholding_CEO, DIF_Blockholders, SOEs) we present the percentage of 
firms that take value of one in the sample. All variables (with the exception of the dummies) are deflated using a 
GDP deflator. Diff. Mean and Diff. Medium are the p-values associated with the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test for equality of means and equality of medians of corresponding variables between bidders and non-bidders. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.3 
Predicting bidders using a Probit model 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Xcash 0.596*** 0.596*** 0.568*** 0.561*** 0.580***   
 
(2.86) (2.86) (2.74) (2.71) (2.78)   
Xcash*Tunneling      1.390*** 0.631* 
      (3.46) (1.75) 
Xcash*(1-Tunneling)      0.268 0.074 
      (1.08) (0.20) 
Return 0.070*** 0.071** 
  
0.067*** 0.066*** 0.061** 
 
(3.62) (2.30) 
  
(3.45) (3.41) (2.55) 
Tobin 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.021 0.011 0.011 0.010 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.50) (1.13) (0.57) (0.56) (0.41) 
Return*Tobin  -0.000      
  (-0.05)      
ROA   0.453** 1.393*** 1.239*** 1.247*** 0.943** 
   (2.07) (4.05) (3.58) (3.60) (2.32) 
ROA*Tobin    -0.375*** -0.361*** -0.365*** -0.216 
    (-3.64) (-3.49) (-3.53) (-1.62) 
Sales growth -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.019 -0.020 -0.014 
 
(-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.24) (-0.42) (-0.76) (-0.80) (-0.46) 
NWC 0.098 0.099 0.038 0.063 0.098 0.094 0.105 
 
(1.18) (1.19) (0.47) (0.76) (1.15) (1.10) (1.04) 
Leverage 0.098 0.098 0.132 0.155 0.167 0.155 0.217 
 
(0.84) (0.84) (1.11) (1.30) (1.39) (1.29) (1.51) 
PE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.82) 
Size 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.189*** 0.191*** 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.184*** 
 
(10.60) (10.59) (9.96) (10.05) (10.21) (10.14) (8.19) 
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Shareholding_CEO -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.130*** -0.132*** -0.129*** -0.130*** -0.127*** 
 
(-3.53) (-3.53) (-3.67) (-3.71) (-3.63) (-3.65) (-2.97) 
Blockholders -0.478*** -0.478*** -0.470*** -0.484*** -0.500*** -0.503*** -0.528*** 
 
(-4.25) (-4.25) (-4.18) (-4.30) (-4.44) (-4.46) (-3.93) 
SOEs -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.139*** -0.137*** -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.195*** 
 
(-3.80) (-3.80) (-3.64) (-3.58) (-3.68) (-3.71) (-4.37) 
N 14,593 14,593 14,629 14,629 14,593 14,593 9,204 
Ρ 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 
chi2 873.68 873.68 862.47 872.41 884.36 889.15 349.30 
Notes: The specifications were estimated using the random-effects panel Probit estimator. The dependent variable in all regressions is equal to one if the firm announces a bid 
in year t+1, and zero otherwise. Xcash is the unexpected (excess) cash holdings predicted by the OPSW model estimated with the fixed effects estimator. Return is the annual 
stock returns. Tobin (Q) is the market-to-book ratio. ROA is return on assets. Sales growth is the annual rate of growth of real sales. NWC is the ratio of net working capital 
(working capital minus cash holdings) to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets. PE is the price-to-earnings ratio. Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Shareholding_CEO is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s CEO is holding shares in his/her own company, and 0 
otherwise. Blockholders is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder. SOEs is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the firm is state-owned in a 
given year, and 0 otherwise. Tunneling is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is more likely to tunnel, and 0 otherwise. In column 6, we consider a firm 
subject to tunneling if its ratio of other receivables scaled by total assets lies in the top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding values of all firms belonging to 
the same industry each year, and 0 otherwise. In column 7, we consider a firm subject to tunneling if its blockholder’s cash-flow ownership is lower than the controlling 
ownership in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Time, industry and province dummies were included in all specifications. ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance 
accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The Z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.4 
Excess cash and tunneling 
Constraints criteria Low-Xcash High-Xcash Diff. Mean Dif. Medum 
OREC     
High_Tunneling 14.7% 19.0% 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Low_Tunneling 15.9% 16.2% 0.65 0.65 
DIF_Blockholders     
High_Tunneling 20.1% 22.4% 0.06* 0.06* 
Low_Tunneling 17.9% 18.3% 0.73 0.73 
Notes: The table presents the average proportion of bidders between high and low Xcash groups. Xcash is the 
unexpected (excess) cash holdings predicted by the OPSW model estimated with the fixed effects estimator. A 
firm is considered to be in the high (low) Xcash group in a given year if its Xcash is above (below) zero. 
High_Tunneling (Low_Tunneling) are dummy variables, equal to 1 if the firm is more (less) likely to tunnel, 
and 0 otherwise. According to the first criterion, we consider a firm subject to tunneling if its ratio of other 
receivables scaled by total assets lies in the top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding values of 
all firms belonging to the same industry each year. The remaining firm-years will be classified as less likely to 
tunnel.  According to the second criterion, we consider a firm subject to tunneling if its blockholder’s cash-
flow ownership is lower than the controlling ownership in a given year. The remaining firm-years will be 
classified as less likely to tunnel. Diff. Mean and Diff. Medium are the p-values associated with the t-test and 
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equality of means and equality of medians of the average proportion of cash 
payment between high and low Xcash groups. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4                                                                                                    Corporate liquidity and acquisitions: The China experience                            
268 
 
Table 4.5 
Determinants of the method of payment taking financial constraints into consideration 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Probit Oprobit Probit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit 
 
    Total Assets 
No. of 
Employees KZ WW 
Dividend 
Paying 
Tobin -0.097** -0.067* -0.094** -0.076* 
     
 
(-2.35) (-1.79) (-2.20) (-1.91) 
     High_FC*Tobin     -0.126*** -0.110** -0.088* -0.128*** -0.099** 
     (-2.84) (-2.44) (-1.96) (-2.69) (-2.21) 
Low_FC*Tobin     -0.028 -0.061 -0.070 -0.043 -0.058 
     (-0.58) (-1.44) (-1.64) (-0.95) (-1.35) 
Cash -0.350 -0.270 -0.391 -0.388 -0.501 -0.380 -0.484 -0.510 -0.446 
 
(-0.88) (-0.73) (-0.94) (-1.02) (-1.30) (-0.98) (-1.25) (-1.30) (-1.16) 
CF 0.955 1.288** 1.002 1.327** 1.011* 1.281** 1.311** 0.902 1.156** 
 
(1.55) (2.47) (1.56) (2.51) (1.86) (2.40) (2.45) (1.59) (2.11) 
Leverage -0.409 -0.284 -0.390 -0.296 -0.384 -0.340 -0.280 -0.351 -0.308 
 
(-1.59) (-1.22) (-1.43) (-1.20) (-1.53) (-1.35) (-1.12) (-1.42) (-1.26) 
Size 0.025 0.055 0.031 0.049 -0.033 0.021 0.038 -0.025 0.022 
 
(0.63) (1.42) (0.29) (0.50) (-0.32) (0.21) (0.39) (-0.24) (0.21) 
Collateral -0.232 -0.216 -0.246 -0.235 -0.188 -0.187 -0.232 -0.190 -0.223 
 
(-0.90) (-0.91) (-0.95) (-0.99) (-0.79) (-0.78) (-0.97) (-0.80) (-0.94) 
Blockholders 0.071 -0.031 0.061 -0.010 0.121 -0.079 -0.045 0.113 0.023 
 
(0.31) (-0.14) (0.18) (-0.03) (0.38) (-0.25) (-0.14) (0.35) (0.07) 
Runup_stock -0.010 -0.001 -0.002 0.011 0.010 0.037 0.012 0.011 0.011 
 
(-0.09) (-0.01) (-0.02) (0.11) (0.10) (0.34) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Sigma_stock -0.569 2.639 0.457 4.783 4.669 5.599 5.304 4.475 5.052 
 (-0.10) (0.41) (0.07) (0.75) (0.73) (0.85) (0.82) (0.70) (0.79) 
Runup_market -0.138 -0.181 -0.121 -0.181 -0.174 -0.203 -0.172 -0.180 -0.180 
 (-0.79) (-1.08) (-0.69) (-1.07) (-1.03) (-1.19) (-1.02) (-1.07) (-1.07) 
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Shareholding_CEO 0.037 0.033 0.030 0.044 0.062 0.029 0.047 0.067 0.052 
 
(0.46) (0.45) (0.29) (0.46) (0.64) (0.30) (0.49) (0.70) (0.54) 
SOEs -0.206*** -0.176** -0.214** -0.179* -0.150 -0.185* -0.177* -0.147 -0.166* 
 
(-2.62) (-2.41) (-2.02) (-1.86) (-1.54) (-1.89) (-1.84) (-1.51) (-1.71) 
Experienced 0.311** 0.308** 0.297** 0.296** 0.313** 0.325** 0.301** 0.301** 0.299** 
 
(2.54) (2.52) (2.44) (2.43) (2.56) (2.54) (2.46) (2.46) (2.45) 
Public_deals -0.745*** -0.645*** -0.735*** -0.636*** -0.630*** -0.625*** -0.626*** -0.637*** -0.637*** 
 
(-3.19) (-3.11) (-3.14) (-3.02) (-2.99) (-2.93) (-2.94) (-3.03) (-3.02) 
Size_ratio -1.545*** -1.364*** -1.509*** -1.429*** -1.422*** -1.460*** -1.494*** -1.411*** -1.425*** 
 
(-3.90) (-7.08) (-3.86) (-6.98) (-7.00) (-6.74) (-6.83) (-6.94) (-6.97) 
Unfriendly 0.244*** 0.229*** 0.242*** 0.226*** 0.229*** 0.243*** 0.223*** 0.227*** 0.226*** 
 
(2.90) (2.88) (2.86) (2.82) (2.85) (3.00) (2.77) (2.83) (2.82) 
Diversifying -0.111 -0.043 -0.106 -0.049 -0.047 -0.058 -0.042 -0.046 -0.047 
 
(-1.60) (-0.63) (-1.53) (-0.72) (-0.70) (-0.85) (-0.62) (-0.68) (-0.70) 
Completed -0.080 -0.100 -0.086 -0.108 -0.105 -0.131* -0.119 -0.105 -0.106 
 
(-1.05) (-1.37) (-1.12) (-1.47) (-1.42) (-1.75) (-1.61) (-1.42) (-1.44) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
  
0.048 -0.026 -0.274 -0.035 -0.054 -0.312 -0.145 
   
(0.08) (-0.05) (-0.48) (-0.06) (-0.10) (-0.54) (-0.25) 
N 1,658 1,659 1,645 1,646 1,646 1,607 1,641 1,646 1,646 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.122 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
chi2 210.66 1487.78 210.94 844.01 857.34 1476.50 1487.22 855.18 847.71 
Notes: The specifications in columns 1 and 3 were estimated using the pooled Probit estimator. The dependent variable is one if the deal was financed only by cash in year 
t+1, and zero otherwise. The rest of the specifications were estimated using the ordered Probit estimator. The dependent variable take a value of 1 for all stock deals, 2 for 
mixed deals, 3 for all cash deals  in year t+1. Tobin (Q) is the market-to-book ratio. Cash is the ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. CF is the ratio of 
the sum of net profit and depreciation to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Collateral is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Blockholders is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder. Runup_stock is the cumulative daily 
stork price returns of the bidder over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the announcement date. Sigma_stock is the standard deviation of bidding 
firms’ daily returns over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the announcement date. Runup_market is the cumulative daily Shanghai and Shenzhen 
value-weighted stock returns over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the deal announcement. Shareholding_CEO is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the firm’s CEO is holding shares in his/her own company, and 0 otherwise. SOEs is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the firm is state-owned in a 
given year, and 0 otherwise.  Experienced is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the bidder had announced at least 3 takeover bids over the five years period prior 
to the deal announcement, and 0 otherwise. Public_deals is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the target is a listed firm, and 0 otherwise.  Size_ratio is the ratio 
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of transaction value divided by the bidder’s market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement. Unfriendly is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the deal is not 
defined as friendly by Thomson Financial SDC, and 0 otherwise. Diversifying is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the bidder was not in the same industry as 
the target as measured using the bidder’s and the target’s first 2-digits of primary SIC code. Completed is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the transactions 
were completed, and 0 otherwise. In columns 5 to 9, we includes an interaction term between Tobin’s Q and the dummy variable, which partition firms into groups with 
relatively high and low levels of financial constraints (High_FC, and Low_FC). Specifically, in columns 5 and 6, we consider a firm to be financially constrained 
(unconstrained) if its size (measured by total assets or number or employees) lies in the bottom three deciles (the top seven deciles) of the distribution of the corresponding 
values of all firms belonging to the same industry each year. In columns 7 and 8, we consider a firm to be financially constrained (unconstrained) if its KZ or WW index falls 
in the top three deciles (the bottom seven deciles) of the distribution of the corresponding values of all firms belonging to the same industry each year. In columns 9, we 
categorize firm-years according to their dividend payout status. In particular, we consider a firm to be financially constrained (unconstrained) if it is not paying (paying) 
dividends in a given year. The Z-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors, which are corrected for clustering. Time, industry and province dummies were 
included in all specifications. Apart from column 1 and 2, we use the Heckman’s two-stage approach by introducing Inverse Mills Ratio into each regression to take account 
of the self-selection bias.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
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Table 4.6 
Choice of the method of payment taking growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q) and financial 
constraints into account 
Constraints criterion Low Q High Q 
Dif. 
Mean 
Dif. 
Medium 
Size (Real assets) 
High_FC 51.6% 46.5% 0.31 0.31 
Low_FC 62.7% 62.7% 0.99 0.99 
     Size (Employees) 
High_FC 59.0% 50.0% 0.03** 0.03** 
Low_FC 62.8% 60.1% 0.26 0.26 
     KZ 
High_FC 56.3% 47.7% 0.02** 0.02** 
Low_FC 64.2% 60.2% 0.08* 0.08* 
     WW 
High_FC 48.6% 45.7% 0.53 0.53 
Low_FC 63.7% 62.9% 0.71 0.71 
     Payout 
High_FC 58.5% 49.5% 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Low_FC 63.8% 63.1% 0.79 0.79 
Notes: The table presents the average proportion of cash payment between high and low Q groups for the 
groups based on different levels of financial constraints. A firm is considered to be in the high (Low) Q group 
in a given year if its Tobin’s Q lies above (below) the median value in the industry to which the firm belongs. 
High_FC, and Low_FC, which are dummy variables, equal to 1 respectively if the firm is more likely to face 
high and low financial constraints relatively to all firms operating in the same industry they belong to in a 
given year, and 0 otherwise. With the first two criteria, we consider a firm to be financially constrained if its 
size (measured by total assets or number or employees) lies in the bottom three deciles of the distribution of the 
corresponding values of all firms belonging to the same industry each year. The remaining firm-years will be 
classified as facing a low level of financial constraints. For the KZ and WW indexes, we consider a firm to be 
financially constrained if its KZ or WW index lies in the top three deciles of the distribution of the 
corresponding variables for all firms belonging to the same industry in a given year. Again, the remaining firm-
years will classified as facing low financial constraints. For the last criterion (Payout), we partition firms 
according to their dividend payout status, which equals 1 if the firm is paying dividends in a given year, and 0 
otherwise. Dif. Mean and Dif. Medium is the p-value associated with the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
for equality of means and equality of medians of the average proportion of cash payment between high and low 
Q groups. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.7 
Cumulative abnormal returns by methods of payment between January 1998 
and December 2011 
  
 
Stock only Mixed PYMT Cash only All Bidders 
Dif. 
Mean 
Dif. 
Medium 
CAR3 8.87%*** 0.94%*** 0.65%*** 1.21%***   
P-Value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.00*** 0.00*** 
N 115 669 1,249 2,033   
CAR5 10.76%*** 1.25%*** 0.62%*** 1.40%***   
P-Value (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 0.00*** 0.00*** 
N 115 669 1,249 2,033   
Notes: Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with parameters estimated over the period beginning 240 days 
and ending 41 days prior to the deal announcement for different day event windows around the announcement (day 0). CAR3 and CAR5 are 
the cumulative abnormal returns in the 3-day (-1, +1) and 5-day (-2, +2) event windows, respectively, where 0 is the announcement. Stock 
Only includes deals that were financed only by stock. Cash Only includes deals that were financed only by cash. Mixed PYMT consists in the 
deals whose payments were not solely completely through stock or cash. Diff. Mean and Diff. Medium are the p-values associated with the t-
test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equality of means and equality of medians of the cumulative abnormal returns between cash and 
stock acquisitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.8 
Short-run cumulative abnormal returns of bidders 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR5 CAR3 CAR5 CAR3 
Payment_cash -0.010** -0.007** -0.010** -0.007** 
 
(-2.29) (-2.06) (-2.25) (-2.01) 
ΔCash 0.051** 0.037* 0.133** 0.103** 
 
(2.01) (1.84) (2.57) (2.51) 
Cash 
  
0.024 0.037* 
   
(0.86) (1.70) 
ΔCash* Cash 
  
-0.401* -0.360** 
   
(-1.96) (-2.05) 
Tobin 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 
 
(1.02) (0.66) (1.12) (0.85) 
CF -0.102** -0.066** -0.114*** -0.077** 
 
(-2.47) (-2.19) (-2.76) (-2.57) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 
(-0.09) (-0.04) (-0.04) (0.15) 
Size 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.01) (-0.56) (-0.04) (-0.47) 
Collateral 0.014 -0.000 0.018 0.007 
 
(0.99) (-0.01) (1.28) (0.62) 
Blockholders 0.012 0.006 0.013 0.006 
 
(0.84) (0.53) (0.87) (0.51) 
Runup_stock -0.021*** -0.011* -0.020*** -0.011* 
 
(-2.63) (-1.93) (-2.60) (-1.84) 
Sigma_stock -0.460 -0.190 -0.458 -0.173 
 (-1.20) (-0.63) (-1.19) (-0.57) 
Runup_market 0.010 0.005 0.009 0.005 
 (0.90) (0.59) (0.85) (0.58) 
Shareholding_CEO -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(-0.11) (-0.33) (-0.21) (-0.44) 
SOEs -0.012** -0.008** -0.012** -0.008** 
 
(-2.35) (-2.05) (-2.40) (-2.16) 
Experienced -0.014** -0.006 -0.014** -0.006 
 
(-2.12) (-1.10) (-2.11) (-1.10) 
Public_deals 0.019 0.018 0.014 0.017 
 
(0.97) (1.24) (0.72) (1.16) 
Size_ratio 0.074*** 0.050*** 0.075*** 0.051*** 
 
(4.50) (4.02) (4.55) (4.09) 
Unfriendly 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.25) (0.40) (0.24) (0.51) 
Diversifying 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.34) (-0.49) (0.23) (-0.54) 
Completed 0.011** 0.011*** 0.011** 0.011*** 
 
(2.30) (2.94) (2.31) (2.99) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.001 
 
(0.21) (-0.05) (0.22) (0.10) 
N 1,646 1,646 1,646 1,646 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09 
F-value 3.32 3.05 3.32 3.06 
Notes: The table presents results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions for the cumulative abnormal returns in 
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the 3-days (columns 2 and 4) and 5-days event (columns 1 and 3) window. The dependent variable are 
cumulative abnormal returns, which are calculated using the market model with the market model parameters 
estimated over the period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to the deal announcement for different 
day event windows around the announcement (day 0). Payment_cash is a dummy variable that take the value 
of one if the deal was financed mainly through cash (>50%), and 0 otherwise. Cash is the ratio of the sum of 
cash and cash equivalents to total assets. ΔCash is the ratio of the annual change in Cash to total assets. Tobin 
(Q) is the market-to-book ratio. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets. 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Collateral is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Blockholders 
is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder. Runup_stock is cumulative daily stock price 
returns of the bidder over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the announcement date. 
Sigma_stock is the standard deviation of bidding firms’ daily returns over the period beginning 205 days and 
ending 6 days prior to the announcement date. Runup_market is the cumulative daily Shanghai and Shenzhen 
value-weighted stock returns over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the deal 
announcement. Shareholding_CEO is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s CEO is holding 
shares in his/her own company, and 0 otherwise. SOEs is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
is state-owned in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Experienced is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if 
the bidder had announced at least 3 takeover bids over the five years period prior to the deal announcement, 
and 0 otherwise. Public_deals is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the target is a listed firm, and 
0 otherwise. Size_ratio is the ratio of transaction value divided by the bidder’s market value 4 weeks prior to 
the announcement. Unfriendly is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the deal is not defined as 
friendly by Thomson Financial SDC, and 0 otherwise. Diversifying is a dummy variable, which takes the value 
of 1 if the bidder was not in the same industry as the target as measured using the bidder’s and the target’s first 
2-digits of primary SIC code. Completed is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the transactions 
were completed, and 0 otherwise. For all specifications, we use the Heckman’s two-stage approach by 
introducing Inverse Mills Ratio into each regression to take account of the self-selection bias. The t-statistics 
(in parentheses) are based on standard errors, which are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. Time 
dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.9 
Changes in industry-adjusted operating performance 
Panel A: (industry-adjusted ROA, control group of firms based on industry) 
Adjusted-ROA Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only 
 
All Bidders 
Year mean median N mean median N mean median N mean median N 
Year (-2) -0.026 0.016 223 0.027 0.028 764 0.033 0.034 1,425 0.026 0.031 2,412 
Year (-1) 0.005 0.020 210 0.026 0.030 791 0.037 0.036 1,455 0.031 0.033 2,456 
Year (0) 0.005 0.024 187 0.027 0.029 731 0.034 0.033 1,292 0.029 0.031 2,210 
Year (1) 0.029 0.033 158 0.023 0.030 630 0.027 0.032 1,119 0.026 0.031 1,907 
Year (2) 0.040 0.036 109 0.024 0.030 564 0.025 0.030 926 0.026 0.030 1,599 
D(-1/2) 0.035 0.015 
 
-0.001 0.000 
 
-0.012 -0.006 
 
-0.005 -0.003 
 t-test/Sign-ranks 0.04** 0.06* 
 
0.86 0.23 
 
0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
0.12 0.00*** 
 Panel B: ( industry-adjusted CF, control group of firms based on industry) 
Adjusted-CF Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders 
Year mean median N mean median N mean median N mean median N 
Year (-2) -0.052 -0.013 221 -0.003 0.000 760 0.003 0.003 1,415 -0.004 0.001 2,396 
Year (-1) -0.027 -0.008 207 -0.006 0.001 781 0.005 0.004 1,446 -0.002 0.002 2,434 
Year (0) -0.027 -0.008 185 -0.005 0.001 726 0.002 0.002 1,283 -0.003 0.001 2,194 
Year(1) -0.007 -0.003 156 -0.007 0.001 630 -0.004 0.000 1,111 -0.005 0.001 1,897 
Year (2) -0.002 -0.003 107 -0.007 0.000 561 -0.006 0.000 921 -0.006 0.000 1,589 
D(-1/2) 0.025 0.004 
 
-0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.011 -0.004 
 
-0.005 -0.002 
 t-test/Sign-ranks 0.12 0.22 
 
0.67 0.12 
 
0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
0.06*** 0.00*** 
 
Panel C: (performance-adjusted ROA, control group of firms based on size and cash levels) 
Adjusted-ROA Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders 
Year mean median N mean median N mean median N mean median N 
Year (-2) -0.048 -0.007 223 -0.002 0.000 764 0.003 0.002 1425 -0.003 0.000 2412 
Year (-1) -0.024 -0.01 210 -0.005 0.000 791 0.005 0.003 1455 0.000 0.001 2456 
Year (0) -0.024 -0.006 187 -0.004 0.000 731 0.002 0.001 1292 -0.002 0.000 2210 
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Year (1) -0.002 0.003 158 -0.006 0.001 630 -0.004 0.000 1119 -0.004 0.000 1907 
Year (2) 0.007 0.003 109 -0.005 0.000 564 -0.006 -0.001 926 -0.005 0.000 1599 
D(-1/2) 0.031 0.013  0.000 0.000  -0.011 -0.004  -0.005 -0.001  
t-test/Sign-ranks 0.06* 0.08*  0.92 0.42  0.00*** 0.00***  0.17 0.00***  
Panel D: ( performance-adjusted CF, control group of firms based on size and cash levels) 
Adjusted-CF Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders 
Year mean median N mean Year mean median N mean Year mean median 
Year (-2) -0.044 -0.008 221 0.000 0.000 760 0.004 0.000 1415 -0.002 0.000 2396 
Year (-1) -0.022 -0.009 207 -0.003 0.000 781 0.005 0.002 1446 0.000 0.000 2434 
Year (0) -0.023 -0.01 185 -0.003 0.000 726 0.003 0.000 1283 -0.001 0.000 2194 
Year (1) -0.004 0.000 156 -0.005 0.000 630 -0.003 -0.001 1111 -0.003 0.000 1897 
Year (2) 0.001 -0.003 107 -0.004 0.000 561 -0.005 -0.002 921 -0.004 -0.001 1589 
D(-1/2) 0.023 0.006  -0.001 0.000  -0.010 -0.004  -0.004 -0.001  
t-test/Sign-ranks 0.12 0.24  0.68 0.09*  0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00***  
Notes: The table presents annual mean and median values of adjusted return-on-assets (adjusted-ROA) in panels A and C and adjusted cash flow (adjusted-CF) in panels B 
and D, from year -2 to year +2 relative to the year of acquisition. In Panels A and B, adjusted operating performance (industry-adjusted ROA or CF)  is measured by the 
difference between a firm’s ROA (CF) and that of the median firm in the industry in a given year. In Panels C and D, adjusted operating performance (performance-adjusted 
ROA or CF)  is constructed by subtracting the benchmark performance (the median performance of the firms in the same portfolio) from the firm’s operating performance in 
each year, where the benchmark performance is constructed as 25 portfolios on the basis of size (total assets) interacted with the cash ratio (Fama & French 1993). D (-1/2) is 
the change of adjusted operating performance from year -1 to year +2. We provide the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for differences in means and medians of 
adjusted operating performance from year -1 to year +2. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.10 
Regressions of industry-adjusted operating performance 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders 
Panel A: (industry-adjusted ROA, control group of firms based on industry) 
 
ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y 
Intercept -0.002 0.011 -0.008** -0.013** -0.005** -0.014*** -0.005*** -0.010*** 
 
(-0.23) -0.9 (-2.44) (-2.41) (-2.44) (-3.31) (-2.88) (-3.19) 
Premerger_ROA 0.01 0.028 0.202** 0.273*** 0.303*** 0.386*** 0.191*** 0.255*** 
 
-0.12 -0.32 -2.34 -3.92 -5.52 -6.32 -4.48 -5.84 
N 152 102 579 474 1,063 829 1,794 1,405 
Adjusted R
2
 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.06 
F-value 0.01 0.10 5.47 15.33 30.46 39.96 20.06 34.08 
Panel B: (industry-adjusted CF, control group of firms based on industry) 
 
CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y 
Intercept -0.003 0.001 -0.007** -0.014** -0.005** -0.014*** -0.005*** -0.011*** 
 
(-0.44) -0.07 (-2.38) (-2.49) (-2.58) (-3.34) (-3.01) (-3.40) 
Pre-merger_CF 0.008 0.016 0.235*** 0.312*** 0.337*** 0.419*** 0.220*** 0.294*** 
 
-0.09 -0.18 -2.72 -4.36 -6.12 -7.36 -5.16 -6.92 
N 148 96 571 467 1,051 817 1,770 1,380 
Adjusted R
2
 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.08 
F-value 0.01 0.03 7.40 19.05 37.49 54.10 26.59 47.90 
Panel C: (performance-adjusted ROA control group of firms based on size and cash level) 
 
ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y 
Intercept 0.001 0.014 -0.006** -0.012** -0.005** -0.014*** -0.004*** -0.010*** 
 
-0.22 -1.27 (-2.10) (-2.18) (-2.55) (-3.63) (-2.68) (-3.23) 
Pre-merger_ROA 0.006 0.003 0.179** 0.233*** 0.272*** 0.367*** 0.171*** 0.228*** 
 
-0.08 -0.04 -2.19 -3.38 -4.65 -5.49 -4.12 -5.16 
N 152 102 579 474 1,063 829 1,794 1,405 
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Adjusted R
2
 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.05 
F-value 0.01 0.00 4.80 11.44 21.66 30.16 16.94 26.67 
Panel D: (performance-adjusted CF, control group of firms based on size and cash level) 
 
CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y 
Intercept 0 0.007 -0.005* -0.012** -0.005** -0.013*** -0.004** -0.009*** 
 
(-0.02) -0.57 (-1.75) (-2.14) (-2.33) (-3.28) (-2.33) (-3.03) 
Pre-merger_CF 0.01 0.01 0.233*** 0.286*** 0.324*** 0.417*** 0.217*** 0.286*** 
 
-0.12 -0.12 -2.82 -4.13 -5.63 -6.79 -5.15 -6.71 
N 148 96 571 467 1,051 817 1,770 1,380 
Adjusted R2 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.08 
F-value 0.01 0.01 7.94 17.02 31.74 46.17 26.51 45.05 
Notes: The table presents the results of an OLS regression of the effect of bidding on the adjusted operating performance. The dependent variable is the post-merger adjusted 
operating performance of the bidder in year +1 (or from year +1 to year+2). Pre-merger performance is the adjusted operating performance of the bidder in year -1 (or from 
year -2 to year-1). In Panels A and B, adjusted operating performance (industry-adjusted ROA or CF)  is measured by the difference between a firm’s ROA (CF) and that of 
the median firm in the industry in a given year. In Panels C and D, adjusted operating performance (performance-adjusted ROA or CF) is constructed by subtracting the 
benchmark performance (the median performance of the firms in the same portfolio) from the firm’s operating performance in each year, where the benchmark performance 
is constructed as  25 portfolios on the basis of size (total assets) interacted with the cash ratio (Fama & French 1993). The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard 
errors, which are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Fig. 4.1 Acquirer cumulative average abnormal return (-30, +30) 
 
This figure shows the average cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) for the bidding firms in 
the (-30, +30) event window between January 1998 and December 2011, where 0 is the 
announcement. The abnormal returns are calculated as the differences between the realised 
returns and the market model benchmark returns with the parameters estimated over the 
period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to the deal announcement. 
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Fig. 4.2 Acquirer cumulative average abnormal returns (-30, +30) across methods of payment 
 
This figure shows the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAARs)  for the bidding firms in 
the (-30, +30) event window across methods of payment between January 1998 and 
December 2011, where 0 is the announcement. The abnormal returns are calculated as the 
differences between the realised returns and the market model benchmark returns with the 
parameters estimated over the period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to the deal 
announcement. Panel A, B and C report the average acquirer cumulative abnormal returns for 
all stock deals, mixed deals and all cash deals, respectively. 
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5.1. Summary of main findings  
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which firms’ behavior can be 
influenced by their financial status. In particular, we focus on listed Chinese firms’ fixed 
capital investment, cash holdings, and acquisition behavior, which represent three key 
corporate activities. Our study contributes to the related literature in the Chinese context by 
employing a panel of Chinese listed firms during the period 1998-2011.   
 
5.1.1. Chapter 2 
In chapter 2, we study for the first time the extent to which investment inefficiency, which 
takes the form of under- and over- investment (i.e. abnormal investment) can be induced by 
financial constraints, agency problems, or a combination of both. Instead of using 
sensitivities of investment to cash flow, we focus on the relationship between abnormal 
investment and free cash flow. We find strong evidence of investment being positively and 
significantly associated with free cash flow for under-investing firms with negative free cash 
flow. This is consistent with the financing constraints hypothesis. We also find a significantly 
positive association between investment and free cash flow for over-investing firms with 
positive free cash flow, which is consistent with the agency costs hypothesis. These findings 
are important as they enable us to distinguish the financing constraints and agency problems 
arguments, which are both likely to play an important role in the Chinese context.  
 We also find a clear declining trend of the sensitivities of under-investment to free 
cash flow with firm size and their dividend payout ratios. This suggests that various 
conventional variables like firm size and the dividend payout ratio (policy) can be used to 
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assess the degree of financial constraints faced by Chinese firms. We therefore argue that 
small firms and firms who cannot pay dividends are more susceptible to capital market 
imperfections.  
We find lower sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow for firms with 
managerial ownership and a higher intensity of competition between controlling 
shareholders. This can be explained by the closely aligned interests between managers and 
shareholders and the more efficient monitoring of controlling shareholders, which both 
reduce the agency problems faced by Chinese firms. We also document that the relationship 
between blockholder ownership and agency costs is not linear, which is probably due to the 
offsetting effects of incentive alignment and entrenchment.  
Furthermore, we find that higher sensitivities of under-investment to free cash flow 
are observed for firms with “Special Treatment” (“ST”) status. This implies that “ST” firms 
generally face higher credit constraints, especially once the “ST” status is announced. 
Moreover, “ST” firms display higher sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow, 
suggesting they are also more likely to face higher agency costs. However, after being given 
“ST” status, under the pressures of being de-listed from the stock exchanges, these firms 
exhibit significantly reduced agency costs, given by lower sensitivities of over-investment to 
free cash flow. Additionally, we demonstrate that frequent bidders tend to display higher 
sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow, due to higher agency problems related to 
hubris or entrenchment of managers or controlling shareholders.  
We further extend our analysis to look at the effects of ownership structure. We find 
that non-SOEs appear to be more financially constrained than their state-owned counterparts, 
probably due to a “crowding out” effect. On the contrary, state-owned firms (and in particular 
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those affiliated with local governments, SOELGs) face higher agency problems, which may 
be due to less effective management, supervision, and legal enforcement. We also find that 
Chinese listed companies are able to alleviate their financial constraints by engaging in 
exporting. 
Finally, using a difference-in-differences (DID) method to circumvent endogeneity 
issues, we find that the 2005 exogenous split share structure reform affected local-
government-controlled enterprises (SOELGs) more than other firms, by reducing their 
agency problems. There is in fact evidence of shrinking sensitivities of over-investment to 
free cash flow after 2005 for SOELGs.  
 
5.1.2. Chapter 3 
In chapter 3, we investigate the extent to which the behavior of corporate cash holdings can 
be explained by the presence of adjustment costs. We provide support for the trade-off view 
of cash holdings, according to which Chinese firms tend to actively adjust their cash reserves 
towards an optimal level. However, given the impact of adjustment costs on cash policy, it is 
clear that this adjustment is imperfect but continuous. On average, the annual adjustment 
speed of Chinese firms lies between 0.331 and 0.580. In other words, the typical Chinese 
listed firm completes half of its required cash adjustment in a period between 1.2 and 2.1 
years. This suggests that Chinese firms rebalance their cash holdings more slowly than firms 
from the West, which is probably due to relatively higher adjustment costs.  
Second, we use a dynamic framework to provide insights into the cross-sectional 
variation in firms’ speeds of adjustment. Specifically, when firms face a cash deficit, it takes 
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longer for them to rebalance their cash levels, as they confront higher costs of adjustment. In 
addition, our results show that firms are able to increase their speeds of cash adjustment by 
actively managing their cash balances through investment, dividend payments, and debt 
issuance.  
Next, we find that although firms benefit from greater cash balances, the marginal 
value of cash holdings drops when the level of cash holdings increases. The results in this 
chapter also suggest that the marginal value of cash is lower for firms making acquisitions in 
the next year and firms who are controlled by the state. Finally, our results show a stronger 
association between cash holdings and value for financially constrained firms than 
unconstrained firms. This implies that additional cash is more valuable for constrained firms, 
since cash accumulation can prevent them from bypassing value-increasing projects.  
 
5.1.3. Chapter 4 
In chapter 4, we investigate the extent to which corporate liquidity conditions affect Chinese 
firms’ takeover engagement, method of payment, and the performance that follows the 
takeover. We find that cash-richness is an important factor driving acquisitions in the Chinese 
context. This is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen 1986). Furthermore, our 
results also show that firms characterized by a high Tobin’s Q and greater operating 
performance (ROA) appear to be less likely to engage in acquisitions, suggesting that these 
firms do not rely on external investment like M&As to spend their excess cash. Put together, 
acquisitions can therefore be seen as a method used by Chinese firms to spend excess cash 
instead of paying it out to shareholders.  
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In this chapter, we also find significant sensitivities of engagement in takeover 
activities to excess cash for firms that are subject to tunneling. This implies that tunneling is 
likely to amplify free-cash-flow-driven takeovers. Namely, Chinese firms tend to use M&As 
as a channel to expropriate cash through tunneling.  
We further investigate whether liquidity conditions are responsible for the method of 
payment in acquisitions. We show that firms with greater growth prospects, reflected by a 
higher Tobin’s Q, are less likely to use cash payments in acquisitions. This effect tends to be 
magnified with the level of financial constraints that firms face. We argue that cash is more 
valuable for constrained bidders, especially those with valuable growth opportunities, which 
is in line with the opportunity cost of cash hypothesis (Alshwer et al. 2011). In addition, 
capital market imperfections cause firms with higher investment opportunities to hesitate to 
spend cash in takeover transactions.  
Finally, we find that cash acquisitions under-perform in both the short- and long-term. 
We suggest that given the lower opportunity costs of cash holding, cash acquisitions do not 
make better use of excess cash, and consequently display worse announcement abnormal 
returns and operating performance following mergers compared to stock acquisitions. Thus, 
the underperformance of cash acquisition once again confirms the opportunity cost of cash 
hypothesis. 
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5.2. Policy and managerial implications  
First of all, the findings in this thesis suggest that financial conditions play a crucial role on 
Chinese firms’ investment, cash holdings, and acquisition behavior. Due to the relatively 
under-developed financial system, asymmetric information and the “political pecking 
order” 184 , non-SOEs or small firms are more likely to face higher levels of financial 
constraints than their state-owned counterparts, which may lead to under-investment. Thus, 
considering that private firms have been the growth engine of China over last 30 years, a 
more effective capital market including banking, equity finance, intermediation sectors and 
an effective credit-rating system should be established to allocate financial resources in a 
more productive or market-based way. Some necessary reforms should be implemented to 
reduce the degree of political intervention in banks’ lending decisions and improve market 
discipline. In addition, given the greater marginal value of cash shown by small and private 
firms, our estimates suggest that these firms should be encouraged to hold sufficient cash to 
offset the negative shocks to the availability of cash flow, bank loans or equity issues through 
their management of liquidity. This strategy would enable them to avoid the cost premium 
they would have to pay in the imperfect capital markets. Policies aimed at reducing the costs 
of liquidity would therefore benefit the economy. 
Second, this study suggests that the existing unique concentrated and state-owned 
ownership structure and weak corporate governance in China lead managers and/or 
controlling shareholders to over-invest their free cash flow in projects with negative NPV. 
This effect of free cash flow is more severe for SOEs (especially those affiliated with local 
                                                          
    
184
 State-owned firms in China are favoured by domestic banks and typically experience soft budget 
constraints due to social and political reasons.  In contrast, given a relatively low political status, Chinese private 
firms find it difficult to obtain loans from banks. Thus, these firms are more subject to financing constraints than 
their state-owned counterparts.  
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governments) and firms with weak corporate governance, e.g. firms characterized by a 
divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights, and firms with low levels of 
managerial ownership, and without competition within large shareholders. The effect is also 
magnified by the expropriation of minority shareholders (tunneling), which may cause 
Chinese cash-rich firms to use their excess liquid assets to pursue value-destroying mergers 
and acquisitions. Therefore, in order to promote firms’ investment efficiency, it is important 
to further reduce state ownership and to decrease the divergence between voting (control) 
rights and cash flow rights. What is also needed is more transparency in firms’ disclosure, 
especially for administrative transfers and connected transactions; as well as a more effective 
supervision and monitoring from investors and financial institutions; an improved legal 
protection for minority shareholders; a more sophisticated regulation of corporate profit 
distribution; and a more market-based managerial compensation scheme.  Last but not least, 
our study confirms the benefit of some regulations and reforms made by the Chinese 
government, such as the “special treatment” policy and the split share structure reform.  
  
Chapter 5                            Conclusions, implications and suggestions for future research 
289 
 
5.3. Suggestions for future research   
In chapter 2, we construct under- and over-investment as in Richardson (2006),  simply using 
an accounting method. One could either attempt to use other economic models to produce 
estimates of optimal investment, or to incorporate forward looking variables or variables 
measuring risk in the investment equation.  In addition, we use the 2005 split share reform as 
an exogenous shock to undertake a difference-in-differences (DID) study. We find that SOEs 
affiliated with local governments (SOELGs) benefit from the reform, as they exhibit a 
reduction in agency costs. Further research could look at how exactly SOELGs strengthened 
their corporate governance via the reform.  
In chapter 3, we find strong empirical support for cash rebalancing due to adjustment 
costs. It would be interesting to further examine the effects of cash holdings on fixed 
investment or firm growth. In addition, there are some relevant questions that we do not 
address in this chapter. For instance, there are a number of papers suggesting that corporate 
governance plays an important role in determining cash holdings of western firms (Dittmar et 
al. 2003; Ozkan & Ozkan 2004; Harford et al. 2008). A study regarding this issue in the 
Chinese context may be fruitful. Moreover, our work does not fully explain the reason of the 
dramatic increase in the average cash holdings of our firms over the sample period. We 
believe this evolution could be attributed to changes in firm characteristics and their business 
environment. This is on the agenda for future research. 
In chapter 4, we find that there is a relationship between Chinese bidders’ corporate 
liquidity and acquisition. Results can be extended to consider a study of targets. In addition, 
there has been an increasing trend of acquisitions abroad for Chinese firms. Further research 
could investigate whether liquidity has a significant influence on Chinese cross-border 
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acquisitions.   
Last, this thesis only focuses on Chinese listed firms. However, there is a large 
difference in firms’ investment, financing, governance, and management strategies between 
listed firms and unlisted firms. Prior studies suggest that unlisted firms may suffer more from 
liquidity constraints (Allen et al. 2005). It is hoped that future research will provide an insight 
into liquidity management for unlisted firms and enhance our understating of China’s growth 
miracle despite a malfunctioning financial system.   
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